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Abstract
As requested by the European Commission, the EFSA Panel on Plant Health (PLH) Panel assessed the
risk of Diaporthe vaccinii in the EU, focusing on entry, establishment, spread and impacts on cultivated
and wild Vaccinium species, the principal hosts being American and European cranberry and blueberry.
Several outbreaks occurred in the EU since 1956, but most were eradicated except in Latvia. The
Panel considered entry via fruits and plants for planting. The risk of establishment from discarded
infected berries is much lower than from infected plants for planting, of which, potted plants and
cuttings pose the greatest risk, while plug plants, derived from tissue culture and grown in pest free
structures, pose a low risk. Nine per cent of the EU is highly suitable for establishment of the
pathogen, mostly in the SE and NE. Following establishment, the pathogen could spread naturally over
short range, and by human assistance over long range. Calculations with an integrated model for
entry, establishment and spread, indicate that with current regulations, over a period of 5 years, a few
hundred cultivated Vaccinium plants and several thousand Vaccinium plants in natural ecosystems
would contract the disease. The associated loss of commercial production is small, less than one tonne
of berries per year. On natural vegetation, the median impact after 5 years was estimated to be
negligible affecting a negligible proportion of the natural Vaccinium population (2 9 10!8). However,
the uncertainty of this estimate was high, due to uncertainty about the rate of spread; in a worst-case
scenario (99th percentile), almost 1% of plants in natural areas would become infected. Complete
deregulation (scenario A1) was predicted to increase the impact substantially, especially in natural
areas, while additional measures (scenario A2) would effectively eliminate the entry of infected plants
for planting, further reducing the impacts below the current situation.
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Summary
Request – Following a request from the European Commission, the EFSA Panel on Plant Health
(PLH) Panel performed a risk assessment for Diaporthe vaccinii (fungal disease) in the European Union
(EU) focusing on the risk of entry and establishment, the spread from established outbreaks, and the
potential impacts considering the host range. The principal hosts of Diaporthe vaccinii are American
and European cranberries (Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos), highbush blueberry
(Vaccinium corymbosum), lowbush blueberry (Vaccinium angustifolium) and rabbiteye blueberry
(Vaccinium ashei), but the host range is thought to include all Vaccinium species. Several outbreaks
have been recorded in the EU since 1956, but most of them were eradicated. Latvia in the only EU
country where the pathogen is currently ofﬁcially present. D. vaccinii is also present in parts of the
USA, Canada, Chile and China, and possibly in Belarus and Russia where the presence of the pathogen
has not been conﬁrmed by molecular techniques, viz. DNA sequencing.
The Panel interpreted the Terms of Reference as a request to conduct a full Pest Risk Assessment
(PRA) with the aim to develop risk reduction options (RROs) on the basis of the pathways of entry and
spread identiﬁed in the recent Pest Categorisation (EFSA PLH Panel, 2014), namely human-assisted
and natural means, including infected symptomatic or asymptomatic Vaccinium plants for planting
intended for commercial berry production or for domestic use in home and garden, infected or
contaminated berries for consumption, as well as rain and wind-dispersed spores, contaminated
irrigation water, or vectoring by animals.
Data and methodology – The literature search followed the strategy described in the pest
categorisation for the retrieval of additional relevant papers besides those listed in the pest
categorisation. In particular, refereed publications on ‘Diaporthe or Phomopsis’ combined with
‘Vaccinium’ were searched in the Web of Science. DNA sequences for recent identiﬁcations of D.
vaccinii worldwide were obtained from GenBank (2010–2016). Research reports and extension
publications on blueberry and cranberry diseases were obtained through searches in Google. Literature
on Phomopsis (or Diaporthe) vaccinii in the Russian language was also obtained through Google and
translated into English by EFSA staff. In addition, a recent paper on the potential distribution of
Vaccinium twig blight in Europe based on the current global distribution and global long-term climate
data was used for the delineation of the potential establishment area. Epidemiological data for the
prediction of natural spread of the pathogen was not available for D. vaccinii, and data on other
Phomopsis species and other fungi were used for this purpose.
Quantitative information on blueberry and cranberry production, interception of Vaccinium plants or
fruits, and ﬁndings of D. vaccinii used for the PRA was deduced from websites of EUROPHYT, EPPO,
ISEFOR, EUROSTAT, FAOSTAT and JRC. Moreover, Member States were consulted about survey data
collected in 2016, and selected berry producers and nurseries were consulted about the origin of their
plants. Finally, quantitative information on the export of Vaccinium plants from the USA was obtained
through several State Certiﬁcation Agencies (USDA-APHIS, 2017).
A map of natural Vaccinium vegetation was made on the basis of the following data sets: (1) Maps
of realised distributions of Vaccinium myrtillus and Vaccinium vitis-idea at 10 9 10 km resolution; (2)
Corine Land Cover data.
Quantitative data on the diseases caused by D. vaccinii and their impact on yield were obtained
primarily from Plant Disease Management Reports of the American Phytopathological Society and
research reports from the Ministry of Agriculture in Canada. However, most of the data needed for the
quantitative estimations presented here were not available in the literature or on websites. Expert
judgement was thus used in many cases. The quantitative estimations provided by the experts should
be taken with caution as different experts might provide different ﬁgures in such a situation of scant
evidence.
Assessment – The quantitative risk assessment template, currently developed by the EFSA PLH
Panel, was followed. The assessment model is presented by means of ﬂow charts in the main text, and
detailed formulas and speciﬁcation and quantitative assessment of parameter values in Appendix A.
Uncertainties associated with trade data and model parameters were identiﬁed and analysed with
regard to their impact on the ﬁnal assessment outcome in line with the Draft Guidance on Uncertainty
(EFSA Scientiﬁc Committee, 2016).
The assessment was based on a quantitative model that distinguished six main pathways of entry
two categories of berry fruit and four categories of plants for planting, three scenarios for RROs, and
four EU regions for the assessment of the probability of establishment and the rate of spread in
nurseries, production and natural areas.
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The three scenarios for the use of RROs are:
A0 scenario, which describes the current situation in the RA area with respect to the EU legislation
(Council Directive 2000/29/EC1) on the pathogen and its host.
A1 scenario, which describes the situation where D. vaccinii is deregulated
A2 scenario, which describes the current situation but with the application of additional RROs. In
this scenario, the application of a combination of the most effective RROs is considered.
The risk of new introductions of D. vaccinii into the RA area by means of the main pathways for entry
(i.e. berry fruits, plants for planting) is relatively high, but the probability of establishment is low. For the
blueberry fruit pathway, the estimated number of infected fruit entering the EU (median, A0 scenario), is
in the order of 200,000/year, but the probability of establishment of the pathogen from an infected berry
is very small. Factors contributing to a low probability of establishment are a low probability of spore
production on infected berries as D. vaccinii may be outcompleted by other microbes, while berries are
eaten by animals, buried or destroyed, and a low probability of transfer of spores to new hosts due a low
probability of encounter with hosts following spore ﬂight. Establishment was thus calculated to be in the
order of only a few infected plants/year, and often in conditions from which further spread is unlikely.
Despite the fact that the estimated number of infected berries entering the EU (mainly from the USA) is
quite large, the number of established populations associated to this pathway was thus estimated to be
quite small and highly uncertain; uncertain with a 50% interval ranging from close to zero (0.45) to 10.
With less than 10 infected plants established per year (median, A0 scenario) from infected plants
for planting, the overall risk of establishment in the form of local disease outbreaks is limited, despite
uncertainty is much lower compared to the berry pathways (from 0.3 to less than 100 infected
plants – 50% intervals). In contrast, under the A1 scenario (deregulation), the median number of
new established populations was predicted to be substantially higher (approximately by a factor of
15). Blueberry potted plants and cranberry cuttings were the most relevant pathways.
In scenario A2, an additional RRO for reducing the risk of entry was assessed, which was to restrict trade
in plants for planting so that plants could be traded only from pest-free areas or in areas where D. vaccinii is
present, only trade in plug plants derived from tissue culture and grown in D. vaccinii-free enclosed
structures would be permitted (i.e. this excludes potted plants and cuttings from ﬁeld grown plants in pest-
affected areas). Scenario A2 was predicted to result in almost no newly established infections.
The establishment model integrated two aspects: (a) distribution of the import of infected fruit
and plants for planting (P4P) over EU countries in four main EU regions (north-west (NW), north-east
(NE), south-west (SW) and south-east (SE)), and (b) establishment in production areas within those
regions based on suitability of the climate for D. vaccinii and in natural areas based on both climate
suitability and prevalence of Vaccinium in the EU region. The distribution of the import of blueberry
and cranberry fruit, and consequently, the number of wasted fruits, was based on the import data: the
NW region accounted for 52% and 93% of the import of blueberry and cranberry, respectively,
followed by NE (26% and 4%), SW (22% and 3%) and SE with negligible values. The distribution of
the import of blueberry and cranberry P4P was based on the scale of cultivated areas in each region
combined with knowledge about import distributions in 2016: SW accounted for 56 and 50% of
blueberry and cranberry, respectively, followed by NE (23 and 50%), NW (20% blueberry and
negligible values for cranberry), while SE had very low values for both species. The climate suitability
ranged from a minimum of 0.63 for the NW to a maximum of 0.86 for the SE.
The established plants with D. vaccinii infection were the starting point for predicted spread within
the EU. D. vaccinii can spread by the asexually produced conidia, the sexually produced ascospores,
droppings of birds that have eaten infected berries, movement of infected berries, and movement of
infected plants or cuttings to new production sites. Transfer from imported berry waste to Vaccinium
plants can take place in home gardens, production ﬁelds or natural areas. Transfer from imported P4P
can take place in nurseries or production ﬁelds. Five ecological compartments were distinguished when
assessing spread: nurseries, production ﬁelds, garden centres, home gardens, and natural areas. Flows
of infection between these compartments were assessed, considering four regions in the EU (NW, NE,
SW and SE) as separate entities, and not considering spread between those regions. Within each
region, the rate of spread of the disease between compartments was assessed and calculated. The
inﬂow of infection from outside the EU through entry and establishment was incorporated in this model
as was the inﬂuence of climate on spread through its effect on establishment.
1 Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms
harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community. OJ L 169, 10.7.2000, p. 1–112.
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The natural spread is mostly by rain-splashed conidia affecting new plants within only 1–10 m from the
original source. Therefore, although conidia are important to intensify or establish an infection at a site, the
role of conidia contributes to spread over only short distances estimated at most to be 10–100 m extension
per focus per year. The possible spread by birds was not considered because of the high uncertainty and
the lack of quantitative evidence. The formation of sexual fruiting bodies in areas where D. vaccinii is
present (Latvia and possibly Belarus and Russia) is thought to be very rare and has not been conﬁrmed by
molecular techniques. Therefore, longer distance natural spread by ascospores was not considered.
The key factor in the spread is the rate of spread in natural areas due to natural mechanisms. Over
extended time (decades of years), the disease is expected to be able to spread substantially, but in the
shorter term (few years) spread is rather limited. Calculations indicate that with current regulations,
over a period of 5 years, a few hundred (from 99 to 608 infected plants – 50% intervals) cultivated
Vaccinium plants would contract the disease as a result of entry into the EU territory, followed by
establishment and spread, and several thousand (this estimate has high uncertainty: from less than
120 to 430,000 infected plants for the 50% intervals) Vaccinium plants in natural ecosystems. Stricter
regulation would reduce entry to a level at which further spread would be negligible, while
deregulation is expected to increase levels of spread by a factor 10–100.
The assessment of the expected impact was based on the potential establishment in nurseries,
commercial blueberry and cranberry production areas and natural habitats combined with the actual
impact observed in areas in the USA and Canada where D. vaccinii is endemic. Concepts were
developed for a fully quantitative impact model, but the model was not implemented due to shortage
of time and human resources. Instead, an assessment of impact was made by combining the
information on spread with the severity of the impact at the level of the individual plant. In serious
cases, individual Vaccinium plants can have 30% of their branches infected with the pathogen,
resulting in 30% loss of berry yield as infected branches do not carry fruit.
Following this methodology, the loss of production in production areas was estimated to be very
small, less than one ton of berries per year across the whole EU territory. On natural vegetation, the
median impact (considering uncertainty) after 5 years was estimated to be negligible, affecting a
negligible fraction of plants (2 9 10!8) in natural areas. However, the uncertainty of this estimate was
high due to uncertainty about the rate of spread and the exponential rate of spread; in a worst case
scenario (99th percentile) almost 1% of plants in natural areas would become infected. Complete
deregulation (scenario A1) was predicted to increase the impact signiﬁcantly, especially in natural
areas, while additional measures (scenario A2) would effectively eliminate the entry of infected plants
for planting, further reducing the impacts below the current situation.
Conclusions – The Panel concluded that the risk of entry of D. vaccinii is moderate and all the
pathways considered can contribute to the introduction of infected material into the EU territory. In
numeric terms, blueberry and cranberry fruits represents by far the largest quantity of infected
material entering EU, followed by blueberry potted plants and cranberry cuttings, while the number of
infected blueberry and cranberry plugs is very small.
However, as the probability of establishment from the berries pathway is low and very uncertain,
blueberry potted plants and cranberry cuttings (very limited in number) are considered to make the
most relevant contribution to the risk of establishment of the disease in the EU territory. The
probability of establishment is also affected by climate suitability and by the distribution of the infected
material entering the EU territory. Using the model, the highest numbers of established founder plants
were predicted to be in the NE and SW part of EU.
The spread is affected by the distribution of the infected founder plants and by habitat suitability. The
pathway most likely to introduce D. vaccinii into the EU is the import of potted highbush blueberry plants
for planting from third countries where D. vaccinii occurs. Model results indicated that it is likely that
most years at least one infected plant arrives in the EU; on average between one and a few tens of
infected plants are likely to enter. The number of established infected plants in the EU range from 1 every
three years (0.339/year for the 1st percentile) up to more than 500 per year for the 99th percentile.
The results for the deregulation scenario (A1) show that the current measures (scenario A0) are
effective in reducing the probability of introduction of the pathogen. However, due to the possibility of the
introduction of the pathogen with asymptomatic plants, there is nevertheless a low risk of introduction.
The proposed strengthened measures (scenario A2) aim at improved requirements for plants for
planting from infected areas (limited to plug plants derived from tissue culture and grown in
D. vaccinii-free enclosed structures). These measures were predicted to reduce the risk of introduction
and establishment to a negligible level.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
The European Commission requested the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), pursuant to
Article 22(5.b) and Article 29(1) of Regulation (EC) No 178/20022, requested from EFSA, as a follow
up to the request of 29 March 2014 (Ares(2014)970361) and the pest categorisations (step I)
delivered in the meantime, to complete the pest risk assessment (PRA), to identify risk reduction
options and to provide an assessment of the effectiveness of current EU phytosanitary requirements
(step 2) for (1) Ceratocystis platani (Walter) Engelbrecht et Harrington, (2) Cryphonectria parasitica
(Murrill) Barr, (3) Diaporthe vaccinii Shear, (4) Ditylenchus destructor Thome, (5) Eotetranychus lewisi
(McGregor), (6) Grapevine Flavescence doree and (7) Radopholus similis (Cobb) Thome.
The current opinion answers the request for a PRA for Diaporthe vaccinii Shear. Based on the pest
categorisation for D. vaccinii (EFSA, 2014), the European Commission proposed the Terms of
Reference (ToR) for the risk assessment of D. vaccinii (see Section 1.2.1).
1.1.1. Recommendation of the working group on the annexes of the Council
Directive 2000/29/EC – Section II- Listing of harmful organisms as
regards the future listing of Diaporthe vaccinii
1.1.1.1. Current regulatory status
Diaporthe vaccinii is listed in the Annex II A I of Directive 2000/29/EC1 for plants of Vaccinium spp.,
intended for planting, other than seeds. Speciﬁc requirements on the import of fruits of the host plant
are listed in Annex VBI of Directive 2000/29/EC1. There are some generic requirements on trees and
shrubs, which relate also to Vaccinium, in Annex IVA I No 39 and No 40, without any speciﬁc
reference to D. vaccinii. The host plants are also regulated under Marketing Directive 2008/90/EC.3
1.1.1.2. Identity of the pest
The identity of D. vaccinii is clearly deﬁned. However, identiﬁcation of the pest is complex as
several other fungal species cause symptoms similar to those caused by D. vaccinii. Species of the
genus Phomopsis with similar cultural and morphological characteristics have also been reported on
Vaccinium spp. Guidance on diagnosis is provided by the EPPO Standard PM 7/86(1) (EPPO, 2009).
1.1.1.3. Distribution of the pest
Within the EU territory, D. vaccinii is present in Latvia. The pest status in the Netherlands is
ofﬁcially declared as transient, under surveillance. Several countries (Germany, Lithuania, Romania,
Poland and the UK) have reported ﬁndings of this fungus which were subsequently eradicated. Outside
the EU, the pest is present in North America (Canada and 12 States of the USA) and in Chile. The
pathogen has also been identiﬁed using DNA sequencing in China (QingHua et al., 2015), but has not
been included in the EPPO data base.
1.1.1.4. Potential for establishment and spread in the PRA area
EFSA pest categorisation concludes that suitable climatic conditions for D. vaccinii are present in
several Member States (MSs) and the organism can be spread by natural and human-assisted means.
In particular, the movement of contaminated but symptomless plants for planting is identiﬁed as a
major pathway. Moreover, the pathogen has the potential to cause environmental consequences in the
risk assessment area by unintentional spread to native plants offsite. Chemical treatments are possible.
1.1.1.5. Potential for consequences in the PRA area
The information available on damage potential of D. vaccinii on Vaccinium spp. crops in the EU is
very limited. Moreover, there are no data on the potential impact on bilberry (Vaccinium myrtillus), as
bilberry does not occur in areas where D. vaccinii originated from. The overall impact of the organism
2 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in
matters of food safety. OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1–24.
3 Commission Implementing Directive 2014/97/EU of 15 October 2014 implementing Council Directive 2008/90/EC as regards the
registration of suppliers and of varieties and the common list of varieties. OJ L 298, 16.10.2014, p. 16–21.
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in the EU territory has so far been very low but, it is difﬁcult to make a longer-term assessment
because of all the uncertainties.
1.1.1.6. Recommendation
Based on the information submitted by EFSA in the pest categorisation, D. vaccinii does not have the
potential to be classiﬁed as quarantine pest as it does not fulﬁl one of the pest categorisation criteria
deﬁned in ISPM 11 (FAO, 2013) (having a severe impact). However, the Working Group highlights that
the pest categorisation presents several uncertainties and data gaps as regards the real
distribution of the pathogen and its host plants in the EU, as well as uncertainties on the
observed impact of the pest both in the EU and in non-EU countries. At the same time,
difﬁculties exist concerning the interpretation of data because of the possible confusion of this organism
with other species in older literature. The impact is usually reported as the result of several species.
At the same time, there are no scientiﬁc arguments to prove that effects on native plants,
biodiversity and ecosystems would be low. As regards the impact on cultivated plants, current
data from non-EU countries has not been fully considered. The Working Group considers that there are
several publications available from Universities and Organisations providing extension services in North
America which emphasise the economic importance of this organism. However, further details are not
available.
Given the level of uncertainly presented above, the Working Group recommends to keep this
organism as Union Quarantine Pest.
If further information is available and the data gap can be addressed, the Working Group
recommends that EFSA prepares full Pest Risk Analysis in order to provide, for the main pathways
(natural and human assistance means, including host plants for planting), further elements in
terms of risk reduction options, on which relevant measures can be taken.
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
1.2.1. Pest categorisation
Information provided in the pest categorisation on D. vaccinii4 is not repeated here. Here, an update
of the current distribution is given. The pathogen is widely referred to its anamorphic state P. vaccinii,
which is currently ofﬁcially present in Latvia only (EPPO Global Database, https://gd.eppo.int/). Until
recently, it was also identiﬁed in Lithuania, Poland and the Netherlands (Gabler et al., 2004; Ka#cergius
and Jovai#sien _e, 2010; NPPO 2013, 2015; Lombard et al., 2014; EPPO 2015; Vilka and Volkova, 2015;
Michalecka et al., 2017). The pathogen might be also present in Belarus (Galynskaya and Liaguskiy,
2012) and Russia (Dokukina, 2001), although proper identiﬁcation using DNA technology has not been
carried out on the D. vaccinii isolates obtained in these countries. Moreover, the colony morphology and
spore dimensions provided in one report from Belarus (Galynskaya et al., 2011) did not correspond to
those of D. vaccinii (Lorenzo Lombard, Hearing Expert on November 25, 2016). Many different Diaporthe
species can be easily confused with D. vaccinii, and DNA sequence analyses of the ITS region and
elongation factor 1-alpha (but preferably four different gene regions) are needed for proper identiﬁcation
(Udayanga et al., 2011, 2014; Lombard et al., 2014; Moore, 2016). In a small survey of commercial and
wild Vaccinium species in Europe, Diaporthe eres seemed to be quite common, while Diaporthe viticola
and two new species were also found (Lorenzo Lombard, Hearing Expert, November 25, 2016). A survey
in the UK revealed the presence of Phomopsis viticola, Phomopsis eres and Phomopsis theicola, but not
of D. vaccinii (Moore, 2016).
1.2.2. Interpretation of ToR and recommendations
The Panel interprets the ToR as a request to conduct a full PRA with the aim to develop risk reduction
options on the basis of the pathways of spreading identiﬁed in the recent Pest Categorisation (EFSA PLH
Panel, 2014), namely human-assisted and natural means, including infected or contaminated
symptomatic or asymptomatic Vaccinium plants for planting intended for commercial berry production,
infected Vaccinium plants for domestic use in home and garden, infected or contaminated berries for
consumption, as well as rain splash, wind-driven rain, irrigation water and animals.
4 Scientiﬁc basis for the recommendation: EFSA PLH Panel (2014). Scientiﬁc Opinion on the pest categorisation of Diaporthe
vaccinii Shear. EFSA Journal 2014:12(7):3774. 28 pp. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2014.3774. http://www.elsa.europa.eu/en/
efsajournal/doc/3774.pdf
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Questions about the ToR and the proposed scenarios were communicated by the Panel to the
European Commission on 11/10/2016, and an answer was received on 25/10/2016. In summary, the
European Commission would like EFSA to explore all possible scenarios: assessment of current situation
(A0), deregulation (A1) and taking reinforced measures (A2) (see Section 2.3.1). All possible pathways
should be considered, including natural spread from eastern Europe. The economic impact on cultivated
plants and effects on native plants, biodiversity and ecosystems should get special attention (Table 1).
2. Data and methodologies
2.1. Pilot phase
EFSA recommends that efforts should be made to work towards more quantitative expression of
both risk and uncertainty whenever possible (EFSA Scientiﬁc Committee, 2012), i.e. where possible,
the expression of the probability of the negative effect and the consequences of the effect should be
reported quantitatively.
The method used in this assessment seeks to address the call for increased quantitative reporting of
risk. The ﬁrst iteration of the method was applied to four case study pests (EFSA PLH Panel, 2016a–d).
Feedback from users has been taken into account to reﬁne the method and the revised method is being
used in a further series of tests on four more pilot case studies. This is one of these second phase pilot
studies. Following feedback received from the second series of pilot case studies, it is anticipated that
further reﬁnements may be made to the method before it is published in 2018 as a new guidance
document for the EFSA PLH Panel (Gilioli et al., 2017).
2.2. Data
The literature search followed the strategy described in the pest categorisation for the retrieval of
additional relevant papers besides those listed in the pest categorisation (EFSA PLH Panel, 2014). In
particular, refereed publications on ‘Diaporthe or Phomopsis’ combined with ‘Vaccinium’ were searched
in the Web of Science. DNA sequences for recent identiﬁcations of D. vaccinii worldwide were obtained
from GenBank (2010–2016). Research reports and extension publications on blueberry and cranberry
diseases were obtained through searches in Google. Literature on Phomopsis (or Diaporthe) vaccinii in
the Russian language was also obtained through Google and translated into English by EFSA staff. In
addition, a recent paper on the potential distribution of Vaccinium twig blight in Europe based on the
current global distribution and global long-term climate data (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017) was used
for the delineation of the potential establishment area. Biogeographic information on the distribution of
Vaccinium species in the EU was obtained from several forestry books and speciﬁc websites found
through Google. Epidemiological data for the prediction of natural spread of the pathogen was not
available for D. vaccinii, and data on other Phomopsis species were used for this purpose. The content
of all these publications was considered in the risk assessment wherever relevant.
Quantitative information on blueberry and cranberry production, interception of Vaccinium plants
or fruits, and ﬁndings of D. vaccinii used for the PRA was deduced from websites of EUROPHYT
(https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity/europhyt_en), EPPO (Global Database
(EPPO, online)), PQR (online), ISEFOR trade data (Increasing Sustainability of European Forests),
EUROSTAT (online), FAOSTAT (online) and JRC (https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en). Moreover, MSs were
consulted about survey data collected in 2016, and selected berry producers and nurseries were
consulted about the origin and destination of their plants. Finally, quantitative information on export of
Table 1: Details on TOR, European Commission recommendations and Panel interpretation
TOR questions in EC recommendation
Panel interpretation and reference to
section
The real distribution of the pathogen in the EU Survey information from member states
The real distribution of the host plants in the EU Establishment section
Observed impact of the pathogen (including the aspect of
confusion with other species)
Impact section
Impact on native plants and ecosystems Limited/no information available, not assessed
Impact on cultivated plants Impact section
Risk assessment and analysis of risk reduction options Three scenarios were assessed
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Vaccinium plants from the USA was obtained through several State Certiﬁcation Agencies (USDA-
APHIS, 2017). Further details on the databases and data used in this PRA are provided in Table 2.
A map of natural Vaccinium vegetation was made on the basis of the following data sets: (1) Maps
of realised distributions of Vaccinium myrtillus and Vaccinium vitis-idea (Meusel et al., 1978; recompiled
by Erik Welk) at 10 9 10 km resolution; (2) Corine Land Cover data (EEA, 2014). The general, large
scale distribution of the two species was obtained using a Species Distribution Model (SDM) based on
the coordinates of collected specimen (GBIF and other databases) and macroclimatic data at 10 9 10
arc min resolution. The reﬁnement of the distribution was based on land cover data, assuming that
natural Vaccinium spp. could be present only within the areas classiﬁed, at ﬁrst hierarchical level of
Corine Land Cover, in groups three (forest and seminatural areas) and four (wetlands). The area of
natural Vaccinium spp. in the EU 28 is approximately 1,400,000 km2. This value indicates all the areas
where the wild species of Vaccinium were found and may occur, but of course the coverage can vary.
Quantitative data on the diseases caused by D. vaccinii and their impact on yield were obtained
primarily from Plant Disease Management Reports of the American Phytopathological Society and
research reports from the Ministry of Agriculture in Canada. However, most of the data needed for the
quantitative estimations presented here were missing in the literature or on websites. Expert
judgement was thus used in many cases. The quantitative estimations provided by the experts should
thus be taken with particular caution, as different experts might provide different ﬁgures in such a
situation of lack of evidence.
2.3. Methodologies
The Panel performed the pest risk assessment for D. vaccinii following the guiding principles
presented in the EFSA Guidance on a harmonised framework for risk assessment (EFSA PLH Panel, 2010)
and as deﬁned in the International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) No. 11 (FAO, 2004).
When conducting this PRA, the Panel took into consideration also the following EFSA horizontal
guidance documents:
• Guidance of the Scientiﬁc Committee on Transparency in the Scientiﬁc Aspects of risk
assessments carried out by EFSA. Part 2: General Principles (EFSA, 2009).
• Guidance on Statistical Reporting (EFSA, 2014).
• Guidance on the structure and content of EFSA’s scientiﬁc opinions and statements (EFSA
Scientiﬁc Committee, 2014).
A mathematical model for entry, establishment, spread and impact was used to support
quantitatively the pest risk assessment. The model is presented in outline in Section 2.3, and details of
the equations are parameters of the model are given in Appendix A. This model was used to carry out
scenario studies which represent different options for risk reduction (Section 2.3.1).
In short, the entry step (Section 3.1; Appendix D) estimates the total amount of infested planting
material that enters the EU from third countries in a year. As trade ﬂows vary, a target year was chosen.
The year 2018 was taken as the target year for estimates because risk assessment concerns the future.
End point of the entry step is in terms of number of infected berries and infected plants for planting
entering yearly into four geographic regions of Europe: north-west (NW), north-east (NE), south-west
(SW) and south-east (SE). End point of the establishment step is in terms of the number of entries
resulting in infected plants in these four zones. Intra-EU movement between the four zones is not
considered. End point of the spread step is in terms of the number of infected plants in the four
Table 2: Summary of the databases and of the data used in the PRA
Database Data extracted
EUROSTAT All berries, blueberry, cranberry production areas and quantities
FAOSTAT Blueberry, cranberry production areas and quantities. Trade of
blueberry and cranberry
USHBC (US Highbush Blueberry Council) Blueberry production areas and quantities
Comtrade Trade of berries fruit
ISEFOR Trade of plants for planting
EUROPHYT Interceptions of D. vaccinii
PQR Distribution of D. vaccinii
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geographic regions if the trade ﬂows estimated for 2018 are continued over 5 years. End point of the
impact step is in terms of numbers of affected plants in natural areas and the ecological consequences of
this in the four regions.
The quantitative model uses equations and parameters, but both the equations and parameters are
uncertain. Uncertainty in parameters is represented by assigning each parameter a probability
distribution that expresses the knowledge of experts about the parameter value. Based on available
data and judgement, the distribution is characterised by a median value and four additional percentiles
of the distribution (1, 25, 75 and 99 percentile). The median is the value for which the probability of
over- or underestimation of the actual true value is judged as equal. Calculations with the model are
made by stochastic simulation, whereby values are drawn randomly from the distribution speciﬁed for
each parameter. The stochastic simulations are repeated 20,000 times to generate a probability
distribution of outcomes, i.e. the outcome of the entry, establishment, spread and impact process in a
given period in the future.
Following the 20,000 model iterations, a statistical regression analysis is made of the contribution of
uncertainty in each model parameter to the uncertainty in chosen model outcomes. The decomposition
of uncertainty calculates the relative contribution (as a proportion) of each individual input to the
overall uncertainty of the result. The relative contributions sum to 1.
Section 3 (‘Assessment’) reports key outcomes of these stochastic simulations. The distributions given
in this section characterise the possible range of outcomes in the future, under a certain scenario.
In Appendix B, a description and analysis is reported of the relevant Risk Reducing Options (RROs).
Tables with data used in this PRA are reported in Appendix C and maps that support the PRA are
reported in the main text and in Appendix D. All the calculations performed using @Risk and the
sensitivity analyses are provided as an @Risk ﬁle in Annex A.
2.3.1. Speciﬁcation of the scenarios
We consider three scenarios:
• A0: Current regulation in place
• A1: Deregulation of D. vaccinii
• A2: Current regulation in place + additional enforced measures.
2.3.1.1. A0 Current regulation in place
Pest-speciﬁc measures
The pathogen D. vaccinii Shear is regulated as a harmful organism in the EU and is listed in Council
Directive 2000/29/EC1 under Annex II, Part A, Section I (c), with respect to contamination of plants of
Vaccinium spp. intended for planting. Its introduction into, and spread within, all MSs is banned if
found on Vaccinium plants or plant products. In addition, there are general import requirements for
plants for planting according to Annex IV, Part A, section I, including special requirements for dwarfed
plants (such as bonsai plants of Vaccinium corymbosum).
A full description of the current measures in place can be found in the pest categorisation (EFSA,
2014). In summary, the following measures are in place:
Current measures for plants for planting
General import requirements: plant health inspection and export certiﬁcate; plants should be
dormant and free from leaves (except if they don’t shed their leaves as is the case for Vaccinium
plants), ﬂowers and fruits; bonsai plants must be grown in clean potting mix in registered nurseries for
at least 2 years, subjected to pest control, and must be inspected regularly.
Speciﬁc requirements for D. vaccinii: Vaccinium plants should be free from D. vaccinii, however,
there are no speciﬁc requirements how pest freedom for D. vaccinii should be guaranteed.
In addition, plants must originate from areas that are free from Xylella fastidiosa, and this
requirements has also effect on trade in Vaccinium (see Table A.40).
EU internal trade: No plant passport requirement, marketing directive (EU/2014/98) in place.
Current measures for fruits (Berries)
Import requirements: plant health inspection and export certiﬁcate. There are no speciﬁc
requirements regarding D. vaccinii.
EU internal trade: No requirements.
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2.3.1.2. A1 Deregulation
Scenario A1 is the situation where D. vaccinii has no quarantine status. This implies that there is no
guarantee anymore that imported Vaccinium plants are free from D. vaccinii.
The general import requirements of EC/2000/291 remain: plant health inspection and export
certiﬁcate; plants should be free from ﬂowers and fruits; import inspection of plants.
2.3.1.3. A2 Improved import requirements
Scenario A2 assesses the situation where speciﬁed requirements for D. vaccinii are in place. In this
scenario, plants for planting should originate from:
• a pest-free area or
• a pest-free place of production or
• be produced and exported as tissue culture or plug plants directly derived from tissue culture.
2.3.2. Deﬁnitions for the scenarios
2.3.2.1. Deﬁnition of the pathways
Six pathways of entry of the pathogen are distinguished in this opinion. Two of those are entry with
fruits for fresh consumption and four are entry with plants for planting. The Panel considers thus six
pathways for entry of the pathogen with trade ﬂows originating from countries with presence of
D. vaccinii.
Berries
1) Fresh blueberries for consumer use
2) Fresh cranberries for consumer use
Host plants for planting
3) Blueberry plants for planting in plug trays
4) Blueberry potted plants for planting
5) Cranberry plants for planting in plug trays
6) Cranberry unrooted or potted cuttings.
2.3.2.2. Deﬁnition of different units used
Speciﬁcation of temporal and spatial scales, resolution and units used in the assessment are given
in Table 3
Table 3: Summary of the temporal and spatial scales, resolution and units used in the assessment
Pathways
Fresh
blueberry fruit
Fresh
cranberry fruit
Blueberry and
cranberry
plants for
planting in
plug trays
Blueberry
potted plants
for planting
Cranberry
cuttings
Entry Metric tonnes/kg
per number of
fruit per year
Metric tonnes/kg
per number of
fruit per year
Number per year Number per year Number per year
Establishment Number of
successful
transfers to host
plants in EU
territory per year
Number of
successful
transfers to host
plants in EU
territory per year
Number of
infected plants
planted in
nurseries and
surviving at least
2 months before
detection
Number of
infected plants
planted in
nurseries or
production ﬁelds
and surviving at
least 2 months
before detection
Number of infected
plants planted in
nurseries or
production ﬁelds
and surviving at
least 2 months
before detection
Spread Number of plants infected in each of 4 regions in the EU
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Production unit in the country of origin: total number of plants per country
Production unit in the assessment area: individual plants in four regions in the EU
Pathway unit: berry or plant
Pathway subunit: none
Transfer unit: infected plant
Spatial unit: infected plants
Time unit: one year for a total of 5 years.
2.3.2.3. Deﬁnition of abundance of the pest
The opinion considers the proportion of berries infected (entry with fresh fruit), the proportion of
plants infected (entry with plants for planting, establishment and spread), the proportion of area units
infected (impact) and the proportion of fruit bearing branches infected (impact).
2.3.2.4. Potential RROs of the steps and identiﬁcation of the RROs for the sub-steps
In Appendix B, an overview is given of the selection of relevant RROs for D. vaccinii for the three
scenarios and for which steps in the risk assessment they are relevant.
In Table 4, a summary is given of the relevant RROs for the different scenarios. For Scenario A0
(Current regulation), eight relevant RROs are identiﬁed. For scenario A1 (deregulation), four RROs
remain in place such as the certiﬁcation system for Vaccinium plants as well as fungicidal control of
fungi present in nurseries. Pruning and roguing of dead and diseased plants may continue despite the
deregulation of D. vaccinii. The main difference between scenario A0 and scenario A2 (more stringent
measures) is the restriction to import of in-vitro plant material and plug plants derived from this
material for areas where D. vaccinii is present.
Pathways
Fresh
blueberry fruit
Fresh
cranberry fruit
Blueberry and
cranberry
plants for
planting in
plug trays
Blueberry
potted plants
for planting
Cranberry
cuttings
Impact Proportion of infected twigs per ha
Proportion yield loss (berries) per ha; proportion of environmental impact
Production kg berries per ha per year
Time step 1 year
Time horizon 5 years
Spatial
resolution
1 infected plant
Spatial extent Whole EU
Table 4: RROs relevant for different scenarios.
RRO A0 A1 A2
1. Certiﬁcation of reproductive material X X X
2. Fungicide treatments of production ﬁelds X X X
3. Inspection of nurseries X X
4. Roguing in case of a ﬁnding of D. vaccinii X X X
5. Laboratory testing to verify the presence of D. vaccinii in nursery (X) X
6. Restriction to in vitro plant material of Vaccinium from pest-free areas for Xylella
fastidiosa
X X X
7. Rejection consignment after export inspection X X
8. Rejection consignment after import inspection X X
9. Import is restricted to tissue culture and plug plants derived from tissue culture from
areas where D. vaccinii is present
X
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2.3.2.5. Ecological factors and conditions in the chosen scenarios
The climate requirements for D. vaccinii range from humid continental climate to hot summer
Mediterranean climate. The climate is moderately conducive in most areas where Vaccinium spp.
grow, especially in the western half of the EU; there is a low risk of establishment in those areas
(Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). However, the climate is highly conducive in most of the eastern part
of the EU. This holds particularly for the north-eastern part, but also for the south-eastern part, which
are classiﬁed as high-risk areas (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). In addition, some areas in northern
Spain, south-eastern France and northern Italy fall in the high-risk category.
The assessment is conducted assuming no change in ecological factors and conditions compared to
the current situation.
2.3.2.6. Temporal and spatial scales
Although the pathogen produces asexual spores (conidia in pycnidia) throughout the spring and
summer, infection is mostly limited to the time of bloom and early fruit set. Sexual spores (ascospores)
have been rarely found. This means that there is essentially only one disease cycle per year, and we
get a reasonable idea of the potential expansion of this disease on a 5-year horizon. Moreover,
blueberry production is in a ﬂux of uncertain expansion at this time, so that a longer horizon would
result in highly uncertain predictions.
Thus, the assessment has a 5-year time horizon, and considers the entry year of import ﬂows as
well as imports in the subsequent 4 years. Establishment and spread are also considered at a yearly
time scale for a total of 5 years.
The spatial scale is the whole of the EU until the moment of establishment, when individual
countries are taken into account. However, the countries are then grouped into four regions (NW, NE,
SW and SE), because the numbers of initial disease foci are predicted to be very low, and the
countries in a particular region have similar climates and importation of Vaccinium plants for planting
and berries.
2.3.2.7. Summary of the different scenarios
In Table 5 it is reported a synthesis of the different assessments presented by the Panel in this
document.
Table 5: Summary of the main pathways, steps and units considered in the RA. All elements remain
the same for all three scenarios (A0, A1 and A2)
Pathways ENTRY:
Fruit:
1) Blueberry
2) Cranberry
Plants for planting:
3) Blueberry plants for planting in plug trays (from tissue
culture)
4) Blueberry potted plants for planting
5) Cranberry plants for planting in plug trays (from cuttings)
6) Cranberry unrooted cuttings
Units
a) Entry
b) Establishment
c) Spread
a) Entry
1) Plants for planting: one single plant
2) Fruit: one single berry
b) Establishment
One living infected Blueberry or Cranberry plant (founder
population), spatially divided over four regions (NW, NE, SW and
SE) in the EU
c) Spread
Individual infected plants in production and natural areas, spatially
divided over four regions (NW, NE, SW and SE) in the EU
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2.4. Model formulation and formalisation
The six entry pathways are elaborated quantitatively to assess their absolute and relative
importance. Establishment is assessed on the basis of relative importation of Vaccinium plants and
berries combined with ecological niche modelling (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). Spread is assessed
using an ecological compartment model with infection ﬂows between the ecological compartments.
The mathematical approach is akin to matrix modelling, in which the ﬂows are calculated as the
product of the number in a compartment and a parameter expressing the proportionality between the
ﬂow and the number in the compartment (Casswell, 1999). Finally, the impact is assessed by
combining calculation results on the number of infected plants with knowledge on the yield loss per
plant. Details on the models are given in Appendix A. Flow charts of the models for entry,
establishment, spread and impact are given in the rest of Section 2. Parameter estimations including a
description of evidence and uncertainties are given in Appendix A. Results of modelling under different
scenarios for risk mitigation are given in Section 3. A ﬂow chart for the overall risk assessment model
is given in Figure 1.
Abundance of the pest in the
a) Production/growing area
b) Pathway unit
c) Transfer unit
a) % infected host plants and % infected berries
b) Infected host plant and infected berry
c) Infected host plant and infected berry
Production unit Single plants
Critical value economically
important losses: quantity
No threshold because the twig blight incidence is linearly related to
yield loss with an intercept at 0. Pest management costs would increase
in production ﬁelds. Vaccinium plants generally do not die from
D. vaccinii infection, and can maintain themselves in natural areas
albeit at a reduced productivity level, and thus reduced ability to
provide food for wildlife
Critical value economically
important losses: quality
Threshold dependent on fungicide residue levels affecting fruit quality
in production areas. No threshold in natural areas
Critical value environmentally
important losses
Thresholds for fungicide applications are comparable to those in other
fruit crops. No threshold in natural areas
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2.4.1. Model for Entry
2.4.1.1. Conceptual model for Entry
Entry pathways 1 and 2: blueberries and cranberries for consumer use
Frozen fruit for processing is not considered in this PRA, because the risk of frozen fruit carrying
live D. vaccinii is practically zero. For fresh fruit, we consider the number of infected fruit, produced in
third countries, exported from Third countries and imported into Europe. Within Europe, three
destinations are considered: packing house, supermarket and consumer. At each, there is a waste
ﬂow, which can result in an exposure. The waste ﬂow from packing houses is commonly deposed of as
starting material for compost (G. Savini, hearing expert). The material entering a composting facility
has a small but non-zero chance of starting a founder population if the waste is in close contact with
hosts (Vaccinium spp.) before it is composted properly (at sufﬁciently high temperatures to kill the
pathogen). Waste generated in supermarkets is generally incinerated or put into the land-ﬁll, and is
not considered to be a risk for further spread. Vaccinium waste generated in households is composted
at household level (where it can result in spore production of D. vaccinii and transfer to hosts in home
gardens) or processed as municipal waste The municipal waste may be composted resulting in the
same type of pathway as for the packing house waste. Fruits that are processed or eaten are not
further considered. The process can be presented in a ﬂow chart (Figure 2).
The six solid boxes at the top (e.g. ‘blueberry fruit’ and ‘blueberry plants for planting’) represent the six
commodities for which the risk of entry of Diaporthe vaccinii with trade is assessed. The other boxes represent
ecological compartments in the European territory in which the pathogen may occur as a result of either entry or
spread. Drawn black arrows represent trade ﬂows. The pathogen can move internationally and within Europe with
these trade ﬂows. Red hatched arrows represent the transfer of the pathogen from one compartment to another as
a result of natural pathways for spread. In the top part of the diagram, the key process is international trade
driving the entry. In the lower part of the diagram, the key processes are transfer, establishment and spread.
Colours indicate the kind of plant material; blue for blueberry, red for cranberry, green for plants and greener for
more natural growing conditions of the plants.
Figure 1: Diagram of the overall model used in the quantitative risk assessment
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Entry pathways 3, 4, 5 and 6: blueberry and cranberry plants for planting
For plants for planting, we consider the number plants imported from Third countries affected by
D. vaccinii. The following types of plants for planting are considered: (1) blueberry plants for planting
in plug trays (from tissue culture); (2) blueberry potted plants for planting; (3) cranberry plants for
planting in plug trays; (4) cranberry unrooted cuttings or rooted cuttings in pots. After the arrival in EU
28, plants are transported to nurseries, before reaching the ﬁnal destination. As ﬁnal destinations, the
Panel considered commercial berry plantations for berry production and domestic gardens.
A conceptual diagram for the plants for planting pathway is given in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Flow chart of the entry model for D. vaccinii into the EU via the pathway of blueberry fruit
for consumer use
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2.4.2. Model for Establishment
2.4.2.1. Conceptual model for Establishment
The establishment model calculates how many infected Vaccinium plants result from entry through
the six pathways considered in the entry stepper year. The establishment model consists of two steps:
(a) distribution of the import of infected fruit and plants for planting (P4P) over EU countries in four
main regions (NW, NE, SW and SE – Figure 4), and (b) establishment in those regions based on
suitability of the climate for D. vaccinii in production areas and both climate suitability and Vaccinium
plant density in natural areas. These established infected plants are the starting point for spread within
the EU.
Figure 3: Flow chart of the entry model for Diaporthe vaccinii into the EU via the pathway of
blueberry plant for planting
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2.4.2.1.1. Distribution of imported infected blueberry and cranberry fruits
Quantitative information on the importation of Vaccinium berries (blueberries and cranberries) is
available by country from FAOSTAT (Tables C.3 and C.4). These data may reﬂect the density of human
populations, their afﬂuence, dietary preferences and the absence of sufﬁcient local production, and are
used for the estimation of the distribution of imported infected berries over the EU countries, assuming
that the distribution of infected berries is the same as that of total berries (primarily healthy).
Deregulation (A1) or more stringent regulation (A2) will not affect the distribution of infected
imported fruit over the EU territory compared to the current situation (A0).
2.4.2.1.2. Probability of establishment of Diaporthe vaccinii from blueberry and cranberry fruits
Establishment is estimated as the number of transfers of D. vaccinii from infected fruit waste to
Vaccinium plants in the particular country of entry. This transfer could realistically happen when waste
is composted outside receiving packing houses, in municipal composting sites, or in home gardens
provided that Vaccinium plants are in the near vicinity of the waste material (meters up to tens of
meters). Transfer to Vaccinium plants could take place through pycnidiospores (conidia) on the waste
material, as long as waste containing infected berries is exposed to the open air and the berries are
not yet properly composted at high enough temperatures to kill D. vaccinii.
The waste from packing houses is thought to pose a risk if the correct procedures for disposal are
not followed i.e. waste material dumped locally instead of going to an isolated landﬁll or the municipal
composting site. Retail waste mostly goes to incineration or landﬁll, which poses minimal risk which is
not further considered. Home waste could lead to plant infection in the garden if it is disposed onto
the garden compost heap.
The probability of establishment of D. vaccinii from berry waste to Vaccinium plants in the vicinity is
affected by the suitability of the local climate for the disease (Figure 5) as well as the density of
Vaccinium plants in the area, including blueberry and cranberry production ﬁelds and Vaccinium plants
in wild habitats (Figures 6 and 8).
A climate suitability map was prepared for this PRA based on the output from two correlative
species distribution models (MaxEnt and Multi-model Framework (MMF)) with input of global
occurrence data of D. vaccinii and long-term climate data (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). The map
represents the average of the probabilities calculated by the two models.
Figure 4: The four EU regions used to assess the establishment. France was included in the SW
region because an area in SE France was highly suitable for D. vaccinii, similar to an area in
north Italy (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017)
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A map for the relative densities of wild Vaccinium species in EU-28 was generated for this PRA based
on spatial data for V. myrtillus and V. vitis-idea (Meusel et al., 1978, recompiled by Erik Welk) as described
under Section 2.2. The area of natural Vaccinium spp. in the EU-28 is approximately 1,400, 000 km2. This
value indicates all areas where wild species of Vaccinium may occur, but the coverage with Vaccinium is
variable.
We do not expect any effect of deregulation (A1) or stricter regulation (A2) on the risk of
D. vaccinii becoming established from berries compared to A0.
Thus, the conceptual model for establishment of D. vaccinii from berry waste is as follows:
Green areas: essentially no risk (score 0–0.33); orange areas: low risk (0.33–0.66); and red areas: high risk
(score > 0.66).
Figure 5: Climate suitability for the potential establishment of Diaporthe vaccinii on Vaccinium species
in Europe, based on the average risks calculated with the correlative models MaxEnt and
Multi-model Framework (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017)
Figure 6: Relative densities of Vaccinium species in natural areas in the EU. The map was prepared
from the following data sets: (1) Maps of realised distributions of Vaccinium myrtillus and
Vaccinium vitis-idea (Meusel et al., 1978; recompiled by Erik Welk) at 10 9 10 km
resolution; (2) Corine Land Cover data (EEA, 2014).
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2.4.2.1.3. Distribution of imported infected blueberry P4P and cranberry P4P
The importation of diseased plant material is not evenly or randomly distributed over all EU
countries, but depends upon the intensity of Vaccinium berry production as this will inﬂuence the
demand for new plants for planting. The distribution of blueberry production over the EU countries is
reasonably well known for blueberries in 2014 (Figure 8). In addition, the destination countries of
recent exports of blueberry P4P form an indication where imported plant material arrives in the EU,
viz. primarily in Spain, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland and Italy (US nursery information for
2015–2017).
Information on production area is not available for cranberries, except for a general overview of the
importance of cranberry production on some websites (http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-top-
countries-in-cranberry-production.html). Combined with export information from the USA, a coarse
estimate of the distribution of cranberry plants over EU countries was made. Import data are available
for all plants for planting (EUROSTAT), but not for Vaccinium plants as a separate category; therefore,
EUROSTAT data could not be used.
Deregulation (A1) or more stringent regulation (A2) will not affect the distribution of infected
imported P4P over the EU territory compared to the current situation (A0).
2.4.2.1.4. Probability of establishment of Diaporthe vaccinii from blueberry and cranberry P4P
As the infection is systemic, there is a one-on-one establishment of infected plants in a receiving
nursery, where establishment is not limited by climatic conditions because overhead irrigation is
commonly used. However, an introduced infected plant may be removed before the disease is spread.
Figure 7: Conceptual model for the transfer of Diaporthe vaccinii from berry waste to Vaccinium
plants. When berry waste is composted, transfer of the pathogen to Vaccinium plants is
possible before and during the composting process (but not from properly composted
materials)
Figure 8: Blueberry production areas (ha) in EU countries in 2014 (Brazelton, 2016). The largest
production area was in Poland, but blueberry production is expanding rapidly in Spain
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During the ﬁrst 2 months after arrival in a nursery in the EU, plants that develop symptoms will be
mostly removed. All plants that develop symptoms are considered established infections, and can be
sources for spread. If infected plants are not rogued, establishment of the infection on this plant and
one or more of its neighbours is highly likely.
Establishment of D. vaccinii through infected potted plants transferred to production ﬁelds will be
affected primarily by climatic conditions (Figure 5) and the availability of cultivated and wild Vaccinium
plants in the surroundings (Figures 6 and 8). The removal of symptomatic infected plants is considered
less stringent than in receiving nurseries.
Plants in production ﬁelds that develop symptoms of D. vaccinii may still be removed, but
inspection by will be less intensive than in nurseries. Under A1, post-entry quarantine will not be in
place, and plant removal is likely reduced, while the situation under A2 is likely the same as under A0
(except that potted plants or ﬁeld-grown cuttings would not be imported anymore).
Deregulation (A1) is expected to have a negative effect on post-entry removal of infected
symptomatic plants but no effect on the establishment of D. vaccinii as affected by climate suitability.
Stricter regulation (A2) would likely lower the number of infected plants coming into the EU (entry
step), but would not have an effect on the removal rate of symptomatic plants nor on the risk of
D. vaccinii becoming established from P4P compared to A0.
Thus, the conceptual model for establishment of D. vaccinii from plants for planting (P4P) in
receiving nurseries (greenhouses and outdoor areas with overhead irrigation) and in production ﬁelds
is as presented in Figure 9.
2.4.3. Model for Spread
2.4.3.1. Introduction to Spread
Whether the original infection came in on berries or on plants for planting, spread occurs from
plant to plant. Transfer from waste of imported berries to Vaccinium plants is unlikely, but non-zero,
and considering the large volume of import, it is difﬁcult to rule out a priori. The transfer can take
place in production ﬁelds, home gardens or natural areas. Transfer from imported P4P can take place
in nurseries or – when P4P are introduced directly into production ﬁelds – in production ﬁelds. Five
main pathways of spread are considered, which are: (1) from nurseries to production areas, (2) from
production areas to natural areas, (3) from nurseries to garden centres, (4) from garden centres to
Number of infected plug plants in 
a greenhouse
Number of established populations of 
D. vaccinii in a greenhouse
Number of infected potted plants 
in production fields
Blueberry or cranberry P4P in plug trays and small pots in a nursery
Blueberry or cranberry potted plants or cranberry cuttings in production fields
Number of established populations 
of D. vaccinii in production fields
Climate suitability and Vaccinium density
Number of cranberry cuttings in a 
production field
Number of established populations 
of D. vaccinii in a production field
Properly disposed-off waste (rogued plants)
Properly disposed-off waste
In a nursery, the number of established populations is considered to be primarily determined by the vigilance of
nursery workers removing symptomatic plants (depending on the RROs in place), and not by environmental
conditions, which are strongly inﬂuenced by overhead irrigation. Removal of P4P in production areas is more limited
(again depending on the RROs in place), and establishment is primarily determined by climatic conditions in this
case Waste is considered to be disposed of properly to avoid infection of Vaccinium plants, and is not considered
further in the model.
Figure 9: Conceptual model for establishment of blueberry and cranberry plants for planting (P4P) in
a nursery or production ﬁeld
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home gardens, and (5) from home gardens to natural areas. In each of these cases, the possible
means of spread are by the asexually produced conidia, the sexually produced ascospores, droppings
of birds that have eaten infected berries and movement of plants including cuttings within production
sites and to new production sites. Each of these processes is discussed below.
Conidia – Two types of conidia are produced but both are dispersed relatively short distances by
rain splash. Conidia can also splash in water ﬁlms onto vehicles, pruning or harvesting machinery,
allowing transfer to the next ﬁeld visited. Conidia can also wash into peat, which can be extracted
from some natural sites for use in horticultural compost but this is currently not considered to pose a
risk due to the peat routinely being sterilised by microwave or other heat sources before use in
horticulture. Splash dispersed pathogens have been reported to travel moderate distances. In still air,
rain-splashed spores have been reported to travel less than 1 m but distances of tens or even
hundreds of metres are likely when a spray created by rain is combined with moderate wind speeds
(Travadon et al., 2007; Perryman et al., 2014). However, much longer distances have also been
reported. For instance, the citrus canker bacterium Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri was reported to
travel up to 3.5 km, most probably in a tropical storm event where the pathogen was aerosolised by
rain combined with strong wind (Gottwald et al., 2002).
In the case of D. vaccinii, consulted experts (A. Schilder and P. Harmon) report disease gradients to
be very steep, suggesting dispersal is mostly by rain-splashed conidia affecting new plants within only
1–10 m from the original source. Therefore, although conidia are important to intensify or establish an
infection at a site, the role of conidia contributes to spread over only short distances estimated at most
to be 10–100 m extension per focus per year.
Ascospores – Ascospores of other ascomycete fungi are wind-dispersed after being released from
mature fruiting bodies (ascomata) following wetting by rain or dew. However, the sexual stage of this
fungus is reported to be very rare by many experts. Most report never to have seen evidence of the
sexual stage (teleomorph). Some reports suggest that the teleomorph only occurs in vitro, while other
suggest it occurs beneath bark with a relatively long protuberance extending to the surface of the bark
to allow spores to be released, with frost required in the maturation process. Wind dispersed spores
can travel hundreds of kilometres (Brown and Hovmøller, 2002) but those lacking pigmentation (such
as D. vaccinii ascospores) are often sensitive to UV light. In early spring in northern latitudes, this may
not reduce viability of the ascospores. D. vaccinii is thought to have spread from an outbreak in
western Belarus, eastwards to near Moscow in a 20-year period (1980s and 1990s), a distance of
approx. 900 km, i.e. 45 km per year on average, similar to the westerly spread of Leptosphaeria
maculans on oilseed rape in Canada (Fitt et al., 2007). Spread in Belarus could have come about by
plants for planting and possibly ascospore dispersal but there is little evidence for natural westerly
spread despite wind patterns being random. Much of western Europe is not classed as particularly
conducive for the pathogen’s lifecycle (see Figure 5). Climate suitability for the potential establishment
of D. vaccinii) but it may also suggest that plants for planting were the main means of spread. Due to
the reported rarity of the sexual stage and lack of evidence of new satellite foci occurring at signiﬁcant
distances from established foci, we consider ascospores to play a negligible role that is incorporated
into considered uncertainty of spread by conidia in this PRA.
Birds – Birds have been reported to vector fungal pathogens over relatively large distances (10–
100s km) in their plumage (Coughlan et al., 2015), or in their faeces (Alfonzo et al., 2013). It is
currently unknown as to whether D. vaccinii can survive being eaten by birds to be voided some
distance from the original plant, however, it is considered that there would be a strong selection
pressure for a berry-infecting pathogen to harness this potential means of spread. Preliminary evidence
of D. vaccinii as an endophyte of some trees may support a possible role of dispersal in the droppings
of birds but this is highly uncertain based on available evidence and will not be considered further in
calculations.
Berries – Berry infection varies with species (estimates range from very low incidence of infection
for lowbush blueberries, increasing to 20% incidence with highbush blueberries, and similarly,
incidences of up to 20% are reported in affected cranberry production sites (A. Schilder, hearing
expert). If infected berries are discarded into domestic gardens in close proximity to ornamental or
home fruit-bearing Vaccinium bushes, it is possible for the fungus to transfer and cause infection via
conidia. Further spread is unlikely due to isolation of the affected bush or bushes in a garden
environment but is nevertheless included in calculations. Similarly, infected berries could act as a
source of infection at packing houses, where large amounts of berries are discarded due to quality
issues. Infected berries could end up in close proximity to natural or cultivated Vaccinium, if good
practice is not followed, for instance if waste is dumped.
Diaporthe vaccinii pest risk assessment
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 24 EFSA Journal 2017;15(9):4924
Plants for planting – Plants for planting (including cuttings) are considered to be an important
source of spread locally within a production site and the movement of plant material is probably the
most important means of spread to new locations within the EU. Producers routinely prune bushes
every 2 years (cranberries) or 3 years (blueberries) by hand or by machine (depending on production
scale) to encourage new branches that bear fruit. Each plant is estimated to produce approximately 20
cuttings (but it can be over 100 in the case of high-bush blueberries), of which in high-risk locations
typically < 1% of stems may be infected for cranberry (range < 1% to 20%) or typically 12% of twigs
may be infected for highbush blueberry (reports range from < 1% to 60% stems affected). Due to the
large volumes involved, cut cranberry stems are usually raked up and planted into a new production
location at the same farm or nearby farms. Stems harbouring latent infections or even small visible
symptoms are unlikely to be noticed or removed and so can introduce the pathogen to the new
production area. In some cases, this type of planting material can be sent to a completely new
location.
Rate of spread – Observations in the USA, where D. vaccinii is endemic, indicate that rates of
spread are greater in managed production sites than in natural sites despite the use of fungicides
because of actors that favour dispersal and infection, such as overhead irrigation, fertiliser (which
exacerbates disease severity), machinery and movement of plants contribute greatly to within-site
dispersal or enhancement of disease. Moreover, in natural areas, Vaccinium plants are interspersed
with other plants, and native plants seem to be more resistant to D. vaccinii than selected cultivars in
the USA.
Mitigating RROs – Production ﬁelds of highbush blueberry in the USA are typically inspected every 2–3
years and affected stems may be removed by rogueing. Cranberry, lowbush blueberries and natural sites
are usually not inspected. Fungicides applied to control other fungal diseases (typically 7–11 applications
in USA, 3–4 in EU) are likely to reduce fruit infection and may reduce the disease impact but cannot
eliminate an infection once established within a stem of a plant. Outbreaks have been eliminated by
removal of affected plants and their surrounding plants.
2.4.3.2. Conceptual model for Spread
Spread is calculated separately for the four geographic regions in Europe that were distinguished
for assessing establishment. Within each of these four regions, ﬁve compartments are distinguished:
nurseries, production ﬁelds, natural Vaccinium stands, garden centres and home gardens (Figure 10).
Within each compartment, the model calculates the number of infected Vaccinium plants. No
distinction is made between species of Vaccinium. As a consequence, entry and establishment ﬂows
via blueberry and cranberry are summed.
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The model considers six inﬂows of infection from outside Europe. These ﬂows are:
F1: establishment of infected plants in nurseries following entry of infected plants for planting in
plug trays (blueberry or cranberry);
F2: establishment of infected plants in nurseries following entry of infected potted plants for
planting (blueberry);
F3: establishment of infected plants in production ﬁelds (blueberry plus cranberry) following entry
of infected potted plants for planting (blueberry) and ﬁeld-derived cuttings (cranberry);
F4: establishment of infected plants in production ﬁelds via the entry pathway of infected berry
waste at packing houses;
F5: establishment of infected plants in natural Vaccinium stands via the entry pathway of berry
waste at packing houses and municipalities;
F6: entry and establishment as a result of disposal (home composting) of infected berries in home
gardens.
The model further considers 11 ﬂows of infection within and between compartments. The ﬁve ﬂows
within compartments are:
F9: survival and propagation of the infection within nurseries;
F11: survival and propagation of the infection within production ﬁelds;
F12: survival and propagation of the infection within natural Vaccinium stands;
F14: survival and propagation of the infection within garden centres;
F17: survival and propagation of the infection within home gardens.
The six ﬂows between compartments comprise three ﬂows of plant material and three ﬂows of
infection due to dispersal by natural means (spores and vectors)
The model comprises ﬁve ecological compartments, for each of four geographic regions in the EU: NW, NE, SW and
SE. Within each region, the model comprises six ﬂows of entry and establishment (F1–F6) and 11 ﬂows of infection
between compartments. Parameterisation of the ﬂows is identical for the four regions, except for ﬂows that involve
dispersal of spores followed by infection. The parameterisation of these ﬂows takes into account the prevalence of
berries in each region, and the average suitability of the climate for D. vaccinii. The ﬂows F1–F6 are ﬂows of
infected plants. These ﬂows are already converted from the units used in the entry (infected berries and infected
plants) to the units used in the spread model (infected plants). Establishment is accounted for.
Figure 10: Flow chart representing the conceptual model for spread
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Movement of infection with infected plant material:
F7: ﬂow of infection from nurseries to production ﬁelds as a result of movement of infected plants;
F8: ﬂow of infection from nurseries to garden centres as a result of movement of infected plants;
F13: ﬂow of infection from garden centres to home gardens as a result of movement of infected
plants.
Movement of infection by natural means (spores and vectors):
F10: ﬂow of infection from production ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium stands as a result of dispersal by
natural means (spores and vectors);
F15: ﬂow of infection from home gardens to production ﬁelds as a result of dispersal by natural
means (spores and vectors);
F16: ﬂow of infection from home gardens to natural Vaccinium stands as a result of dispersal by
natural means (spores and vectors).
These 17 ﬂows are illustrated in the ﬂow diagram of Figure 10. Equations and parameters for ﬂows
1–17 are given in Appendix A.3.1. Justiﬁcation for parameters is given in Appendix A.3.2.
The model is run over a time period of 5 years, with constant yearly inﬂows F1–F6. The initial
condition of this model is no infection within Europe (i.e. the presence of infection in Latvia is ignored).
The rationale for leaving out the initial condition is a lack of knowledge on the extent of the current
infection. The modelling aims to provide insight in the consequences over a time frame of 5 years of
entry of new infection with international trade in berries and planting material.
2.4.4. Model for Impact
The impact of the presence of D. vaccinii in nurseries, berry production ﬁelds and the natural
environment is assessed. The losses incurred to garden centres and consumers (home gardens) who
lose plants to D. vaccinii in their own gardens will not be considered; home gardens will only be
considered as potential sources of infection of Vaccinium plants in wild habitats.
The expected impact on berry yield is based on impact observed in areas in the USA and Canada
where D. vaccinii is endemic. No information was found on the impact of D. vaccinii in any other
countries where the pathogen was reported. A review of the literature on the impact of D. vaccinii in
the USA and Canada is given in Section 3.5.1.
The Panel did not quantify the magnitude of impact, but addressed it in a narrative approach based
on the results of the spread model (Section 3.4.2), where the number of infected Vaccinium plants
infected with D. vaccinii in the four EU regions is estimated after a 5-year time frame in nurseries,
berry production ﬁelds and the natural environment.
Diaporthe vaccinii pest risk assessment
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 27 EFSA Journal 2017;15(9):4924
3. Assessment
3.1. Distribution of the pest
3.1.1. World distribution
D. vaccinii is most abundant in central and eastern states of the USA and is present at lower
incidence in Canada, western USA, Chile, China, Latvia and possibly Belarus and Russia. The latter two
locations have not formally been conﬁrmed by molecular-based identiﬁcation but literature suggests
the presence of the pathogen (Dokukina, 2001; Galynskaya et al., 2011; Galynskaya and Liaguskiy,
2012), which coincides with high suitability of climate in these locations (Narouei-Khandan et al.,
2017). The pathogen is not known to occur in the following important berry production locations:
Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia (Figure 11).
3.1.2. EU distribution
In the EU, D. vaccinii is ofﬁcially present only in Latvia. This status was conﬁrmed by a survey done
by EFSA among member states on the presence of D. vaccinii in 2016 (Table 6, details in Table C.19).
Eight MS provided results so far on a total of 16 MSs that carried out the survey. The MS that provided
feed-back indicated negative results, with the exception of Latvia, where the presence of the pathogen
was already known.
Although the Panel recognised the efforts performed by the MS for surveying the pathogen, the
Panel considers these results quite difﬁcult to summarise in terms of presence and absence at the EU
Figure 11: Distribution of Diaporthe vaccinii according to EPPO global database © www.eppo.int
Table 6: Summary of the results of the Diaporthe vaccinii survey at EU level
Country No. of samples Positive samples
Belgium 14 0
Netherlands 27 0
Latvia 53 3
Czech Republic 22 0
Germany 45 0
Poland 4 0
Sweden 19 0
Lithuania 24 0
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level. The survey designs are not comparable and the Panel recognises a need for harmonising the
pest surveillance activity across the EU. Low numbers of samples taken in some of the member states
(Table C.19) provide only weak evidence on absence of the pathogen.
3.1.3. Historical entry events into the EU
The ﬁrst known outbreak of D. vaccinii occurred in the Netherlands in 1956, presumably from
infected blueberry planting materials from the USA. From the Netherlands, infected plants were
imported into Scotland, where another outbreak was observed. Approximately 30 subsequent
outbreaks were detected (Figure D.8; original data from Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). Details on
past outbreaks are reported in the literature (Wilcox and Falconer, 1961; Baker, 1972; Teodorescu
et al., 1985; Guerrero and Godoy, 1989; Gabler et al., 2004; Netherlands Plant Protection Service,
2009, 2013, 20155; Ka#cergius and Jovai#sien _e, 2010; Lombard et al., 2014; EPPO, 2010, 2015; Vilka
and Volkova, 2015; Michalecka et al., 2017).
3.2. Entry
3.2.1. Introduction to Entry
Until recently, the most important route of potential entry of D. vaccinii was considered to be via
the movement of infected or contaminated host plants for planting, particularly asymptomatic infected
plants (Wilcox and Falconer, 1961; Baker, 1972; Guerrero and Godoy, 1989). Infected Vaccinium spp.
plants exported from North America to other countries were suspected to be an important pathway by
which the pathogen was introduced into new areas (Wilcox and Falconer, 1961; Baker, 1972; Guerrero
and Godoy, 1989; QingHua et al., 2015). This was especially true when rooted or unrooted cuttings
were taken from ﬁeld-grown or greenhouse-grown plants. However, in recent years, practically all
blueberry planting materials are produced by micropropagation (tissue culture) (Debnath, 2006, 2007,
2009; Sedlak and Paprstein, 2009; Litwinczuk, 2013). The resulting plantlets are considered to be
disease-free, and the risk situation may be quite different now compared to decades ago. On the other
hand, the number of plants shipped worldwide has increased signiﬁcantly (Brazelton, 2016), so that
the risk of introduction of D. vaccinii on plants for planting could still be considerable (Diekmann et al.,
1994a,b). Moreover, Vaccinium species have become popular potted plants for domestic use, either
indoors or outdoors (Zee et al., 2010), which may involve additional risks.
Plants for planting are sorted and packaged at the production site or at the receiving location (Evans
and Ballen, 2014; Ort!uzar, 2014). They can also be shipped in bulk without sorting, and then be sorted
and packaged at the receiving location, potentially enhancing the risk of pathogen spread in the receiving
country. However, Vaccinium plants for planting are inspected twice: once by the exporting company
before being shipped and then by the recipient company upon arrival in the EU (approximately 1% of
plants are also inspected at the EU border). The majority of symptomatic infected plants are unlikely to
escape detection. However, asymptomatic infection is quite common on blueberry and cranberry plants,
as twig blight, since the incubation period can be relatively long (2–8 weeks). In North Carolina, 5% of
non-inoculated, healthy looking blueberry plants became symptomatic one to two months after the start
of a ﬁeld experiment (Milholland, 1982), and D. vaccinii was isolated from 90% of apparently healthy
cranberry vines (Friend and Boone, 1968). Thus, plants for planting from open nurseries in D. vaccinii
affected areas can escape detection by visual inspection. Considering the current worldwide movements
of Vaccinium plants and the possibility of latent or systemic infections by D. vaccinii, the most probable
pathway of entry of this pathogen into the EU is infected host plants for planting. This is also a possible
pathway for spread within the EU.
We distinguish three types of host plants for planting, differing in risk of carrying D. vaccinii: (a) tissue
culture plants, (b) plug plants derived from tissue culture or cuttings grown in a greenhouse, (c) potted
plants grown in a greenhouse or outside and unrooted cuttings produced outdoors.
Most berry plants for planting originate from in vitro propagation (tissue culture) these days
(Debnath, 2006, 2007; Sedlak and Paprstein, 2009; Litwinczuk, 2013). New plants can be obtained
from tissue culture through shoot proliferation from pre-existing buds or through adventitious shoot
regeneration following shoot morphogenesis. The ﬁrst method is most common for commercial
Vaccinium plant production. In vitro propagation through axillary shoot proliferation involves the
following steps: (i) initiation of aseptic culture, (ii) shoot multiplication, (iii) rooting of microshoots and
5 Data were kindly provided by the Dutch National Plant Protection Organisation.
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(iv) hardening and greenhouse and/or ﬁeld transfer of tissue culture-raised plants. Steps (i) through
(iii) take place under controlled conditions (named ‘tissue culture plants’ for this PRA), and these plants
are considered to be disease-free, but step (iv) and additional propagation in a greenhouse or ﬁeld can
involve risks. These last plants are named ‘plug plants’ or ‘potted plants’, respectively, for this PRA.
A traditional method of propagation (still practiced) is through stem cuttings taken from fully grown
mother plants in a greenhouse or ﬁeld. Stem cuttings can be transported as unrooted cuttings or as
potted plants, especially in the case of cranberry. The asymptomatic presence of D. vaccinii on
unrooted or rooted cuttings can pose a serious risk, considering the past introductions of the pathogen
into new areas that were attributed to plants for planting (Wilcox and Falconer, 1961; Baker, 1972;
Teodorescu et al., 1985; Guerrero and Godoy, 1989; Netherlands Plant Protection Service, 2009;
QingHua et al., 2015; Moore, 2016). In addition to these types of plants for planting, a wide variety of
Vaccinium species are produced as ﬂowering or fruiting plants in pots for domestic use. These potted
plants may carry D. vaccinii in twigs or older branches, and the risk of the pathogen being present is
considered to be higher than in young cuttings in plug trays. It is unlikely that the pathogen would be
associated with potting mix, because this must be an unused artiﬁcial growing medium or a natural
growing medium treated by fumigation or heat.
In addition to stem infections, D. vaccinii can cause blueberry fruit rot (Milholland and Daykin, 1983)
and cranberry viscid rot (Kusek, 1995). Fruit infection can take place in the ﬁeld at all development
stages, and remain latent until maturity (Milholland and Daykin, 1983). Symptom development can
continue during storage, but the extent of ﬁeld rot is not a direct indicator of that of storage rot (Olatinwo
et al., 2004). Thus, Vaccinium berries from third countries with D. vaccinii can carry the pathogen
without showing symptoms. American type blueberries and cranberries are increasingly transported on a
global scale (FAOSTAT, online; Evans and Ballen, 2014; USDA/ERS, 2013, 2016; Brazelton, 2016).
Blueberries are harvested by large machines or picked by hand (Longstroth and Hanson, 2012).
Cranberries are harvested by combs, either dry or in standing water as the berries ﬂoat (Pesticide Risk
Reduction Program, 2007). They are sorted and packed in small containers in packing houses or put in
boxes for bulk shipment. The packed berries are moved into controlled cool rooms, inspected for
quality control, and then refrigerated to optimum storage temperatures, just below or above freezing.
The berries may also be stored in controlled atmospheres (at elevated CO2 or O3 concentrations and
reduced O2 and ethylene concentrations, but at high relative humidity to prevent drying out). Under
optimal conditions, fresh berries can be stored for up to 8 weeks. Berries can also be deep frozen and
stored for longer periods. Berries too small for fresh consumption are frozen and processed into juice.
We assume that frozen berries and juice will not lead to transfer of viable D. vaccinii spores, and these
will not be considered in this PRA. Fresh berries can be transported overseas to the EU as
prepackaged or as bulk shipments in large containers (http://www.freshfruitportal.com/news/2012/04/
10/bulk-blueberry-shipping-a-future-alternative-for-chile/); bulk shipments are then sorted and
packaged at the ﬁnal destination within the EU. Berries can travel via air or sea freight under
controlled environment conditions. We consider the risk of D. vaccinii importation to be minimal when
fruit are sorted and packed in the country of origin, but this risk is not negligible when the berries are
shipped in bulk and then processed in the country of destination. The risk will depend primarily on
waste management and distance to berry production areas or natural areas containing Vaccinium
species. However, no published information is available about this risk. Similarly, we have estimated
waste of infected berries in retail but consider that these will be disposed of in a way that does not
allow the pathogen to transfer infection (incineration or landﬁll) and we have also estimated waste in
domestic household settings where a proportion of waste infected berries could transfer infection.
Despite these various potential entry ways, there was only one interception of D. vaccinii reported
in EUROPHYT during the past 20 years, namely in 1996. The pathogen was associated with plants for
planting of Vaccinium sp. and Rubus sp. imported from the US (interception nr. 2249). In the past
5 years, Vaccinium plants or fruits were intercepted, for other reasons, 46 times in total: 19 times from
Argentina, seven times from the United States, six times from Morocco, four times from Peru, three
times from Chile, twice each from Mexico and Ukraine and once each from Australia, Belarus and
Germany. The reasons for these interceptions were the presence of pests other than D. vaccinii,
absence of the required documents, or noncompliance with special requirements (EUROPHYT, online).
3.2.2. Assessment of Entry for the different scenarios
Six pathways were considered to estimate the number of infected berries or infected plants for
planting entering the EU per year. It is important to note that infected berries are not equivalent to
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founder populations (i.e. established outbreaks) as various ecological processes affect the formation of
a founder population from an infected berry (and the chance is quite small). In the case of infected
berries, this is due to the colony of D. vaccinii in infected fruit being replaced by other microbes, eaten
by animals, buried or discarded where it cannot contribute to further establishment and spread (e.g.
landﬁll or incineration), while for infected plants, the number leading to an established outbreak is
reduced due to being removed and discarded by nursery staff before contributing to establishment
and transfer of infection (described fully in the next section).
The results of the entry assessment (described in detail in Appendix A.1) for the pathways berries
and plants for planting are shown for the A0 scenario in Table 7, and in Figure 12a–c for all scenarios
(A0, A1 and A2). Table 7 reports ﬁve quantile values (1%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 99%) of the predicted
number of berries infected with D. vaccinii entering the EU per year, not including retail waste berries
(which were not thought to allow transfer) ranged from about 6,000 (1% limit) to nearly 3 million
(99% limit) with a median value around 200,000. Most infected berries were due to infected blueberry
rather than cranberry fruits (about 85% of berry infections were on blueberries based on the median
values). In contrast to the berry pathway, far fewer infected plants for planting were predicted to enter
the EU per year: for plug plants, the number ranged from about 0.02 (1% limit) to about 10 (99%
limit) with a median around 1 (most of which was due to blueberry plug plants rather than cranberry),
while for potted plants and cuttings, the number of infected plants entering the EU per year was
predicted to range from about 0.3 (1% limit) to about 220 (99% limit) with a median of about 19
(again mostly due to blueberry plants).
Table 7: Number of individual D. vaccinii-infected berries or plants for planting predicted to enter
the EU under the A0 scenario. Figures include infected units originating from both high-
and low-risk locations
Pathways
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Blueberry fruit – packing house 423 13,891 41,626 109,875 805,429
Blueberry fruit – consumers 5,544 62,491 140,573 297,502 1,502,544
Blueberry plugs 0.018 0.31 0.70 1.38 4.89
Blueberry potted plants 0.31 6.69 16.01 33.86 137.98
Cranberry fruit – packing house 396 11,965 33,382 80,308 439,856
Cranberry fruit – consumers 25 482 1,488 4,466 59,863
Cranberry plugs 0.001 0.055 0.23 0.71 5.09
Cranberry potted plants 0.001 0.51 2.70 9.65 82.88
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Figure 12: Probability distributions for the number of Diaporthe vaccinii-infected berries or plants for planting expected per year due to new entries into
the EU for the scenarios (A0, A1 and A2), for each of three main pathways of entry (a) D. vaccinii-infected berries, (b) D. vaccinii-infected plug
plants for planting and (c) D. vaccinii-infected potted plants or cuttings for planting. Note differences in scale of the horizontal axis. A combined
ﬁgure showing the overall number of individual infections (potential founder populations) for all pathways is not shown because the numbers
differ greatly between infected fruit and infected plants for planting and the chance of an infected berry leading to an established outbreak of
the disease is much less than the chance from an infected plant (see next section). Nevertheless, the number of infected berries or infected
plants entering the EU is a useful indicator of the efﬁcacy of RROs by comparing the A0, A1 and A2 scenarios
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The number of entries of infected berries into the EU per year under the A0 (current) scenario was
predicted to range from about 7,000 to 3,000,000 (1–99% percentiles) with a median of about
200,000 (median values for waste at pack-houses, and domestic households were about 75,000 and
140,000, respectively).
The number of entries into the EU per year under the A0 (current) scenario from blueberry and
cranberry plug plants for planting was predicted to range from about 0.02 to about 10 (1–99%
percentiles) with a median of about 1 (median values for blueberry and cranberry plug plants were
about 0.7 and 0.2, respectively).
The number of entries into the EU per year under the A0 (current) scenario from blueberry and
cranberry potted plants for planting and cuttings was predicted to range from about 0.3 to about 230
(1–99% limits) with a median of about 19 (median values for blueberry and cranberry potted plants
and cuttings were about 16 and about 2.70, respectively).
The A1 scenario is predicted to increase the number of infected berries entering the EU, with a
median value predicted to be about 500,000 (ranging from about 25,000 (1% quantile) to about 6
million (99% quantile)), compared to a median of about 200,000 under the A0 scenario. For plug
plants, the number of infected plants entering the EU under scenario A1 was predicted to be around
1.5, ranging from about 0.04 to about 14 (1–99% quantiles, respectively), compared to a median of
about 0.9 under the A0 scenario. For potted plants and cuttings, the median number of potential
founder populations entering the EU per year under the A1 scenario was predicted to be around 500
plants, ranging from about 5 to 9,000 (1–99% quantiles, respectively), compared to about 19 under
A0.
The A2 scenario was predicted to reduce the number of infected berries entering the EU slightly
compared to the A0, due to an enhanced level of disease control in affected production locations,
leading to a slightly reduced incidence of infected berries being harvested. Similarly, for plug plants,
the predicted median number was also slightly reduced at about 0.6, within a range from 0.01 as the
1% quantile, to about 5 as the 99% quantile and compared to a median of 0.9 under A0, while for
potted plants and cuttings, the predicted median number of infections under the A2 scenario was close
to zero due to restricted trade, (the predicted values ranged from 0 at the 1% quantile to about 0.6 as
the 99% quantile) compared to a median of 19 under A0).
3.2.3. Uncertainties and sensitivities affecting the assessment of entry
Data used for the quantitative estimates of entry were based essentially on trade data (trade of
blueberries and cranberries fruits and plants for planting) and on the parameters expressing the
variations in abundance of the pest along the pathways from the countries of origin to the EU. Trade
data were often available aggregated (fruits of all Vaccinium species), incomplete (ISEFOR database)
and extrapolation or further processing were required. In other cases, especially for the parameters
used in the model, expert judgement was used.
Uncertainties of data and parameters used for the entry submodel are discussed in detail in
Appendix A.1.
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Figure 13 indicates the assessment of uncertainty of the results, showing that for the berry
pathway, parameters E7 (proportion of infected berries removed at packing houses in the EU),
followed by E3 (proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
exported to the EU) made the largest contributions to the uncertainty in the inﬂow of infected berries
(Figure 13a). For the plug plants for planting pathway, the predominant parameter responsible for
uncertainty in the entry was E1 (proportion of plants for planting infected with D. vaccinii when leaving
the place of production from high-risk locations) (Figure 13b), while for the potted plants for planting
pathway, the most important parameters for uncertainty were also E1 (proportion of plants for
planting infected with D. vaccinii when leaving the place of production from high-risk locations),
followed by the same parameter for low-risk countries (Figure 13c).
A detailed description of the uncertainty analysis is given in the Appendix. Due to trade ﬂow, the
blueberry pathways had a greater overall inﬂuence than those of cranberry. In the case of the berry
pathways (for blueberry and cranberry), the estimates of infected fruits entering the EU are then
subject to substantial reduction in the Section 3.3 (Establishment) to produce an estimate of
established populations following estimation of processes that limit the ability of infected material (fruit
Figure 13: Examples for blueberry only (full set of ﬁgures for both blueberry and cranberry is in
Appendix E) showing the relative contribution of factors included in the assessment to the
quantiﬁed uncertainty for the entry of Diaporthe vaccinii) into the risk assessment area for
the different scenarios considered (A0, A1 and A2) and for the different pathways (a)
berries, (b) plug plants for planting, and (c) potted plants for planting
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or plants) to establish a population. Uncertainty around the estimated numbers of D. vaccinii-infected
plant material entering the EU is highly connected to the scale of berries being discarded in each
sector (pack-houses, retail or domestic households). Additional uncertainties affecting the entry
assessment but not quantiﬁed within the assessment model are listed in Table 7, including
undocumented or illegal import of fruit or plants for planting, and long-distance natural spread by
ascospores or by birds that have eaten infected berries. Some of these additional factors cannot be
controlled or are thought to be of relatively minor consequence.
Additional uncertainties affecting the entry assessment but not quantiﬁed within the assessment
model are listed in Table 8.
3.2.4. Conclusion on the assessment of Entry for the different scenarios
Results indicate that compared to the current situation (A0), a relaxation of regulations would lead
to an increase in new entries of infected berries into the EU per year to about 500,000 (median value),
which is more than double that predicted under A0. Similarly, the A1 scenario would increase the
number of infected plants for planting (both plug plants and potted plants or cuttings) from a
predicted median of about 20 under A0 to about 500. In contrast, the A2 scenario was predicted to
decrease the median number of D. vaccinii-infected fruits slightly, while infected plants for planting
(plugs and potted plants or cuttings combined) would also reduce according to predictions for A2, to
0.6 (entirely from plug plants as there would be no trade in potted plants or cuttings form affected
production sites).
Although the number of D. vaccinii-infected berries predicted to arise in the EU each year is much
higher than the number of D. vaccinii-infected plants for planting, the estimated numbers cannot be
compared directly because a vastly reduced chance of transferring infection is likely to occur from
infected fruits than from infected plants for planting (discussed in the Section 3.3, Establishment).
Nevertheless, the measures proposed under scenario A2 would substantially reduce the number of
D. vaccinii-infections entering the EU according to predictions.
The main uncertainties and sensitivities to this analysis were parameters E7 and E3 (proportion of
infected berries removed at packing houses in the EU and in the exporting country, respectively), for
the berry pathway, while for plants for planting, the predominant parameter that inﬂuenced the results
most was; E1 (proportion of plants for planting infected with D. vaccinii when leaving the place of
production from high-risk locations, followed by the same parameter for low-risk countries.
Table 8: List of additional uncertainties affecting the entry assessment but not quantiﬁed within the
assessment model
No.
Description of source of
uncertainty
Description of effect on assessment of entry
1 Temporal trend in the
blueberry and cranberry
fruit trade
The most recently available data (until 2014) were considered, but
the trade volumes are still increasing
2 Temporal trend in the
blueberry and cranberry
plants for planting trade
Cultivation of berries, especially highbush blueberry, is steadily
increasing in EU and the majority of new varieties have been created
by USA plants producers. Several of these producers (commercial
companies, but also Universities) often allows associated plant
nurseries in EU to produce and sell P4P, starting from imported
mother plants. There is lack of this type of data and the overall
combination of these processes render it difﬁcult to estimate temporal
trends of P4P trade
3 Undocumented import of
berry fruit
Data not available
4 Illegal import of plants for
planting
Data not available
5 Long-distance natural
spread (by birds or
ascospores)
Data not available
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3.3. Establishment
3.3.1. Introduction to Establishment
Once D. vaccinii has entered the EU via plants for planting or berries, the pathogen may get
established in a production area or natural environment. In plants for planting, the pathogen is in
essence already established in that plant, although local spread and infection are needed for the
pathogen to get established in a founder population. When the D. vaccinii enters the EU with a berry,
sporulation, local transport and infection of a Vaccinium plant are needed before a founder population
can get established; the probability of establishment via this route is thus much smaller than via plants
for planting.
The pathogen enters Vaccinium host tissues mainly through pruning or freezing wounds and open
ﬂower buds, and to a lesser extent directly into the tips of young, succulent shoots and leaf margins
(Milholland, 1982; Parker and Ramsdell, 1977). Field studies demonstrated that mature, healthy
unwounded blueberry plants did not become infected by D. vaccinii, even after 1 month of exposure
to natural ﬁeld inoculum (Parker and Ramsdell, 1977; EFSA PLHP, 2014). The pathogen can enter into
the host vascular tissues through leaf margins and open ﬂower buds (Weingartner and Klos, 1975;
Milholland, 1982; Williamson et al., 2013), and fungicide applications are most effective at the early
ﬂowering stages (Williamson et al., 2013).
During the growing season (generally, in the northern hemisphere, March–September), disease
symptoms become evident in young plants within 2 weeks following infection (Milholland, 1982), and
2–3 weeks after infection of partially hardened twigs on older plants (Polashock and Kramer, 2006).
Four weeks after inoculation with D. vaccinii twig blight lesions are on average 30–50 mm long on
highbush and rabbiteye blueberries, and 22–24 mm on lowbush blueberries and their hybrids
(Polashock and Kramer, 2006). Systemic infection results in wilting and dieback of twigs, and ultimately
in stem canker (Milholland, 1982). Stem canker may lead to the death of entire bushes, for example in
Southern Michigan (Wilcox, 1939; Weingartner and Klos, 1975). D. vaccinii may survive in symptomatic
or asymptomatic branches or in broken twigs on the soil surface (Oudemans et al., 1998). The
pathogen typically does not survive in leaves or soil (Oudemans et al., 1998).
Initial establishment (and subsequent spread as discussed in Section 3.3.1) depends on the climate
in the region where the pathogen is introduced and the season at the time of introduction. Each
systemically infected plant for planting can become a founder plant at the proper time for sporulation
and spread (see Section 3.3.1). Infected berries or their waste would need more exacting conditions
to create founder plant. The most favourable period for infection is April through September (during
bloom), and for further disease development from May to October.
The optimum temperature for the growth of D. vaccinii in culture is 21–27°C (Ramsdell, 1995), but
the pathogen has a very wide temperature range for growth (4–32°C) (Parker and Ramsdell, 1977;
EPPO, 1990). Disease development in the ﬁeld is optimal at an average annual temperature between 8
and 15°C, although the disease can occur at average annual temperatures between 0 and 25°C
(Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). Nevertheless, stem cankers were more common in areas with higher
spring/summer temperatures (> 30°C) in Michigan, and heat stress appears to promote disease
development (Weingartner and Klos, 1975).
3.3.2. Further speciﬁcation of host range
All Vaccinium species tested thus far for infection and symptom development by D. vaccinii are
susceptible to the pathogen. Very little is known about the relative susceptibility of different Vaccinium
species in cultivated ﬁelds and wild habitats (Polashock and Kramer, 2006). Lowbush blueberry
cultivars (Vaccinium angustifolium) and half-high bush cultivars (hybrids between highbush and
lowbush blueberry plants) generally are more resistant to Phomopsis twig blight than the Southern
highbush (V. corymbosum) and rabbiteye cultivars (Vaccinium ashei or Vaccinium virgatum).
Sparkleberry, a native of south-central USA was somewhat resistant (Polashock and Kramer, 2006).
Both lowbush blueberry and sparkleberry grow in wild habitats and are generally not cultivated
(Annemiek Schilder, hearing expert, November 24, 2016). There was no clear resistance among
cranberry cultivars. Yet, D. vaccinii infection seemed to be rare in wild cranberry stands (Annemiek
Schilder, hearing expert, November 24, 2016). Indeed, D. vaccinii was not isolated from rotten
cranberry fruits at four unmanaged or native stands in New Jersey, but was isolated from 16% to 23%
of rotten fruits from two other unmanaged or native cranberry stands (Stiles and Oudemans, 1999).
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Taking into account the literature on reported isolations of D. vaccinii as well as DNA sequences of
D. vaccinii reported in GenBank (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore?term=Diaporthe%20vaccinii&c
md=DetailsSearch), we conclude that D. vaccinii has been found as pathogen in many species of
Vaccinium and as endophyte in a variety of different genera (Table 9).
Table 9: Host range of Diaporthe vaccinii as a pathogen and as an endophyte based on sequences
deposited in GenBank (extracted in November, 2016)
Function Plant species
Common
name
Identiﬁcation
method
Location Reference
Pathogen Vaccinium
corymbosum
Highbush
blueberry
ITS Michigan, North
Carolina, USA
Farr et al. (2002a,b)
Pathogen Vaccinium
corymbosum
Highbush
blueberry
Translation elongation
factor 1; 5.8S, 18S,
28S, ITS1 and 2;
calmodulin gene
USA, Netherlands Lombard et al.
(2014)
Pathogen Vaccinium
macrocarpon
American
cranberry
Translation elongation
factor 1; 5.8S, 18S,
28S, ITS1 and 2;
calmodulin gene
USA, Lithuania, Latvia Lombard et al.
(2014)
Pathogen Vaccinium
macrocarpon
American
cranberry
Partial sequence 5.8S,
ITS1 and 2, 28S
Latvia Vilka and Volkova
(2015)
Pathogen Vaccinium
macrocarpon
American
cranberry
ITS Massachussets, New
Jersey, Wisconsin, USA
Farr et al. (2002a,b)
Pathogen Oxycoccus
macrocarpus =
Vaccinium
macrocarpon
American
cranberry
Complete sequence
5.8S, ITS1 and 2
Sand Hutton, York,
North Yorkshire
England
Hughes (2005)
Direct submission to
GenBank.
Pathogen Vaccinium
oxycoccus
European
cranberry
Translation elongation
factor 1; 5.8S, 18S,
28S, ITS1 and 2;
calmodulin gene
Latvia Lombard et al.
(2014)
Pathogen Vaccinium
palustris
Bog
cranberry
ITS1 and 2, 5.8S and
28S rRNA
Lithuania Ka#cergius and
Jovai#sien _e (2010)
Pathogen ?
(brown spot)
Potentilla
fragarioides
Chinese
potentilla
(medicinal
plant)
Partial sequence 5.8S,
18S, 28S, ITS1 and 2
Shenyang Agricultural
University,
Liaoning, China
Zhou (2014) Direct
submission to
GenBank
Endophyte Physalis
alkekengi
Chinese
Lantern
plant
Partial sequence 5.8S,
18S, 28S, ITS1 and 2
Qingdao Agricultural
University, Chengyang
District, Shandong
China
Yue and Liang
(2013) Direct
Submission to
GenBank
Endophyte Populus simonii Simon’s
poplar
Partial sequence 5.8S,
18S, ITS1 and 2, 28S
Northwest A&F
University, Yangling,
Shaanxi, China
Zhang et al. (2014)
Direct Submission to
GenBank
Endophyte Unknown unknown Partial sequence 5.8S,
18S, ITS1 and 2, 28S
Northwest A&F
University, Yangling,
Shaanxi, China
Zhang et al. (2014)
Direct Submission to
GenBank
Endophyte Unknown
(many species
collected)
unknown Complete sequence
5.8S, partial ITS1
and 2
Alicante, Spain Macia-Vicente et al.
(2008)
Endophyte Unknown Medicinal
plant
Partial sequence 5.8S,
18S, 28S, ITS1 and 2
Guizhou University,
Guiyang, Guizhou
Province, China
Su et al. (2012)
Direct Submission to
GenBank
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No information is available about the relative resistance or susceptibility of native European
Vaccinium species, which have generally not been exposed to D. vaccinii, with the exception of native
stands of Vaccinium oxycoccus in Lithuania (EPPO, 2004; Lombard et al., 2014), Vaccinium palustris in
Lithuania (Ka#cergius et al., 2004; Ka#cergius and Jovai#sien _e, 2010), and possibly (no molecular
identiﬁcation) of V. myrtillus in Russia (Dokukina, 2001) and V. angustifolium in Belarus (Galynskaya
et al., 2011; Galynskaya and Liaguskiy, 2012). Therefore, we consider the worst-case scenario of
susceptible Vaccinium stands wherever D. vaccinii could establish according to its ecological niche
(Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017).
3.3.3. Assessment of establishment for the different scenarios
The main EU countries where blueberries were produced in 2014 were Poland, Germany and Spain
(Figure 8), while the countries where Vaccinium plants were imported from the USA (2015–2017) were
Spain, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Poland and Italy (information from a large blueberry
nursery in the USA). Blueberry production areas in Spain, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands
have climates that are only moderately suitable for disease establishment, while production areas in
Poland and northern Italy have a highly suitable climate (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). Imported
infected blueberries and cranberries that are discarded outdoors may be sources of infection for
Vaccinium plants but the probability of successful transfer and infection is affected by plant densities
and climate (Appendix A.1.2). Imported infected P4P that have not been removed are planted in the
middle of other Vaccinium plants, so that there is no shortage of infection courts. Plug plants and small
potted plants arrive in nurseries, where establishment of D. vaccinii is hardly affected by the outside
climate. Larger potted plants and imported cranberry cuttings may be planted directly in production
ﬁelds, where establishment of the pathogen is affected by climate. Reduction factors due to
suboptimal climates range from 0.08 in the NW to 0.30 in the SE of the EU.
The results of the establishment assessment for the different scenarios and for the four EU regions
are shown in Table 10 and Figure 14. Table 9 reports ﬁve quantile values (1st, 25th, 50th, 75th and
99th) of the number of established populations of D. vaccinii in terms of infected founder plants per
year in each of the four regions in the EU for scenarios A0, A1 and A2, whereas Figure 14 shows the
estimated continuous probability distributions associated with the values of the number of established
founder plants.
Function Plant species
Common
name
Identiﬁcation
method
Location Reference
Endophyte Unknown
(many species
collected)
Unknown Partial sequence 5.8S,
28S, ITS1 and 2
Santo Domingo,
Heredia, Costa Rica
Rojas-Jimenez et al.
(2016)
Endophyte Unknown Unknown 5.8S,18S, 28S, ITS1
and 2
Beijing Forestry
University, Qinghua,
Beijing, China
Tian (2009) Direct
Submission to
GenBank
Table 10: Selected quantiles of the uncertainty distribution for the number of established founder
plants infected by Diaporthe vaccinii expected per year in four regions in the EU over
during one year for scenarios A0, A1, and A2
Quantile Source
1%
quantile
1st
quartile
(25%)
Median
(50%)
3rd
quartile
(75%)
99%
quantile
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A0 – NW
region
Berries 0 0 1 5 215
Plug plants 0 0.008 0.018 0.039 0.17
Potted plants 0.008 0.164 0.419 0.935 47
Total 0.008 0.17 1.4 6.0 262
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A0 – NE
region
Berries 0 0 1 5 207
Plug plants 0.01 0.086 0.17 0.316 1.258
Potted plants 0.145 1.555 3.273 6.377 24.93
Total 0.15 1.6 4.4 11.7 233
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Under the A0 scenario, potted plants were predicted to be the main source of established infected
founder plants, followed by berries (Table 9). Plug plants were predicted to result in very few
established founder plants. The risk of establishment was greatest in the NE region of the EU, followed
by the SW. Under A1, by far the largest risk of establishment was predicted from potted plants, much
less from berries, and hardly from plug plants. In this situation, the greatest risk was in the SW (where
most P4P are imported), followed by the NE. Under scenario A2, the probability of establishment of
founder plants with D. vaccinii were predicted to be very low, and highest from import of infected
berries, which are not affected by extra regulation of import of P4P. In this case, the greatest risk was
Quantile Source
1%
quantile
1st
quartile
(25%)
Median
(50%)
3rd
quartile
(75%)
99%
quantile
. . . Number of established pest
in scenario A0 – SW region
Berries 0 0 0 1 33
Plug plants 0.011 0.091 0.178 0.321 1.062
Potted plants 0.165 1.735 3.656 7.033 27.24
Total 0.18 1.8 3.8 8.4 61
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A0 – SE
region
Berries 0 0 0 0 0
Plug plants 0 0 0 0 0.001
Potted plants 0 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.031
Total 0 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.032
Number of established pest in
scenario A1 – NW region
Berries 0 1 3 13 499
Plug plants 0.001 0.016 0.038 0.082 0.36
Potted plants 0.12 3.7 12.6 37.2 271
Total 0.12 4.7 15.6 50.2 770
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A1 – NE
region
Berries 0 0 2 11 433
Plug plants 0.005 0.12 0.25 0.45 1.54
Potted plants 1.628 23.183 62.798 163.974 1,043
Total 1.6 23.3 65 175 1,4778
. . . Number of established
founder plants in scenario A1 –
SW region
Berries 0 0 0 2 67
Plug plants 0.016 0.15 0.30 0.56 1.99
Potted plants 1.83 28.4 85.0 234 1,543
Total 1.85 28.5 85.2 237 1,611
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A1 – SE
region
Berries 0 0 0 0 0
Plug plants 0 0 0 0 0.02
Potted plants 0.002 0.032 0.092 0.25 1.64
Total 0.002 0.032 0.092 0.25 1.66
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A2 – NW
region
Berries 0 0 0 2 71
Plug plants 0 0.007 0.016 0.034 0.15
Potted plants 0 0 0 0.001 0.016
Total 0 0.007 0.016 2.03 71.2
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A2 – NE
region
Berries 0 0 0 1 26
Plug plants 0.005 0.04 0.081 0.15 0.56
Potted plants 0 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.061
Total 0.005 0.041 0.083 1.16 26.62
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A2 – SW
region
Berries 0 0 0 0 4
Plug plants 0.005 0.051 0.109 0.21 0.81
Potted plants 0 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.01
Total 0.005 0.052 0.111 0.22 4.82
Number of established founder
plants in scenario A2 – SE
region
Berries 0 0 0 0 0
Plug plants 0 0 0 0 0.001
Potted plants 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0.001
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in the NW, where most blue- and cranberries are imported. Under all scenario’s the risk of
establishments of founder plants with D. vaccinii was lowest in the SE, where only few P4P are
imported and no berries.
Probability density functions (Figure 14) clearly show that the proposed RRO’s have little effect on
the estimated establishment of founder plants from berry waste over a 1-year period. This is
illustrated by the close proximity of the curves under the three scenarios, with median values close to
one infected plant in the NW and NE of the EU under scenario A0 and between approximately 0.1 and
10 infected plants under scenarios A2 and A1, respectively. The uncertainty intervals became slightly
wider under A1 and narrower under A2 compared to A0. In the SW, the risk of establishment of
infected founder plants from berries was lower than in the NW and NE, with medians of about 0.1
under A0, and around 0.5 and 0.07 for scenarios A1 and A2, respectively. The lower medians in the
SW can be ascribed to reduced import of berries and a less suitable climate for establishment. The
uncertainty intervals were very similar for the three scenarios. No founder populations were predicted
to become established in the SE, because berries were not expected to be imported in that region.
Probability density functions for the establishment of infected founder plants from plug plants
(Figure 15) were very similar for the three scenarios in the NW of the EU, with medians of < 0.04
founder plants from plug plants under all scenarios over a 1-year period. The uncertainty levels were
also similar in the NW. The estimated infected founder plants in the NE and SW from imported plug
plants were higher than in the NW, with medians ranging from close to 0.1 plants (A2) to < 100 plants
(A1) over a 1-year period. The difference with the NW was due to a more suitable climate in the NE
and larger imports in the SW. The uncertainty ranges were similar for the three scenarios. The
establishment of infected founder plants from imported plugs in the SE was estimated to be very low
(< 0.0001 plants per year) for all three scenarios due to the expected low levels of imports from third
countries. The uncertainty was similar for the three scenarios.
Probability density functions for established founder plants from potted plants or cuttings
differed greatly for the different scenarios in all geographic regions of the EU (Figure 16). The median
values increased from < 1 infected plant in the NW and < 4 infected plants in the NE and SW under
scenario A0 to about 13 plants in the NW and 80 plants in the NE and SW under scenario A1. The
median numbers were reduced to about 0.0001 in the NW and 0.001 in the NE and SW under scenario
A2. In the SE region, the numbers of established infected plants from potted plants or cuttings was
low (0.004–0.09) under scenarios A0 and A1, and 0 under A2. The uncertainties increased
considerably under scenario A1 (at the higher end of the log-scale) in all regions.
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Figure 14: Probability density functions for the establishment from imported infected blueberry and cranberry fruits (number of infected plants or founder
populations of Diaporthe vaccinii) expected per year in four geographic regions of the EU (NW, NE, SW and SE) under three scenarios (A0, A1
and A2). Note that the scales for the X-axes are different, and that no berries were imported into the SE
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Figure 15: Probability density functions for the establishment from imported infected blueberry and cranberry plugs (number of infected plants or founder
populations) in four geographic regions of the EU (NW, NE, SW and SE) per year under three scenarios (A0, A1 and A2). Note that the scales
for the X-axes are different
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Figure 16: Probability density functions for the establishment from imported infected blueberry potted plants and cranberry potted plants or cuttings
(number of infected plants or founder populations) in four geographic regions of the EU (NW, NE, SW and SE) per year under three scenarios
(A0, A1 and A2). Note that the scales for the X-axes are different, and that the uncertainties at the lower end of the scale are much smaller
than those at the higher end due to the log-scale
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From the results presented in Table 9 and Figures 14, 15 and 16, it is clear that the numbers of
established infected founder plants would be greatly increased under scenario A1, and reduced under
scenario A2 compared to A0, primarily due to changes in the importation of infected potted plants and
cuttings. The expected median total number of established infected plants in the whole of the EU is
about 10 founder plants per year under the current situation (A0), 166 plants per year under A1 and
0.2 plants pea year under A2. More importantly, the potential maximum numbers (99 percentile) are
estimated to be 556 under A0, 3,860 under A1 and 103 under A2 over a 1-year period. In addition,
the uncertainty interval is greatly increased under scenario A1 compared A0 and A2. These results
form an argument in favour of keeping the quarantine status of D. vaccinii and perhaps set extra
restrictions to the import of potted plants and cuttings and even the importation of bulk fruit.
3.3.4. Uncertainties affecting the assessment of establishment
The contribution of the various factors to uncertainty in the establishment assessment for scenario
A0 is shown in Figure 17. The contributions are expressed as standardised regression coefﬁcients.
Under the current situation (scenario A0), the factor that contributed most to the uncertainty of
establishment from blueberry and cranberry waste was rate b2 (proportion of fruits infected with D.
vaccinii resulting in plant infection and establishment per year) in all regions of the EU. Because the
contribution of b2 was (almost) 100%, no pie charts are shown for the establishment from waste. The
factors contributing to the establishment of infected plants from plugs and potted plants or cuttings
were similar for the four different geographic regions in the EU. However, differences in contributing
factors could be observed between the plugs pathways and the potted plants/cuttings pathways. In
the former pathway, the factors e1-HR (proportion of blueberry production ﬁelds infected with
D. vaccinii in high incidence regions in third countries), N0-LR (number of blueberry plugs imported
from low incidence regions in third countries) and e6-HR (multiplier accounting for a change in the
number of infected plug plants from high incidence countries during intra-EU transport) had the
greatest contribution to uncertainty in the establishment. In the pathways of blueberry potted plants,
the factors e1-LR and e1-HR (proportion of blueberry production ﬁelds infected with D. vaccinii in low
or high incidence regions in third countries), N0-LR and to a lesser extent N0-HR (number of blueberry
potted plants imported from low- or high incidence regions in third countries), as well as e4-HR
(multiplier for a change in the number of infected plants during transport from high incidence regions
to the EU) and e6-HR (multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected plants from high
incidence third countries during intra-EU transport) contributed most to the uncertainty. Fewer factors
were inﬂuential in the cranberry potted plants/cuttings pathways, viz. e1-HR (proportion of cranberry
production ﬁelds infected with D. vaccinii in high incidence regions in third countries), N0-HR (number
of cranberry plants or cuttings imported from high incidence regions in third countries) and e6-HR
(multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected plants from high incidence third countries
during intra-EU transport).
Since establishment was considered to be little affected by changes in RROs, the relative
contributions of the various factors to uncertainty were expected to be the same for the different
scenarios (not assessed for scenarios A1 and A2).
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Additional uncertainties affecting the establishment assessment but not quantiﬁed within the
assessment model are listed in Table 11.
Figure 17: Contribution of factors included in the assessment to the quantiﬁed uncertainty for the
establishment of Diaporthe vaccinii infected plants for scenario A0. The distribution of the
contributing factors was the same for each of the geographic regions in the EU, but
differences were obtained for plugs and potted plants, as well as for blueberry versus
cranberry plants. Pie charts are displayed of plugs (a) and pots (c) of blueberry plants in
the SW (where most import takes place) and of plugs (b) and pots/cuttings (d) of
cranberry plants in the NE region (where most cranberries are grown)
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3.3.5. Conclusions on Establishment for the different scenarios including the
area of potential establishment
a. The import of potted plants and ﬁeld cuttings constitute the greatest risk of introduction and
establishment of D. vaccinii in the EU. This is especially true for the SW region, where most P4P are
imported, and for the NE region where the climate is highly suitable for disease development and plant
material is imported with the highest probability of infection (cranberry cuttings imported as bales from
ﬁelds in high incidence areas in the country of origin and planted directly into ﬁelds in NE EU). Under
A0 (current situation), the range (1–99 percentile) in numbers of established infected plants is from
< 0.01 to > 27 plants per year in the NW, NE and SW of the EU (SE excluded because of low imports).
Under A1 (no quarantine), this range is from about 0.1 to > 1,500 plants per year. Under A2, this
range is from 0 to < 0.1 plants per year. Thus, the risk of establishment of D. vaccinii from imported
Table 11: List of additional uncertainties affecting the establishment assessment but not quantiﬁed
within the assessment model
No.
Step: Division of
infected imported
berries and P4P over
four climatic regions
Description of source of
uncertainty for both sub-steps
but considering all the factors
separately
Description of effect on assessment
of establishment
1 Division of all EU
countries over four
regions (NW, NE, SW
and SE)
Allocation of the countries to four
regions was partially based on relative
numbers of imported P4P and berries,
estimated from export data from the
USA and FAOSTAT data, respectively.
No information was available on
imports of P4P in individual EU
countries
An important unknown is the
introduction of berries and P4P from
Belarus and Russia, and uncertainty
about the occurrence of the pathogen
in these countries (no molecular
identiﬁcation used)
Uncertainties about the distribution of
imported plants and berries over EU
countries and thus regions have a large
inﬂuence on the risk calculations, because
the four regions have distinct climate
suitability for D. vaccinii development
Because very few P4P and no berries are
imported in the SE, and internal
redistribution of P4P was not included in
the model, the risk for establishment in
the SE is grossly underestimated.
Risks in the NE and SE would be greatly
inﬂuenced by the potential presence of
D. vaccinii in Belarus and Russia
No. Step: Number of
established
populations
Description of source of
uncertainty for both sub-steps
but considering all the factors
separately
Description of effect on assessment
of establishment
2 Climate suitability for
D. vaccinii
establishment
in the four regions
The grouping of countries was
further based on climate suitability
for D. vaccinii development, so that
establishment could be assessed for
each climatic region separately.
Uncertainty about the relative
climate suitability in smaller areas
(NUT2 or
NUTS3) was not considered
The climate suitability had been
estimated previously from long-term
climate data (Worldclim data) combined
with global occurrence of the pathogen.
Low-risk and high-risk regions were
distinguished, but the outcome of the
model is strongly affected by the relative
suitability assumed in high-risk versus
low-risk regions. However, differences in
establishment in the four regions were
determined more by relative berry and
P4P imports than by
differences in climate suitability
3 Host plant
availability
For establishment from berry waste,
the relative density of wild Vaccinium
plants was estimated from
geographic distributions of
ecoregions and climate suitability
for Vaccinium growth. Host plants
were considered to be plentiful in
production areas where imported
P4P were located
The relative densities of host plants
strongly inﬂuence the probability of
transfer from berry waste to a hot plant,
which is the single most inﬂuential factor
affecting establishment of D. vaccinii from
berry waste. Any over estimation of the
proximity of host plants to berry waste
greatly inﬂuence the establishment from
berry waste
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potted plants and cuttings would be greatly enhanced by removing this pathogen from the quarantine
list, while additional regulations, allowing potted plants only from pest-free areas, would reduce the
risk to practically zero. Additional risks, currently not in the model, are associated with intra-EU
transport of imported infected plant materials, especially if the ﬁnal destination would be in the SE
region, which is currently not importing many P4P directly from third countries, but has a climate that
is highly suitable for establishment of D. vaccinii.
b. The import of infected berries could theoretically lead to discarded waste material that could
result in infection of nearby plants. However, the uncertainty about this happening is enormous. Under
A0, our calculations result in a range (1–99 percentile) of 0–215 infected founder plants in the NW
region, where most berries are imported. Under A1, this range increases to 0–499 infected founder
plants in the same region, while under A2, this range is reduced to 0–71 infected founder plants. There
is no indication in the literature that past outbreaks were ever associated with imported berries, and our
parameter estimates may have been too high (biased, despite the wide range). On the other hand, the
import of blueberries and cranberries has grown exponentially in recent years and may lead to infected
founder plants in the future. In our model, we did not make a distinction between berries imported in
bulk (without sorting out leaves, twigs and damaged berries at the source) and presorted and packaged
berries. Our estimates may be more accurate for bulk shipments than for prepackaged shipments.
c. The import of plug plants that originate from tissue culture are predicted to lead to very few
infected founder plants, despite the large numbers of plug plants imported annually (5–6 million).
Under A0, the range (1–99 percentile) is expected to be 0–1.3 founder plants per year. Under A1, this
range is 0.001–2.0 founder plants per year, and under A2, 0–0.8 founder plants per year. The
uncertainty about plug plants is much less than about potted plants or berries.
Taking all sources of infected berries and P4P together, the median number of established founder
plants would be expected being 17 times greater if the quarantine status of D. vaccinii were abolished
(A1), and 46 times reduced if additional restrictions on import of P4P were instituted (A2). The
greatest uncertainties in the model are about potted plants and cuttings, and these uncertainties are
even larger under A1 than under A0 conditions.
An important additional uncertainty is the potential presence of the pathogen in Belarus and Russia.
Planting materials are imported from Belarus (intercepted once), but the quantities are undocumented.
Vegetative propagation of Vaccinium species from cuttings is easy and common practice, but
movement of cuttings across borders is unknown. Moreover, in our model potential natural spread D.
vaccinii from Belarus and Russia is not taken into account, because the pathogen has not been
identiﬁed by molecular techniques, and the presence of ascospores (needed for long-distance
dispersal) has not been documented formally.
3.4. Spread and further establishment
3.4.1. Introduction to Spread and further establishment
D. vaccinii overwinters in the previous year’s infected blueberry twigs, in dead vines, and possibly in
plant debris (twigs, leaves, fruit) lying on the soil surface (Shear et al., 1931; Wilcox, 1939). It can
also survive as endophyte in living woody stems (Friend and Boone, 1968; Oudemans et al., 1998). In
cranberry, the pathogen can also survive the winter in asymptomatic uprights (Kusek, 1995).
D. vaccinii has been isolated from up to 90% of healthy looking cranberry vines from a bed with a
history of high disease incidence in Wisconsin (Friend and Boone, 1968). It has also been isolated from
fruiting bodies found on overwintered cranberry leaves in New Jersey (Wilcox, 1939).
In infested blueberry ﬁelds, the primary inoculum consists of conidia that are produced in pycnidia
of D. vaccinii. Pycnidia are found on dead cankered stems and leaf lesions (Wilcox, 1939; Weingartner
and Klos, 1975; Parker and Ramsdell, 1977; Milholland, 1982). The sexual stage (perithecia) has not
been found on blueberry plants under ﬁeld conditions (Weingartner and Klos, 1975; Parker and
Ramsdell, 1977). However, perithecia have been observed on infected upright cranberry twigs (Wilcox,
1940) and on infected and decaying cranberry fruits (Boone and Caruso, 1995). Overwintering at cool
temperatures seems to be necessary for ascocarp development on fruits (Shear et al., 1931; Wilcox,
1940). Production of ascospores of D. vaccinii has (rarely) been reported for cranberry ﬁelds in Canada
(Pesticide Risk Reduction Program, 2007) and northern states of the USA (Shear et al., 1931; Wilcox,
1940; Boone and Caruso, 1995), as well as possibly in Belarus (Galynskaya et al., 2011; Galynskaya
and Liaguskiy, 2012; Pleskatsevich and Berlinchik, 2012). Thus, ascospores may be a source of initial
inoculum in Northern cranberry ﬁelds (Boone and Caruso, 1995).
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Ascospores are released from perithecia formed in dead leaves and fruits under humid conditions in
spring, and could be dispersed by wind over fairly long distances (tens to hundreds of km). Infected
twigs and abscised leaves could also be blown over longer distances and then produce pycnidia and
conidia. However, long distance spread by natural means has not been documented for D. vaccinii.
Conidia are splash dispersed over short distances generally less than a meter (Parker and Ramsdell,
1977; Milholland, 1982), and could be transported over longer distances in aerosols by wind or by
surface ﬂow of water (Parker and Ramsdell, 1977; Milholland, 1982; Schilder, 2006). In Michigan, USA,
the major period of conidial dispersal occurred during rains from bloom through petal fall in late May
and June, and during rains in June and August (Parker and Ramsdell, 1977). After this period inoculum
was depleted, as no conidia were trapped after September although there was considerable rain. In
North Carolina, rain-dispersed conidia of D. vaccinii have been trapped throughout the growing
season, but mostly between blossom budbreak through to bloom (Milholland, 1982).
Once established, the pathogen has a high potential for local spread by natural means, but the rate
of spread may be retarded by unfavourable environmental conditions (e.g. low temperatures, dry
weather). There is no documented information on the spread of the pathogen by rain splash or by
wind in the form of aerosol. However, analogous to the spread of similar pathogens, D. vaccinii
inoculum (pycnidiospores or conidia and ascospores) can spread by weather related events such as
rain, wind-driven rain, and wind. High humidity is not sufﬁcient for germination of conidia (Parker and
Ramsdell, 1977). Leaf wetness is needed for germination and infection, and rain (Travadon et al.,
2007; Perryman et al., 2014) is needed for natural spread of the pathogen by splash dispersal (Parker
and Ramsdell, 1977). The probability of occurrence of the disease is highest in areas with at least 100
mm precipitation in the driest quarter (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017).
The pathogen could possibly spread within affected areas over short and long distances via running
surface water and the water of rivers and streams containing infected plant debris, but this has not
been documented. For example, V. myrtillus is common in the natural vegetation at high altitudes and
in humid environments with a low soil pH at lower elevations throughout the EU and in Eastern
Europe. D. vaccinii has been found in native Vaccinium species in low, wet areas in Eastern Europe
and Russia (Dokukina, 2001; Vilka et al., 2009a,b; Ka#cergius and Jovai#sien _e, 2010; Galynskaya et al.,
2011; Vilka and Volkova, 2015), and the pathogen could potentially be transported on broken twigs
and as conidiospores in waterways. However, no quantitative information is available about this
potential pathway and it is not considered in this PRA.
Although no evidence exists, insects or birds may act as carriers of the pathogen between
Vaccinium spp. plants (Trappe and Claridge, 2005). Pycnidia and conidia, especially when produced on
fruits, may be spread by birds and other animals that eat infected fruits over fairly long distances from
the source plant. Pycnidia could pass the digestive tract intact and release conidiospores from the
faeces. Alternatively, the production of ascocarps and release of ascospores could be stimulated by the
passage through the digestive tract (Trappe and Claridge, 2005). However, this pathway has not been
documented for D. vaccinii.
Although there is no information available in the literature on the spread of D. vaccinii on
agricultural tools, it may be assumed that this pathogen, like other Phomopsis species, can spread
locally (within a ﬁeld) with pruning tools and agricultural machinery (EFSA PLH Panel, 2014). Blueberry
bushes are pruned in winter, when infection would be very limited (Davies and Crocker, 1994; Caruso
and Ramsdell, 1995). Cranberry plants are sometimes mowed to remove infected upright branches,
but also to collect planting materials from clean ﬁelds. However, transmission by machinery and tools is
considered only a minor pathway for introduction and further spread in the EU, and will not be
considered further.
3.4.2. Assessment of spread and further establishment
Three scenarios were compared: current regulation (A0), deregulation (A1) and stricter regulation
(A2). Spread was calculated over a 5-year time frame, 2018–2022, using entry ﬂows that were kept
constant each year at the estimated level for 2018, and using a model for entry, establishment and
spread in each of four geographic regions within the EU. The model is described in Appendix A.3. This
model is mostly identical for the geographic regions, but does take into account the effect of climate
on natural spread of the disease in production areas and natural Vaccinium stands.
Under current regulation, spread in production areas is very limited, and with marked differences
between geographic regions (Figure 18). The median level varies from less than one infected plant in
the SE, to approximately 10 infected plants in the NW, 100 infected plants in the SW and 200 infected
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plants in the NE. These are estimated levels of spread that are amenable to control response by
growers. Scenario A1 (deregulation) would raise these median levels of spread to approximately 10
infected plants in the SE, 250 in the NW, 2,000 in the SW and 3,000 in the NE. The median numbers
of infected plants under this scenario appear higher than can be contained by growers, creating a
situation that may result in impacts in due course. The scenario A2 with stricter regulation would
reduce median spread to very low levels of less than 1 infected plant in the SE and NW, and between
1 and 10 infected plants in the SW and NE.
Spread in natural areas is an order of magnitude greater than in production areas (Figure 19).
Under current regulation, the median spread (number of infected plants) in natural areas is far below
1 in the SE, around 100 in the SW, 250 in the NW and 2,000 in the NE. These are levels of infestation
that are hardly noticeable. The median level of spread is slightly increased under the deregulation
scenario (well below 1 infected plant in the SE, around 100 infected plants in the SW, around 600
infected plants in the NW and around 3,000 infected plants in the NE). Stricter regulation is expected
to reduce the level of spread.
Thus, the model simulations indicate that spread will be more important in natural areas than in
production ﬁelds (Figure 20).
Distributions of spread (Figures 18 and 19) are quite wide, spanning 2–3 orders of magnitude
where it concerns the spread in production areas, and up to nine orders of magnitude for spread in
natural areas. Therefore, the absolute levels of spread should be interpreted with considerable caution,
especially in natural areas (Tables 12–15). Comparisons between scenarios are considered more robust
than estimates of absolute levels of spread, due to uncertainty in the absolute value in parameters, but
greater conﬁdence of the assessors in comparative differences in model parameters between scenarios
(see Appendix A).
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Figure 18: Simulated spread (number of infected plants) in Vaccinium production ﬁelds in four geographic regions in Europe under three scenarios for
regulation
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Figure 19: Simulated spread (number of infected plants) in natural areas in four geographic regions in Europe under three scenarios for regulation
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Figure 20: Simulated spread (number of infected plants) in Vaccinium production ﬁelds and in natural
Vaccinium in EU under the baseline scenario of current regulation
Table 12: Selected quantiles of the uncertainty distribution for the number of Diaporthe vaccinii
infected plants in production areas in the chosen time horizon for scenarios A0, A1 and A2
Quantile
1%
quantile
1st Quartile
(25%)
Median
(50%)
3rd Quartile
(75%)
99% quantile
Scenario A0 – NW region 0.37 4.19 11.1 29.3 364
Scenario A0 – NE region 7.7 72.9 180 444 4,557
Scenario A0 – SW region 4.9 44.9 109 264 2,896
Scenario A0 – SE region 0.012 0.13 0.32 0.81 8.6
Scenario A1 – NW region 3.27 79.8 297 1,032 17,453
Scenario A1 – NE region 59.8 1,021 3,298 10,243 151,166
Scenario A1 – SW region 38.9 719 2,444 7,907 121,267
Scenario A1 – SE region 0.10 1.95 6.67 21.7 339
Scenario A2 – NW region 0.021 0.23 0.57 1.48 19.0
Scenario A2 – NE region 0.20 1.77 4.35 10.6 106
Scenario A2 – SW region 0.13 1.30 3.30 8.24 89.4
Scenario A2 – NE region 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.22
Table 13: Selected quantiles of the uncertainty distribution for the number of Diaporthe vaccinii
infected plants in natural areas in the chosen time horizon for scenarios A0, A1 and A2
Quantile
1%
quantile
1st Quartile
(25%)
Median
(50%)
3rd Quartile
(75%)
99% quantile
Scenario A0 – NW region 0.02 6.44 201 10,315 283,385,626
Scenario A0 – NE region 0.08 111 6,349 419,753 11,245,309,145
Scenario A0 – SW region 0.006 1.52 61.4 3,901 113,021,203
Scenario A0 – SE region 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009 13.0
Scenario A1 – NW region 0.076 19.90 622 31,661 875,566,390
Scenario A1 – NE region 0.42 308 16,861 1,039,405 283,845,658,812
Scenario A1 – SW region 0.041 4.88 164 9,799 279,023,882
Scenario A1 – SE region 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.22 347
Scenario A2 – NW region 0.004 2.39 79.3 4,176 130,704,915
Scenario A2 – NE region 0.004 9.0 514 33,130 1,175,899,654
Scenario A2 – SW region 0.000 0.11 4.61 283 9,354,012
Scenario A2 – SE region 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026
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3.4.3. Uncertainties affecting the assessment of spread
The contribution of uncertainty in model parameters to overall uncertainty in spread in the north-
western region is shown in Figure 21a. Many factors contribute to the uncertainty in spread in
production sites, but the most important is uncertainty in the number of potted blueberry plants for
planting entering the EU territory (N0_pot_blue_HR). The second most important uncertainty
contributing to the spread in production areas is uncertainty in the proportion of potted plants infected
in the country of origin (e1_pot_blue_LR).
For spread in natural areas, uncertainty in the spread factor (S8_spread_natural_NW) is by far the
most important contributing factor to overall uncertainty in the spread in the NW region.
Table 14: Selected quantiles of the uncertainty distribution for the number of Diaporthe vaccinii
infected plants in nurseries in the chosen time horizon for scenarios A0, A1 and A2
Quantile
1%
quantile
1st Quartile
(25%)
Median
(50%)
3rd Quartile
(75%)
99% quantile
Scenario A0 – NW region 0.16 2.19 6.14 17.0 278
Scenario A0 – NE region 2.29 19.6 47.7 121 1,787
Scenario A0 – SW region 2.48 21.5 53.0 134 1,923
Scenario A0 – SE region 0.003 0.025 0.061 0.15 2.22
Scenario A1 – NW region 1.55 45.0 172 620 12,899
Scenario A1 – NE region 17.0 274 885 2,835 52,473
Scenario A1 – SW region 19.282 344 1,195 3,952 77,561
Scenario A1 – SE region 0.022 0.38 1.29 4.24 80.68
Scenario A2 – NW region 0.006 0.093 0.26 0.69 10.5
Scenario A2 – NE region 0.059 0.52 1.29 3.23 43.9
Scenario A2 – SW region 0.07 0.69 1.74 4.46 61.7
Scenario A2 – SE region 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.067
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3.4.4. Conclusions on Spread for the different scenarios
Calculations with the model indicate that under current regulation, there is some spread expected
in production sites and natural areas, but at levels that can be contained by growers by careful
management, and that are hardly noticeable in natural areas. Deregulation is expected to increase
these levels 10- to 100-fold, which would create a situation in which the disease would become
difﬁcult to contain in production sites, and in which its expected prevalence in natural areas is
substantially higher than is presently the case. Stricter regulation would decrease disease prevalence in
production sites and natural areas by a factor 10–100. These results indicate that regulation has a
relevant level of impact on the prevalence of this pathogen in production sites and natural areas. The
next section translates these ﬁndings to effects on impacts.
Figure 21: Contribution of factors included in the assessment to the quantiﬁed uncertainty for the
spread of Diaporthe vaccinii infected plants for scenario A0. The distribution of the
contributing factors was the same for each of the geographic regions in the EU, but
differences were obtained for production areas and natural areas. Pie-charts are displayed
of production area (a) and natural areas (b), both for NW region
Table 15: List of additional uncertainties affecting the spread assessment but not quantiﬁed within
the assessment model
No. Description of source of uncertainty Description of effect on assessment of spread
1 Intra-EU trade of berries and plants for
planting
The internal movement of infected berries and/or
plants for planting can affect the spread
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3.5. Impact
3.5.1. Introduction to Impact
EPPO (1990) summarised the losses from D. vaccinii in the USA (1933–1983) as follows: occasional
severe losses (18–35%) of cranberries in production ﬁelds and in storage (65% due to infections by
several fungi) in the north-eastern and central USA, and occasional epidemic outbreaks of Phomopsis
dieback in blueberry ﬁelds in north-central USA and twig blight (causing a loss of 2–3 pints/bush or
25–37% yield loss at a maximum yield of 9,000 kg/ha) in the south-eastern USA. Moreover, the
pathogen was associated with 15.2% defective blueberry fruit in New York supermarkets.
Blueberries
Weingartner and Klos (1975) isolated D. vaccinii from 38% of 242 asymptomatic blueberry stem
segments, and from 25% of 2,838 symptomatic stem segments in Michigan and Indiana. From the
same blueberry segments, they isolated Godronia cassandrae (Fusicoccum putrefaciens) from 20% of
the asymptomatic and from 41% of the symptomatic stem segments.
Parker and Ramsdell (1977) observed an average of nine wilted 1-year-old blueberry stems per
bush (about 9%) in untreated plots and 3.8 per bush (about 3.8%) in the best fungicide treated plots
in Michigan. Isolations of D. vaccinii were made, as identiﬁed from morphological characteristics. The
severe infection was attributed to freezing wounds and wounds from mechanical harvesting in 85% of
the blueberry area. In consumer samples, 0.1% of blueberries were infected by D. vaccinii in North
Carolina (Milholland and Daykin, 1983).
Based on the Plant Disease Management Reports (PDMRs) from 2000 to 2016, the overall yield of
blueberries ranged from 841 to 8,968 kg/ha, with a median of 4,484 kg/ha. In nine spray trials in
North Carolina (2000–2004), the median yield with the best fungicide was 8,100 kg/ha (5,040–8,955
kg/ha), and without fungicide was 5,310 kg/ha (2,250–8,748 kg/ha). The median percentage of blighted
twigs was 5% (0.25–22%) in the best fungicide treated plots, and 28% (7–62%) in untreated control
plots. There was a signiﬁcant positive linear relationship between per cent twig blight and yield loss
(Figure 22). The median percentage fruit rot at harvest was 9% (2.4–19%) in the fungicide treated plots
and 12.4% (4.2–20%) in control plots (extracted from nine reports contributed by W. O. Cline,
B. K. Bloodworth, and C. W. Meister). Fruit rot was considered to be caused by D. vaccinii when the
berries split open under light pressure from rolling them between thumb and foreﬁnger. There was no
relationship between per cent twig blight and fruit rot nor between per cent fruit rot and yield.
Blueberry cultivars differ in resistance to Phomopsis twig blight (Polashock and Kramer, 2006).
Southern highbush blueberries (V. corymbosum) and rabbiteye blueberries (V. ashei or V. virgatum) are
more susceptible than lowbush cultivars (V. angustifolium) and half-high cultivars (hybrids between
highbush and lowbush blueberry plants), which develop smaller lesions on inoculated twigs. However,
the relative resistance is also affected by the D. vaccinii isolate used.
Taking the available literature into account, blueberry twig blight caused by D. vaccinii can have a
severe impact, especially on highbush cultivars in central and south-eastern parts of the USA after heat
Figure 22: Relation between per cent of twigs blighted and yield loss per blueberry bush, derived
from eight fungicide spray trials in North Carolina from 2000 to 2003 reported in Plant
Disease Management Reports of the American Phytopathological Society by W. O. Cline,
B. K. Bloodworth (NC State Univ.) and C. W. Meister (Univ. Florida). Data from the
untreated control and best fungicide treatment were extracted from the reports and
included in this graph
Diaporthe vaccinii pest risk assessment
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 55 EFSA Journal 2017;15(9):4924
stress (Weingartner and Klos, 1975), and could be a problem in south-western and south-central parts
of Europe (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017), where the highly susceptible highbush blueberries with low
chilling requirements are being planted on a large scale. Blueberry fruit-rot is generally not very severe
and can be controlled with fungicides.
Cranberries
In PDMRs reporting on cranberry experiments, the median cranberry yield was 29,546 kg/ha
(11,202–49,191 kg/ha) in the best fungicide treated plots, and 6,973 kg/ha (996–37,352 kg/ha) in
untreated control plots in 27 spray trials in Wisconsin and Massachussets (2003–2012), i.e. indicating
76% yield loss from all fungal diseases. Upright dieback caused by D. vaccinii was not assessed. The
median percentage fruit rot was 3.5% (1–20.9%) in fungicide treated plots, and 40.4% (4.7–89.3%)
in untreated control plots (extracted from reports contributed by P. McManus, S. Hemauer, and V. Best
in Wisconsin, and F.L. Caruso in Massachussets). Fruit rots included ripe rot by Coleophoma empetri,
bitter rot by Colletotrichum spp., viscid rot by D. vaccinii, black rot by Allantophomopsis spp., end rot
by F. putrefaciens, early rot by Phyllosticta vaccinii and blotch rot by Physalospora vaccinii. Again,
there was no relationship between per cent fruit rot and yield. The other fungi were generally more
common than D. vaccinii, which was isolated from 12% to 49% of the fruits at three of 11 locations in
1996 (Stiles and Oudemans, 1999). The range of fungi isolated was similar for various cultivars.
During surveys of cranberry ﬁelds in Michigan in 1999-2001, fruit rot incidence varied widely from
1% to 97% in individual ﬁelds. There were signiﬁcant cultivar differences, but these varied by location
and year. The predominant fungi isolated from the fruit varied from year to year. D. vaccinii was
isolated less frequently than most other fungi, but became more dominant (up to 20%) in the last
2 years (Olatinwo et al., 2003). The pathogen occurred in both rotten and healthy-looking fruit.
D. vaccinii became slightly more important during two months of storage, but was still only one of
many fruit rotting fungi isolated (Olatinwo et al., 2004). The incidence of D. vaccinii storage rot on
cranberries (stored at 5°C for 1 or 2 months) varied widely (from 0% to 15%) and was dependent on
region and cultivar (Olatinwo et al., 2004). D. vaccinii was commonly found among several other fungi
isolated from rotten cranberries.
Data from a recent report from Canada (Sabaratnam et al., 2016) indicated that 3.5% (median
from 14 farms; range 0–24%) of cranberry fruits were lost due to fruit rot in the production phase,
and an additional 24% (range 11–61%) after storage for 3 weeks, providing an indication of latent
infection at harvest (Sabaratnam et al., 2016). Eight fungal pathogens were isolated at different stages
of ﬂowering and fruiting, D. vaccinii being the fourth most prevalent pathogen (based on isolation and
DNA sequencing). In ﬁve farms, a median of 9% (range 4–23%) of the ﬂowers were infected by
D. vaccinii, 4% (2–14%) of green fruits and 13% (9–27%) of ripe fruits at harvest (Sabaratnam et al.,
2016).
Similar to Canada and the USA, several pathogens were isolated from decaying cranberry fruit in
Latvia, Botrytis cinerea, F. putrefaciens, and D. vaccinii being the most important ones (Vilka et al.,
2009b).
Based on the available literature, cranberry fruits are highly susceptible to D. vaccinii (Sabaratnam
et al., 2016), and this pathogen could have severe impact on cranberry production in north-central
Europe, not only through viscid rot of fruits but also through upright dieback and the consequent yield
loss (Michalecka et al., 2017).
Wild Vaccinium berries
Many Vaccinium species grow in wild habitats in Canada and the USA, and very little is known
about the relative susceptibility of the various Vaccinium species in these habitats. Lowbush blueberries
(V. angustifolium), native in the north-eastern USA and Canada, are relatively resistant to D. vaccinii
(Polashock and Kramer, 2006). Similarly, sparkleberry (V. arboretum) a native of south-central USA is
relatively resistant (Polashock and Kramer, 2006). Both lowbush blueberry and sparkleberry are
generally not cultivated, and disease incidence is generally low on wild blueberry plants (Annemiek
Schilder, hearing expert, November 24, 2016).
In New Jersey, D. vaccinii was isolated from 0% of rotten cranberry fruits from four unmanaged or
native stands, but from 16% to 23% of rotten fruits from two other unmanaged or native cranberry
stands (Stiles and Oudemans, 1999). Other fungal pathogens, like C. empetri, Phyllosticta elongata,
P. vaccinii and P. vaccinii were isolated more frequently. In other areas, Godronia cassandrae
(anamorph F. putrefaciens) were commonly associated with cranberry fruit rot (P. McManus, personal
communication). No resistant cranberry cultivars were found (Stiles and Oudemans, 1999). Yet,
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D. vaccinii infection seems to be rare in wild cranberry stands (Annemiek Schilder, hearing expert,
November 24, 2016).
F. putrefaciens is very common in wild and cultivated Vaccinium bushes in northern Europe
(Ka#cergius et al., 2004; Vilka et al., 2009b; Strømeng and Stensvand, 2011), while D. vaccinii has been
found only occasionally and temporarily (EFSA, 2014; Lombard et al., 2014; EPPO, 2015; NPPO, 2015;
Vilka and Volkova, 2015; Michalecka et al., 2017).
No information is available about the relative resistance or susceptibility of native European
Vaccinium species to D. vaccinii, which have generally not been exposed to D. vaccinii (for exceptions
see Table 9). Therefore, we consider the worst-case scenario of susceptible Vaccinium stands wherever
D. vaccinii could establish according to its ecological niche (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017). However,
considering the similarity in stem symptoms induced by D. vaccinii and F. putrefaciens, which is
common in wild Vaccinium stands in northern Europe (Strømeng and Stensvand, 2011), and the ability
of Vaccinium plants to regrow after twig blight and dieback from F. putrefaciens, it is unlikely that
D. vaccinii infection would result in large-scale death of Vaccinium stands, although it could affect
relative coverage and productivity.
3.5.2. Assessment of Impact
An overview of the estimation of the number of infected plants after a 5-year time frame in
nurseries, berry production ﬁelds and the natural environment can be found in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Number of infected plants, after 5 years period, in the production areas (blueberry and
cranberry cultivations), natural areas and plant nurseries for scenarios A0, A1 and A2
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3.5.2.1. Assessment of impact on Vaccinium production in nurseries
Given its current regulatory status, D. vaccinii has the potential to have impact on nurseries
producing propagative or ornamental Vaccinium plants. With the current legislation in place (scenario
A0), the detection of a D. vaccinii infection in a nursery will result in eradication measures and the
loss of the complete production lot. Under scenario A0 the estimated number of infected plants
present in EU nurseries after the 5-year assessment period is low for all regions in the EU. When
the four regions are compared, the number of outbreaks in nurseries is expected to be higher in
north-east and south-west EU (within the range of 20–130 infected plants in 5 years) compared to
north-west and South East (within the range of 0–17 infected plants in 5 years). This difference
between regions reﬂects the difference in estimated trade ﬂow of plants to these areas in
combination with favourable climatic conditions and presence of signiﬁcant berry production (i.e.
demand for Vaccinium plants).
3.5.2.2. Assessment of impact on berry production
There are several Phomopsis species present in Vaccinium production ﬁelds in Europe that have
similar symptoms as D. vaccinii. If it is assumed that the majority of D. vaccinii plants in production
ﬁelds are not recognised by the farmer, eradication measures may not be applied. An unnoticed
infected plant in a production ﬁeld could lead to an ‘outbreak’ in the production ﬁeld in case overhead
irrigation or mechanical harvesting is applied that promotes fast within-ﬁeld spread of the pathogen. In
general, farmers have a fungicide programme in place to control the fungal diseases present in the
production place. It can be assumed that D. vaccinii will be partly controlled with these standard
fungicide applications. Speciﬁc additional fungicide applications may be needed to control D. vaccinii.
Farmers keep production ﬁelds relative clean from twig blight and may remove severely infected plants
and replace them with new plants. For the replanted plants, it may take several years before the yield
is at a normal production level. Thus, there may be a multiyear yield loss due to limited production of
berries of new replanted plants after removal.
For the current situation (scenario A0), the highest maximum estimated number of infected plants
after the 5-year assessment period in production areas is in the NE region with an estimate of
between 70 and 440 infected plants (1st and 3rd quantile). In the NE region, both blueberry and
cranberry production are important. Poland is an important blue berry producer in the NE region with
2,500–5,000 ha of blueberry production (Figure 8). Assuming that a blue berry production ﬁeld of 1 ha
has approximately 3,000 plants, the number of production plants in Poland is between 7.5 and 15
million plants. Assuming a worst-case scenario in which all entry, establishment and spread events in
the NE region take place in blueberry production in Poland, the number of estimated infected plants
after 5 years (70–440 plants) is still extremely low. The same reasoning can be applied for cranberry
production with an estimated 100,000 plants/ha.]
The Panel considers that the expected impact of D. vaccinii in berry production is low. At a local
scale, additional fungicide applications may have to be applied and there may be some loss in the
production of berries due to replacement of infected blueberry bushes.
3.5.2.3. Assessment of impact in natural areas
Vaccinium species are widespread in natural areas in the EU (Figure 6). Although not listed as a
characteristic species related to vulnerable habitat types in the EU (EU Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC),
Vaccinium shrubs can be an important component of European ecosystems. Following the EFSA (2016)
guidance on environmental risk assessment, the importance of Vaccinium is reﬂected in its role in
providing provisional services (e.g. consumption of wild berries), regulating services (e.g. pollination,
erosion), supporting services (e.g. nutrients and water cycling) and cultural services (e.g. recreation
and tourism).
D. vaccinii has a narrow host range, but can likely infect all Vaccinium species in natural habitats in
the EU. However, it should be stressed that there is very limited information on the host suitability of
the native Vaccinium species present in the natural environment in Europe (see Section 3.3.2)
The overall impact in natural areas is expected to be similar to that of F. putrefaciens, which is
already widespread in northern Europe. The impact may even be slightly less than that of
F. putrefaciens, because in North America, D. vaccinii seems to be a fairly poor competitor of
F. putrefaciens and other pathogenic fungi (McManus, personal communication; Weingartner and Klos,
1975).
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The current quarantine status of D. vaccinii implies that new outbreaks in natural areas have to be
eradicated. The Panel considered that eradication of D. vaccinii in the natural environment is difﬁcult to
achieve without drastic removal of all Vaccinium plants in the environment to ensure the removal of all
potential inoculation sources in the outbreak area. In Latvia, where D. vaccinii is present in the natural
environment no eradication efforts are taken. Therefore, the impact of eradication or containment
measures for the natural environment was not assessed. It is assumed that infections in the natural
environment may result in local founder populations that may result in visible local impact after some
years.
With the current legislation in place (scenario A0), the estimated number of infected plants in the
natural environment is high compared to nurseries and production ﬁelds. When the four regions are
compared, the number of infected plants is expected to be highest in north-east EU (within the range
of 100–400,000 infected plants in 5 years) compared to other regions (within the range of 0–10,000
infected plants in 5 years). The NE region has a relative high density of wild Vaccinium (see Figure 6)
and D. vaccinii is already present in Latvia in the natural environment.
3.5.3. Uncertainties affecting the assessment of impact
Nurseries: undetected presence of D. vaccinii in nurseries may lead to the spread of the pathogen
to garden centres, production ﬁelds and other nurseries Long-distance spread of infected plants for
planting between regions is possible, but is not included in this PRA.
Berry production areas: Impact of D. vaccinii on berry production in organic blueberry and
cranberry farms, where fungicidal control may be more difﬁcult, the farmer has to rely more on
removal and replacement of infected plants, which is difﬁcult and can lead to multiyear yield losses
and the potential for further spread.
Natural areas: The host suitability of wild European Vaccinium species and the level of induced
mortality is unknown.
3.5.4. Conclusions on Impact for the different scenarios
Nurseries: Under scenario A1, where D. vaccinii is not listed as a quarantine organism anymore,
the number of infected plants in nurseries is expected to increase with a factor of 20 compared to
scenario A0. Reasons for this increase are the fact that the presence in of D. vaccinii in export and EU
nurseries does not necessarily leads to rejection of consignments or eradication measures.
Under scenario A2 with more stringent requirements for plants for planting (i.e. plants directly
originate tissue culture), the number of infected plants in nurseries is reduced to virtually zero.
Berry production areas: Blueberries and cranberries are high value crops, and even moderate
percentages of loss can imply considerable ﬁnancial loss (Oudemans et al., 1998). For scenario A0, the
Panel estimates the general impact of D. vaccinii on blueberry and cranberry production as negligible.
Local impact (outbreak in a production ﬁeld) may occur.
Under scenario A1, where D. vaccinii is not listed as a quarantine organism anymore, the number
of infected plants in production areas is expected to increase with a factor of 10–25 compared to
scenario A0. Reasons for this increase are the fact that there is no guarantee anymore to new plants
planted in production areas is free from D. vaccinii and there are no obligatory eradication measures in
case of ﬁndings.
Under scenario A2 with more stringent requirements for plants for planting (i.e. plants directly
originate tissue culture), the number of infected plants in production areas is reduced to virtually zero.
Natural areas: Only deregulation may lead to a signiﬁcant presence of D. vaccinii in the natural
environment and possible impact on ecosystem services.
Under scenario A1, where D. vaccinii is not listed as a quarantine organism anymore, the number
of infected plants in natural areas is expected to increase with a factor 3 compared to scenario A0.
Reasons for this increase are the fact that more founder populations will establish in natural areas.
The increase in the abundance of D. vaccinii in the natural environment may negatively affect the
ecosystem services Vaccinium provides. However, it is uncertain if the density of wild Vaccinium
plants will decrease as a result of mortality of plants induced by the presence of D. vaccinii in the
natural environment. Under scenario A2 with more stringent requirements for plants for planting (i.e.
plants directly originate tissue culture), the number of infected plants in natural areas is reduced
drastically.
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Conclusions of the assessment
Overall conclusions
Diaporthe vaccinii Shear is the fungal agent responsible for twig blight, canker, viscid rot, fruit rot
and storage rot of several Vaccinium species. The hosts are restricted to Vaccinium species. The main
cultivated hosts are the highbush blueberries and cranberries. Highbush blueberry in particular is
cultivated in several EU countries and wild Vaccinium species are common components of forests, and
other arctic-alpine ecosystems (tundra, above timberline vegetation, etc.).
Based on the available information, Latvia is the only EU country where the presence of D. vaccinii
is ofﬁcially reported. However, on the base of evidence from scientiﬁc literature other outbreaks are
reported for Poland in 2016.
The Panel identiﬁed six potential pathways of entry of D. vaccinii: trade of blueberry and cranberry
fruit and trade of blueberry and cranberry plants for planting (plugs, cuttings and potted plants). The
D. vaccinii-affected countries exporting plants for planting to the EU were differentiated into High Risk
(part of the USA, Canada) and Low Risk (all the other affected countries).
For the establishment of D. vaccinii, the EU was dived into four main regions, characterised by
different climate and different areas of cultivated blueberry and cranberry. For production ﬁelds,
climate suitability determines the risk of establishment. For natural areas the risk of establishment is
dependent on climate suitability and Vaccinium plant densities.
The spread was calculated for each of four geographic regions in the EU, and for ﬁve compartments:
nurseries, production ﬁelds, natural Vaccinium stands, garden centres and home gardens.
The impact of the presence of D. vaccinii in nurseries, berry production ﬁelds and the natural
environment is assessed. The losses incurred to garden centres and consumers (home gardens) were
not considered; home gardens were only considered as potential sources of infection of Vaccinium
plants in wild habitats.
Three scenarios were compared: A0, the current situation of D. vaccinii as a quarantine organism,
A1, deregulation of speciﬁc requirements for D. vaccinii (removal from the quarantine list), and A2,
extra quarantine regulations, including restriction of the source of planting materials to pest-free areas
or pest-free production conditions. There were relevant differences in entry, establishment, spread and
impact among these three scenarios, with the current situation being characterised by low levels of
entry, establishment and spread, and negligible impact while deregulation would increase entry,
establishment, spread and impact by approximately one order of magnitude, and areas in the EU.
Estimates of spread of D. vaccinii in natural areas in the EU stricter regulation would likely reduce
entry, establishment and spread to negligible levels.
The risks from introduced infected berries and plug plants were deemed to be negligible, but the
risks from older potted plants for planting and ﬁeld cuttings were estimated to be considerable. Export
of bales of cranberry mowings directly from cranberry ﬁelds in areas where the pathogen occurs into
ﬁelds in the EU were considered to be posing the highest risk.
The median estimates of the number of infected plants in the production areas were 301, 6,046
and 8 for scenario A0, A1 and A2, respectively. Assuming an average productivity of 16 tonnes/ha for
highbush blueberry we can estimate 1.6, 32.2 and 0.04 tonnes of blueberry yield losses, respectively,
for the three scenarios (A0, A1 and A2).
The number of infected plants in natural areas is considerably higher (6,611, 17,647 and 5,898 as
median for A0, A1 and A2 scenarios) than in production areas and the uncertainty is extremely high
with differences up to 10 orders of magnitude between the 1st and the 99th percentile.
Uncertainty affecting the assessment
Data on the trade in plants for planting in EUROSTAT and FAOSTAT are aggregated and could not
be used directly for assessing trade ﬂows relevant for this opinion. The Panel, therefore, relied on
industry data. These are considered relatively reliable because certiﬁcation papers are needed for the
export of planting materials and horticultural products.
Quantitative data on disease incidence within the EU territory is virtually lacking. More information
was available about the incidence and severity of the disease in countries of origin, but no information
was available about the incidence on planting materials or fruit at the port of export, and hardly any
information about this at the port of import. Interception data are inconclusive due to the possibility of
asymptomatic infections.
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Estimation of disease incidence in imported plant materials and berries based on past outbreaks in
the EU leads to ‘reverse engineering’, adjusting the estimates of input parameters for the model to
what is expected from past outbreaks. Such calibration of model inputs to information on past
outbreaks is unavoidable in the case of lack of direct evidence. Ideally, risk assessment can be built
with data at the level of the underlying processes, such that data on outbreaks can be used for testing
the model rather than model calibration.
Information about the occurrence of D. vaccinii in the EU is still limited, especially in natural
habitats, despite the surveys carried out in 2016. Survey protocols and reports should be standardised
in the form of excel spread sheets, so that they can be integrated into one data base.
Information about the occurrence of D. vaccinii in countries bordering to EU countries is uncertain.
Conﬁrmation of the reported widespread occurrence of D. vaccinii in Belarus and Russia by molecular
identiﬁcation is urgently needed. Also, quantitative information about import of planting materials and
berries from these countries is lacking.
Quantitative information about the import of planting materials and berries from Morocco is
needed, as well as information about the presence of blueberry diseases there. Blueberry production is
rising rapidly in Morocco, and so is trade between Morocco and Spain.
The occurrence and distribution of D. vaccinii in China needs to be conﬁrmed. Molecular
identiﬁcation has been reported in GenBank, but not in refereed journals in English. Import of
Vaccinium planting materials and berries from China does take place, but the quantities are unknown.
D. vaccinii is a pathogen of Vaccinium species, but occurs endophytically in other plant species. This
has been shown for some medicinal plants in China as well as a variety of wild vegetation in Spain. It is
unknown if endophytic D. vaccinii can be transferred to Vaccinium species and become pathogenic.
Information about the relative susceptibility of European Vaccinium species to D. vaccinii compared
to American species is lacking, so that it is very difﬁcult to predict the spread of D. vaccinii in natural
areas in the EU. Estimates of spread of D. vaccinii in natural areas in the EU over a sequence of years
were made using data on the spread of Phomopsis species in soybeans in the USA over a time frame
of two months. The use of such surrogate data results in uncertainties that are very difﬁcult to assess.
In this opinion, distinction was made between four geographic regions to calculate establishment and
spread. This choice was made because the south-east of Europe is comparatively suitable for
establishment but has comparatively low entry. As a result, the current analysis shows that the southeast
has a low establishment, spread and impact as a result of the low entry. A disadvantage of this approach
is that spread of the pathogen between these four regions (e.g. by movement of plants for planting) was
not accounted for. A narrative approach would have reached much the same conclusion.
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Appendix A – Formal model and parameters estimates
Notation
The following steps are deﬁned
E = entry
B = establishment
S = spread
I = Impact
The steps are linearly ordered in a sequence E ? B ? S ? I.
The letter A deﬁnes an assessment, the relevant scenario is deﬁned by a subscript j (j = 0, 1, 2, . . .).
A0 represents the current scenario.
Sub-components or sub-steps
Different sub-steps are deﬁned by an integer following the letter of the step.
For example, E1 is the ﬁrst sub-step of the entry step and B2 is the second sub-step of the
establishment step.
Variables
X = a population abundance, a letter (E, B, S, I) and a number (1, 2, . . .) in the subscript specify to
which step and sub-step it refers to (e.g. XE1 represents the population abundance in the sub-step 1 of
the Entry step)
N = a number, a letter (E, B, S, I) and a number (1, 2, . . .) in the subscript specify to which step
and sub-step it refers to (e.g. NE0 represents the number of transfer units in the sub-step 1 of the
Entry step)
Y = an area, a letter (E, B, S, I) and a number (1, 2, . . .) in the subscript specify to which step and
sub-step it refers to
I = an impact, a number (1, 2, . . .) in the subscript speciﬁes to which sub-step of impact it refers to
T = represents a time horizon.
Parameters
e, e = a generic parameter appearing in the model for entry (with a subscript from 1 to . . . in order
of appearance in the set of formulas deﬁning the entry process)
b = a generic parameter appearing in the model for establishment (with a subscript from 1 to. . . in
order of appearance in the set of formulas deﬁning the establishment process)
s = a generic parameter appearing in the model for spread (with a subscript from 1 to. . . in order
of appearance in the set of formulas deﬁning the spread process)
i = a generic parameter appearing in the model for impact (with a subscript from 1 to. . . in order of
appearance in the set of formulas deﬁning the impact process)
A.1. Details on modelling and estimated parameter values for entry
A.1.1. Formal model for entry
Entry pathway 1: Blueberries for consumer use
Fruits are produced in countries of origin. We consider only the import of fresh fruits from countries
with reported presence of D. vaccinii. The total number of fruit from those countries is named NE0,
where N stands for number, the E in the subscript stands for ‘Entry’ and the 0 stands for the initial
step of the entry (Table A.1)
Not all ﬁelds in a country or origin with the ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii need to be infected. Even
in countries with a long history of infection with the pathogen (e.g. the USA), the proportion is not 1
because newly planted ﬁelds may be disease-free. In countries with recent introduction of the
pathogen (e.g. Chile), the proportion of infected ﬁelds is likely to be low. The proportion of infected
ﬁelds is e1 (Table A.2).
Not all berries harvested from production ﬁelds in which the pathogen is present are infected with
D. vaccinii. The proportion of infected berries harvested from infected ﬁelds is e2 (Table A.2).
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Berries are shipped as bulk or in small packages (blueberries in clam shells, cranberries in plastic
bags). Berries that are packaged are cleaned before packaging in packing houses before export.
Berries with visible symptoms will be removed. The proportion of berries removed by cleaning at
packing houses is e3 (Table A.2). For berries that are shipped as bulk, there is no further cleaning in
the country of origin.
During transport of berries from third countries to the EU, cross-contamination or cross-infection is
in theory possible. It is also theoretically possible that the pathogen would not survive transport. Both
processes are accounted for by considering a multiplier e4 for the proportion of infected berries in the
international trade (Table A.2).
At customs clearing, an inspection is carried out. The proportion of infected berries removed from
the ﬂow at import inspection is e5 (Table A.2).
During within-EU transport of berries, cross-contamination or cross-infection is in theory possible. It
is also theoretically possible that the pathogen would not survive transport. Both processes are
accounted for by considering a multiplier e6 for the change in the proportion of infected berries in the
intra-EU trade (Table A.2).
Quality control is done at packing houses following import and before berries are shipped to retail.
The proportion of infected berries removed during this quality control is e7 (Table A.2).
Quality control is done at retail. The proportion of infected berries removed during this quality
control (usually whole packages) is e8 (Table A.2).
Consumers buying berries may sort out bad ones, or let berries go bad. The proportion of infected
berries that is not consumed is e9 (Table A.2).
Table A.1: State variables of the entry model for blueberry fruit. All variables are expressed in
numbers of individual blueberries, considering the whole yearly ﬂow of blueberries from
countries with ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii into the EU. Note: the model is the same
for cranberries, but the parameter values are different
Symbol Meaning
NE0 Total number of blueberries imported from countries with ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii into the EU
per year
NE1 Total number of blueberries originating from ﬁelds with presence of D. vaccinii in countries with
ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii imported into the EU per year
NE2 Total number of blueberries infected with D. vaccinii that are prepared for export to the EU per year
in countries with ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii
NE3 Total number of blueberries infected with D. vaccinii that pass cleaning and culling before being put
on transport to the EU per year
NE4 Total number of blueberries infected with D. vaccinii that arrive at customs before import into the EU
per year
NE5 Total number of blueberries infected with D. vaccinii that pass import inspection at entry into the EU
per year
NE6 Total number of infected blueberries arriving at packing houses in the EU per year
NE7 Total number of infected blueberries arriving at retail in the EU per year
NE8 Total number of infected blueberries arriving at consumer per year
NE9 Total number of infected blueberries ending up as waste at packing houses in the EU per year
NE10 Total number of infected blueberries ending up as waste at retail in the EU per year
NE11 Total number of infected blueberries ending up as waste at consumer in the EU per year
Table A.2: Parameters of the entry model for blueberry fruit. All parameters are multiplication
numbers (mostly proportions, i.e. < 1). Note: the parameters are the same for
cranberries but their values are different
Symbol Meaning
e1 Proportion of blueberry production ﬁelds infected with D. vaccinii in countries with ofﬁcial presence
of the pathogen
e2 Proportion of berries harvested in ﬁelds with presence of D. vaccinii that are infected with the
fungus. This includes latent infections
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Formulas
The total number of infected blueberries ending up as waste at packing houses in the EU is
calculated as:
NE9 ¼ NE0 # e1 # e2 # 1! e3ð Þ # e4 # 1! e5ð Þ # e6 # e7
The total number of infected blueberries ending up as waste at retail in the EU is calculated as:
NE10 ¼ NE0 # e1 # e2 # 1! e3ð Þ # e4 # 1! e5ð Þ # e6 # 1! e7ð Þ # e8
The total number of infected blueberries ending up as waste at consumer in the EU is calculated
as:
NE11 ¼ NE0 # e1 # e2 # ð1! e3Þ # e4 # ð1! e5Þ # e6 # ð1! e7Þ # ð1! e8Þ # e9
Entry pathway 2: Cranberries for consumer use
For cranberry fruit, we use the exact same pathway model as described above for blueberry fruit.
Transfer of inoculum from fruit waste to cultivated and naturally occurring Vaccinium plants.
Three kinds of waste were considered in the entry pathways of blueberry and cranberry fruit:
• Waste at packing house, partly composted
• Waste at retail not relevant: goes to landﬁll and incineration (low risk)
• Waste at consumer partly composted
Waste at processing was not considered, because all the fruit for processing is frozen. Across
Europe, a large portion of waste is buried in landﬁll or incinerated. Especially, the waste at retail is
expected to go to landﬁll or incinerator. This waste is assumed to pose no risk. Risk may exist if fruit
waste is composted, in particular before the start of the composting process. In such cases, spores
may be produced, especially from little branches (e.g. fruit stalks) contained in the waste. The most
likely transfers occur at the packing house, which is often at the same location as berry production,
and may use composting, and consumer waste, which may be composted in home gardens with
Vaccinium plants being present.
Entry pathway 3: Blueberry plants for planting in plug trays (Vaccinium
corymbosum)
Blueberry plants for planting are produced according to a strict scheme of quality control, with the
original material originating from tissue culture. This original material is multiplied in protected
glasshouses for most of the time.
The total yearly trade of blueberry plants for planting constitutes the variable PE0 (we use P to
distinguish from berries, N).
Level of risk is considered to be homogeneous across countries with high and low prevalence of
D. vaccinii because the plants originate from tissue culture and are multiplied under protected
conditions.
The proportion of infected cuttings shipped from the place of production is !1. We use the Greek
letter epsilon (!) to distinguish entry parameters for the trade in plants for planting from entry
parameters for the trade in berries (Table A.3).
Symbol Meaning
e3 Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being further shipped for
export
e4 Proportion (or multiplier) accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during transport
from Third countries to the EU, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries
e5 Proportion of infected berries that is intercepted at import inspection
e6 Proportion (or multiplier) accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU
transport, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries
e7 Proportion of infected berries that is removed at packing houses in the EU
e8 Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail
e9 Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers
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Additional parameters account for removal of infected plants for planting before export (!
2
), a
change in the proportion of infected plants for planting during transport from third countries to the EU,
e.g. due to cross-contamination (!
3
), the proportion of infected plants for planting that is intercepted
at import inspection (!
4
), a change in the proportion of infected plants for planting during transport
within the EU, e.g. due to cross-contamination (!
5
), and the proportion of infected plants that is
removed at arrival at nurseries in the EU (!
6
).
Formula
The total number of infected blueberry plants for planting (V. corymbosum) that are planted in
nurseries in the EU is then equal to:
PE1 ¼ PE0 # !1 # 1! !2ð Þ # !3 # 1! !4ð Þ # !5 # ð1! !6Þ
Entry pathway 4: Potted plants (Vaccinium spp.)
Three risk categories of countries of origin were distinguished
Low risk: Western USA (Oregon & Washington), Canada, Chile and China as low prevalence
locations of origin
High risk: Central-east USA (Michigan as an example for blueberries; Wisconsin as an example for
cranberries) as high prevalence places of origin
No risk: Places with no D. vaccinii (e.g. California, South Africa, Australia, Argentina)
Entry pathway 5: Cranberry plants for planting in plug trays (from cuttings)
Similar to blueberry plants for planting in plug trays
Entry pathway 6: Cranberry unrooted cuttings
Unrooted cuttings have been imported into the EU from the USA (USDA APHIS, 2017)
The proportion of infected cuttings and number of cuttings (stems) was estimated in a similar way
to that described above for blueberry potted plants.
A.1.2. Assessment of Entry through fruits for the different scenarios
A.1.2.1. Introduction
Comtrade/EUROSTAT data
These data sets provide a unique code and a unique value for all the Vaccinium berries (081040 –
Fruit of Vaccinium spp.), that include blueberry, cranberry and other minor Vaccinum berries. This data
Table A.3: Parameters of the entry model for blueberry plants for planting
Symbol Meaning
!
1
Proportion of blueberry plants for planting (plants in plug trays) infected with D. vaccinii when
leaving the place of production
!
2
Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed before being further shipped for export.
There are no packing houses. The material leaving the nursery goes straight to the port for export.
This parameter was set to zero
!
3
Proportion (or multiplier) accounting for a change in the number of infected plants for planting
during transport from Third countries to the EU, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination
between plants. Transport time is short, conditions are cool, symptoms can in theory develop (latent
becomes visibly infected). No change (but keep the parameter)
!
4
Proportion of infected plants for planting that is intercepted at import inspection (low effect, but
relevant)
!
5
Proportion (or multiplier) accounting for a change in the number of infected plants for planting
during intra-EU transport, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between individual
plants. This parameter was set to one.
!
6
Proportion of infected plants for planting that is removed during presence at the receiving nursery in
the EU
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can be found in Table C.2 (Appendix C), and represent the quantities (tonnes) of berries imported into
EU28 from Third countries.
The infection rate of blueberry and cranberry fruit can differ substantially, and this is the rationale
behind the need to estimate in detail the import of blueberry and cranberry separately.
In order to calculate the ratio between blueberry and cranberry export, the FAOSTAT database was
used. The FAOSTAT database reports export volumes of blueberry and cranberry from all countries,
irrespective of destinations. From these data, the ratios of blueberry/cranberry, for a 10-year period
(2004–2013) were calculated (Table A.4)
These ratios were applied to Comtrade database in order to estimate the import volume into EU28
for blueberry and cranberry separately (Appendices C.3 and C.4).
A summary of import volumes of blueberry and cranberry from countries where D. vaccinii is
present is presented in Table A.5.
A.1.2.2. Entry through blueberry fruit
A.1.2.2.1. Total trade ﬂow from countries with D. vaccinii
NE0 – Estimated total number of blueberries (in millions) imported from countries with ofﬁcial
presence of D. vaccinii into the EU per year
Justiﬁcation: The mean annual volume of blueberry was estimated from the total volume of all
Vaccinium berries imported into EU28 and adjusted for the annual ratios blueberry/cranberry
calculated using FAOSTAT export data. For low-risk countries, there could be variation in the actual
Table A.4: Total import of Vaccinium berries (tonnes) into EU and ratios blueberry/cranberry in the
EU28 import, based on FAOSTAT data
Import of Vaccinium berries
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
11,075 10,942 13,264 12,584 12,922 14,143 18,014 22,485 25,529 28,023
Proportion of blueberries
80.3 81.2 69.6 72.8 61.9 69.5 69.5 64.7 68.0 69.5
Proportion of cranberries
19.7 18.8 30.4 27.2 38.1 30.6 30.5 35.3 32.0 30.6
Table A.5: Data on import into EU28 of cranberry and blueberry from countries where
Diaporthe vaccinii is present. The mean annual estimated volume (tonnes) of cranberry
and blueberry based on trade data of the period 2004–2013. The number of berries was
calculated based on an average weight of 1.8 g/berry (Vargas and Bryla, 2015)
Country
Cranberry Blueberry Cranberry Blueberry
Annual average (kg) Number of berries
Belarus(a) 277,095 729,135 251,890,909 405,083,333
Canada 128,850 265,303 117,136,363 147,377,777
Chile 1,939,769 4,221,212 1,763,427,273 2,345,111,111
China(a) 6,415 14,562 5,831,924 8,100,000
Russian Federation(a) 259,748 861,914 236,134,639 478,844,444
USA 405,987 979,225 369,081,818 544,027,777
(a): Based on several publications (Dokukina, 2001; Galynskaya et al., 2011; Galynskaya and Liaguskiy, 2012; QingHua et al.,
2015), D. vaccinii is presumably present in these countries.
Table A.6: Estimated total number of blueberries imported from high- and low-risk countries
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 272 408 544 816 1,088
Low-risk countries (all others) 1,692 2,538 3,384 5,076 6,769
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ratio between blueberry/cranberry, but the average is assumed to be similar to the high-risk country
(US). To calculate the number of berries, the estimated mean weight of one berry was used. The
average ratio blueberry/cranberry was derived from US data. (Source: Comtrade.un.org).
File: Import of Vaccinium berry fruits (weight in kg) – Comtrade -01_feb_2017v2_Wageningen.xls
Uncertainty: As median value the estimated import value based on import data is used. We
assume a normal distribution. Uncertainty is mainly due to variation in mean berry weight and annual
variation in import quantities (1.1–1.8) (McManus et al., Univ. of Wisconsin, Plant Disease Management
Reports 2003–2014; http://www.plantmanagementnetwork.org/pub/trial/PDMR/; Vargas and Bryla,
2015). There are differences among varieties and production systems.
A.1.2.2.2. Trade ﬂow of berries infected by D. vaccinii
e1 – Prevalence level; Proportion of blueberry production ﬁelds infected with D. vaccinii in countries
with ofﬁcial presence of the pathogen.
Justiﬁcation: High-risk countries (US): in East US (Michigan, Georgia, New Jersey) the prevalence
level of D. vaccinii in blueberry can be very high (0.9). For West US (Washington, Oregon) the
prevalence level is estimated to be 0.1. The estimated median prevalence is assumed to be 0.6. Low-
risk countries: there is no detailed information on the prevalence level of D. vaccinii in the low-risk
countries. The median estimate is based on the low prevalence level (0.1) in the west US. The climate
in Chile is similar to the West US.
Uncertainty: Variation and incomplete information in prevalence levels within and between
countries, incomplete information about which blueberry producing regions export to the EU. Correct
identiﬁcation of Phomopsis species.
Justiﬁcation: The proportion of ﬁelds with D. vaccinii will likely be the same in high-risk countries
when quarantine regulations are lifted. In low-risk countries, removal of quarantine status will likely
promote the spread of the disease so that the levels will become similar to those of the high-risk
countries.
Uncertainty: Variation and incomplete information in prevalence levels within and between
countries, incomplete information about which blueberry producing regions export to the EU. Correct
identiﬁcation of Phomopsis species.
Justiﬁcation: Extra RROs will not affect the prevalence of the disease in high- and low-risk
countries.
Uncertainty: Variation and incomplete information in prevalence levels within and between
countries, incomplete information about which blueberry producing regions export to the EU. Correct
identiﬁcation of Phomopsis species.
Table A.7: Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin under A0
A0 – current situation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 0.1 0.45 0.6 0.70 0.9
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.03
Table A.8: Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin under A1
A1 – deregulation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 0.1 0.45 0.6 0.70 0.9
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.15 0.3
Table A.9: Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin under A2
A2 – stricter measures 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 0.1 0.45 0.6 0.70 0.9
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.03
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A.1.2.2.3. Proportion of infected fruits (visible and latent infections) at harvest in the
countries of origin under A0
The incidence of D. vaccinii is lower in Chile than in the US because of the dry mediterranean
climate (Schilder, pers. Comm.)
e2 – Incidence level; Proportion of blueberry fruit harvested in ﬁelds with presence of D. vaccinii
that are infected with the fungus. This includes latent infections.
Justiﬁcation: High-risk countries: the Plant Disease Management Reports (PDMR) contain
information on the incidence levels (visibly D. vaccinii infected blueberry) in east US. The range of
incidence levels in east US is from 0.02 to 0.19. The median incidence level is estimated to be 0.09 in
eastern US. The estimated incidence level in west US is 0.009. The median incidence level for the
whole US is estimated to be 0.06, because most berries exported to the EU originate from east US.
Low-risk countries: the incidence level of D. vaccinii in the most important exporter (Chile) of berries to
EU is assumed to be 100-fold lower compared to high-risk countries.
Uncertainty: Variation and incomplete information on incidence levels within and between
countries exporting to the EU. Correct identiﬁcation of Phomopsis species. There is incomplete
information on proportion of berries with latent infections at the time of harvest.
Justiﬁcation: High-risk countries: we assume that fewer fungicide applications are made resulting
in fruit quality equal to the one for the internal market in those countries. Low-risk countries: the
standard of the internal market may be even lower than in high-risk countries.
Uncertainty: The effect of deregulation on control measures in third countries is uncertain.
Variations among third countries are considerable. There is variation and incomplete information on
incidence levels within and between countries exporting to the EU. Import of berries from low-risk
countries like Chile and China may increase considerably, while spread of D. vaccinii within those
countries in uncertain. Correct identiﬁcation of Phomopsis species. There is incomplete information on
proportion of berries with latent infections at the time of harvest.
Justiﬁcation: High-risk countries: if plants produced from cuttings are restricted to pest-free
production areas, the proportion of infected berries will ultimately go down. Additionally, mandatory
pruning of twig blight affected branches and fungicide applications during ﬂowering would reduce the
proportion of infected berries. Low-risk countries: extra RROs will not affect the proportion of berries
signiﬁcantly compared to the A0 (current) situation.
Uncertainty: The effect of extra control measures in third countries is uncertain due to
uncertainty about the proportion of plants produced from ﬁeld cuttings compared to those produced
from tissue culture. Variation and incomplete information on incidence levels within and between
countries, incomplete information about which blueberry producing regions export to the EU. Correct
identiﬁcation of Phomopsis species. There is incomplete information on proportion of berries with
latent infections at the time of harvest.
Table A.10: Proportion of fruits infected by D. vaccinii in infected ﬁelds under A0
A0 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.15
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.00015
Table A.11: Proportion of fruits infected by D. vaccinii in infected ﬁelds under A1
A1 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.2
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.001 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.02
Table A.12: Proportion of fruits infected by D. vaccinii in infected ﬁelds under A2
A2 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA) 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.015
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.00015
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A.1.2.2.4. Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
further shipped for export
e3 – Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being further
shipped for export
Justiﬁcation: Table blueberries are generally handpicked (early season), whereas berries destined
for processing are harvested mechanically in the late growing season. Handpicked berries are mostly
healthy looking (but may have latent infection) while mechanically harvested berries may include
higher number of infected berries. Mechanically harvested fruit is mostly frozen and used for
processing; frozen fruit is not considered in this risk assessment because pathogen containing waste is
negligible. The incubation period for visible symptoms on harvested ripe berries is 2–3 weeks (Schilder,
pers. comm.). We assume that at the time of harvest 10% of the infected berries show symptoms of
infection and 90% are latent infections. Here, we elicit the removal rate over the visibly infected fruit;
the latent infected berries are assumed to remain undetected. We assume that culling of symptomatic
berries is 100% effective. The median proportion of latent infected berries is assumed 0.9. In case the
harvest is delayed a higher proportion of infected berries will show symptoms, but still 50% of the
infected berries will be asymptomatic. Therefore, the 1% quantile is set at 0.5.
Uncertainty: The proportion of latently infected berries present. There are other diseases with
similar symptoms as D. vaccinii. Effect of harvesting procedure: mechanical damage caused by
mechanical harvesting.
Justiﬁcation: Deregulation may lead to less stringent inspection at the packing house affecting
the 75% and 99% efﬁciency levels.
Uncertainty: Removal of visibly infected berries for export may remain the same or be less
effective.
Justiﬁcation: The inspection efﬁciency will not be affected by extra control measures in the ﬁeld.
Uncertainty: The same as under the A0 current situation.
A.1.2.2.5. Proportion of infected berries removed after export inspection
e3b – Proportion of infected berries removed after export inspection
Table A.13: Proportion of visibly infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
further shipped for export under A0
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0.5 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99
Table A.14: Proportion of visibly infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
further shipped for export under A1
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A1 – deregulation 0.5 0.85 0.9 0.92 0.95
Table A.15: Proportion of visibly infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
further shipped for export under A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A2 – stricter regulation 0.5 0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99
Table A.16: Proportion of visibly infected berries removed after export inspection
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 1 1 1 1 1
A1 – deregulation 1 1 1 1 1
A2 – stricter measures 1 1 1 1 1
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Justiﬁcation: Assuming that an export inspection is based on visual inspection of consignments
the proportion of infected berries remains the same as after packing house inspection.
Uncertainty: It is not sure if inspection prior to export is as effective as inspection at the packing
house.
A.1.2.2.6. Number of infected berries during transport from Third countries to the EU
e4 – Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during transport from
Third countries to the EU, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries
Justiﬁcation: Berries are transported at low temperatures and/or under controlled atmosphere by
air or ship (20% air transport, 1 day; 80% ship transport, 2–3 weeks, 1–2°C). We assume that there is
no change in the number of infected berries during transport. There are no speciﬁc requirements
concerning transport; thus, deregulation would not affect this multiplier. Stricter requirements, for
example mandatory controlled atmosphere transportation would not be more effective than the
current voluntary measures taken during transport.
Uncertainty: The uncertainty is considered very low.
A.1.2.2.7. Proportion of infected berries that is intercepted at import inspection
e5 – Proportion of infected berries that is intercepted at import inspection
Justiﬁcation: There are no records of interception of D. vaccinii berries in the EU. As for the export
inspection, the import inspection is assumed not to change the number of D. vaccinii-infected berries.
Uncertainty: Uncertainty is considered to be negligible.
A.1.2.2.8. Change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU transport
e6 – Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU transport,
e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries
Justiﬁcation: Transport time within the EU is so short that there are no changes in the number of
infected fruit.
Uncertainty: None
A.1.2.2.9. Proportion of infected berries that is removed at packing houses in the EU
e7 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed at packing houses in the EU
Table A.17: Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during transport
under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 1 1 1 1 1
A1 – deregulation 1 1 1 1 1
A2 – stricter measures 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.18: Percentage of infected fruit being intercepted at EU customs
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0 0 0 0 0
A1 – deregulation 0 0 0 0 0
A2 – stricter measures 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.19: Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU
transport under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 1 1 1 1 1
A1 – deregulation 1 1 1 1 1
A2 – stricter measures 1 1 1 1 1
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Justiﬁcation: Bulk shipments likely contain a higher proportion of infected fruit than shipments in
small packages (clam shells). Bulk shipments may also contain some leaves and other plant material.
Most blueberries are imported in clam shells but may be resorted and repackaged after arrival in the
EU (GianLuca Savini, hearing expert, personal communication). We assume that only a small
proportion of latently infected berries develop symptoms because shipments are transported under
refrigeration. Waste removal of imported berries is around 3–5% of all presorted berries. The median
is taken as 0.3. This percentage may be higher in bulk shipments; therefore, the 99% is considered to
be 0.1. Waste is assumed to be deposited at the local council composting facility, and could potentially
become a source of infection if the composting is not carried out properly (Gianluca Savini, hearing
expert, personal communication).
Deregulation does not affect the sorting efﬁciency because there is no regulation on sorting of culls
in place for packing houses. Extra regulations on cull sorting would not affect the proportion of
infected berries removed because the visibly infected berries are already removed under the current
situation.
Uncertainty: The proportion of berries shipped in bulk (unsorted at the source) is uncertain but
bulk shipment does take place, for example from Chile.
A.1.2.2.10. Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail in the EU
e8 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail in the EU
Justiﬁcation: When retailers check for berry defects, they will not inspect individual berries.
Instead, they will discard whole clam shells even if there is only one infected berry. Moreover, storage
of the clam shells is longer than in packing houses. Therefore, we assume that the culling rate is
higher than at stage 8 providing time for more latently infected berries to become symptomatic. The
waste ﬂow of discarded clam shells is assumed to go to the general waste which can be a landﬁll or
incineration. Deregulation or stricter regulatory measures will not affect the proportion of berries
culled.
Uncertainty: The inspection and sorting procedure for clam shells with blueberries is uncertain.
Moreover, the quality of the berries is affected by the turnover rate in a store.
A.1.2.2.11. Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers in the EU
e9 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers (waste)
Justiﬁcation: Compared to the retail conditions the storage of berries may be longer resulting in
increased rot. The waste ﬂow of discarded blueberries is assumed to be maximum 20%. It is assumed
Table A.20: Percentage of infected fruit being culled at packing houses in the EU under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1
A1 – deregulation 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1
A2 – stricter measures 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1
Table A.21: Percentage of infected fruit being culled at retail in the EU under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.2
A1 – deregulation 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.2
A2 – stricter measures 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.12 0.2
Table A.22: Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers (waste)
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.2
A1 – deregulation 0 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.2
A2 – stricter measures 0 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.2
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that 50% of discarded food (berries) is treated as organic waste and 50% is discarded as general
waste. Deregulation or stricter regulatory measures will not affect the proportion of berries culled.
Uncertainty: The storage conditions and rate of consumption vary considerably.
A.1.2.3. Entry through cranberry fruit
A.1.2.3.1. Total trade ﬂow of cranberries from countries with D. vaccinii
NE0 – Total number of cranberries (in millions) imported from countries that have D. vaccinii into
the EU per year.
Justiﬁcation: The mean annual volume of cranberry was estimated from the total volume of all
Vaccinium berries imported into EU28 (2006–2013), based on the annual ratios of blueberry/cranberry
calculated using FAOSTAT export data. To calculate the number of berries, the estimated mean weight
of one berry was used. The calculated numbers (in millions of berries) were used as median values.
Uncertainty: USA and Canada were considered high-risk export countries, and the other countries
with export to EU28 as low-risk countries, but the exact export numbers for these two categories are
uncertain, because the numbers are averages of berry imports from 2006 to 2013, while imports have
likely grown in the meantime, especially from Chile. There are also differences in berry weight among
varieties and production methods; the variation is uncertain.
A.1.2.3.2. Trade ﬂow of cranberries infected by D. vaccinii into the EU per year
e1 – Proportion of cranberry production ﬁelds infected with D. vaccinii in countries with the
presence of the pathogen.
Justiﬁcation: The median proportions in high-risk countries are based on incidence levels in the
USA and Canada (Olatinwo et al., 2004; Sabaratnam et al., 2016). The proportions in low-risk
countries are the same as those for blueberries.
Uncertainty: There are regional differences in incidence of viscid rot in the high-risk countries and
even greater differences among the low-risk countries. In Belarus and Russia, the pathogen was
identiﬁed from morphological characteristics only, while molecular identiﬁcation tools were used in
China and Chile. The disease incidence in Belarus and Russia is highly uncertain but most of the import
is form Chile.
Justiﬁcation: Deregulation will likely not affect the proportion of ﬁelds affected by D. vaccinii in
high-risk areas. It may increase the number of small farmers that export cranberries to the EU,
potentially resulting in a higher proportion of export ﬁelds affected.
Uncertainty: The same as for the current situation in high-risk areas, but increased uncertainty in
low-risk areas if smaller farmers participate in the export of cranberries.
Table A.23: Total number of cranberries (in millions) imported from countries that have D. vaccinii
into the EU per year
A0, A1 and A2 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 450 470 486 490 500
Low-risk countries (Belarus, Chile, China, Russia) 1,800 2,000 2,257 3,000 4,514
Table A.24: Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin under A0
A0 – current situation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 0.8 0.87 0.9 0.93 1
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.03
Table A.25: Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin under A1
A1 – deregulation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 0.8 0.87 0.9 0.93 1
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.01 0.02 0.025 0.05
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Justiﬁcation: Extra regulation will likely not affect the proportion of ﬁelds affected by D. vaccinii in
both high-risk and low-risk areas.
Uncertainty: The uncertainty is the same as for the current situation in both high-risk and low-risk
areas.
A.1.2.3.3. Proportion of cranberry fruit harvested in ﬁelds with presence of D. vaccinii
that are infected with the fungus
e2 – Proportion of cranberry fruit harvested in ﬁelds with the presence of D. vaccinii that are
infected with the fungus. This includes latent infections.
Justiﬁcation: The median proportions in high-risk countries are based on incidence levels in the
USA and Canada (Olatinwo et al., 2004; Sabaratnam et al., 2016; P. MacManus, personal
communication; A. Schilder, hearing expert). The incidence of D. vaccinii is lower in Chile than in the
eastern US and Canada because of the dry Mediterranean climate. We assumed that the incidence is
100 times lower in low-risk countries.
Uncertainty: There are regional differences in incidence of viscid rot in the high-risk countries and
even greater differences among the low-risk countries. Latent infections are highly uncertain, but were
demonstrated in Canada (Sabaratnam et al., 2016).
Justiﬁcation: High-risk countries: we assume that fewer fungicide applications are made resulting
in fruit quality equal to the one for the internal market in those countries which is inferior quality
compared to the current export quality. The proportions are based on Canadian data (Sabaratnam
et al., 2016). Low-risk countries: the standard of the internal market may be even lower than in high-
risk countries. We assume that the incidence levels are 10 times higher than in the A0 current
situation.
Uncertainty: The effect of deregulation of control measures in third countries is uncertain.
Variations among third countries are considerable. There is variation and incomplete information on
incidence levels within and between countries exporting to the EU. Import of berries from low-risk
countries like Chile and China may increase considerably, while spread of D. vaccinii within those
countries is uncertain. Infection by the D. vaccinii results in distinct symptoms, viscid rot but the
proportion of latent infection is even higher than in blueberries. There is incomplete information on the
proportion of berries with latent infections at the time of harvest. The uncertainty range is considered
to be similar to the current situation.
Table A.26: Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin under A2
A2 – stricter measures 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 0.8 0.87 0.9 0.93 1
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.015 0.03
Table A.27: Proportion of infected fruit (symptomatic and latent) at harvest under A0
A0 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.41
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0006 0.0014 0.0018 0.0024 0.0041
Table A.28: Proportion of infected fruit (symptomatic and latent) at harvest under A1
A1 – deregulation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.34 0.61
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.006 0.014 0.018 0.024 0.041
Table A.29: Proportion of infected fruit (symptomatic and latent) at harvest under A2
A2 – stricter regulation 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
High-risk countries (USA, Canada) 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.41
Low-risk countries (all others) 0.0006 0.0014 0.0018 0.0024 0.0041
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Justiﬁcation: Mandatory fungicide applications and other extra regulations would not affect
control in high-risk areas, where fungicides are already applied on 50–100% of the farms
(P. MacManus, personal communication; Table A.30). We assume that the incidence levels are similar
to those in the A0 situation.
Uncertainty: The effect of extra regulation of control measures (such as mandatory fungicide
applications) in third countries is uncertain. The uncertainty range is considered to be similar to the
current situation (A0).
A.1.2.3.4. Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
shipped for export
e3 – Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being shipped for
export.
Justiﬁcation: We assume 90% visible infection and 10% latent infection. The removal rate is
limited to visibly infected fruit; the latently infected berries all go through.
Uncertainty: The uncertainty is very low because exporters want to ship symptomless berries.
Latent infection cannot be detected but detection and removal of symptomatic berries is almost
perfect.
Justiﬁcation: We still assume 90% visible infection and 10% latent infection. The removal rate is
limited to visibly infected fruit, but is lower than in A0 situation.
Uncertainty: Deregulation may loosen the inspection standards and thus decrease the per cent
removal. The uncertainty is slightly higher in this situation compared to A0.
Justiﬁcation: We still assume 90% visible infection and 10% latent infection. The removal rate is
limited to visibly infected fruit, and is the same as in the A0 situation.
Uncertainty: The uncertainty is similar to the situation A0.
Table A.33: Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
shipped for export under A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A2 – stricter measures 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 1
Table A.30: Proportion of Cranberry fruit showing disease symptoms under different management
regimes
Literature data 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Cranberry (sprayed, including symptomatic) (Plant disease
management reports of the APS)
1 8 11 14 21
Cranberry (unsprayed) (Plant disease management reports of the APS) 4.7 50 89
Latent infection, Infection showing after 3 weeks of incubation at
room temperature (Sabaratnam et al., 2016)
11 20 24 34 61
Estimated average cranberry infection (sprayed and latent) 6 14 18 24 41
Table A.31: Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
shipped for export under A0
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 1
Table A.32: Proportion of infected berries that are removed at packing houses before being
shipped for export under A1
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A1 – deregulation 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.97 0.99
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A.1.2.3.5. Change in the number of infected berries during transport from Third countries
to the EU
e4 – Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during transport from
Third countries to the EU, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries
Justiﬁcation: Berries are transported at low temperatures by air or ship (20% air transport,
1 day; 80% ship transport, 2–3 weeks, 1–2°C). We assume that there is no change in the number of
infected berries during transport. There are no speciﬁc requirements concerning transport; thus,
deregulation would not affect this multiplier. Stricter requirements would not be more conducive than
the current voluntary measures taken during transport.
Uncertainty: The uncertainty is considered negligible.
A.1.2.3.6. Proportion of infected berries that is intercepted at import inspection
e5 – Proportion of infected berries that is intercepted at import inspection.
Justiﬁcation: There are no records of interception of D. vaccinii cranberries in the EU. The import
inspection is assumed not to change the number of D. vaccinii infected berries.
Uncertainty: Uncertainty is considered to be negligible.
A.1.2.3.7. Change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU transport
e6 – Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU transport,
e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries.
Justiﬁcation: Transport time within EU is so short that there are only very minor changes in the
number of visibly infected fruit but this does not result in a multiplier effect. Changes in regulations
have no effect on the multipliers.
Uncertainty: Uncertainty is considered to be negligible.
A.1.2.3.8. Proportion of infected berries that is removed at packing houses in the EU
e7 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed at packing houses in the EU.
Table A.36: Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during intra-EU
transport under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 1 1 1 1 1
A1 – deregulation 1 1 1 1 1
A2 – stricter measures 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.34: Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected berries during transport
under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 1 1 1 1 1
A1 – deregulation 1 1 1 1 1
A2 – stricter measures 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.35: Percentage of infected fruit being intercepted at EU customs
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0 0 0 0 0
A1 – deregulation 0 0 0 0 0
A2 – stricter measures 0 0 0 0 0
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Justiﬁcation: We assume that only a small proportion of latently infected berries develop
symptoms because shipments are transported under refrigeration. Waste removal of imported berries
is around 3–5% of all presorted berries. The median is taken as 0.3. This percentage may be higher in
bulk shipments; therefore, the 99% is considered to be 0.1. The maximum number of bags removed is
assumed to be 10%. These bags will likely go to municipal landﬁll or incineration facility. Changes in
regulation are likely not affecting the removal rates.
Uncertainty: All fresh cranberries are shipped in plastic bags ready for retail. Some latent
infections become symptomatic in transport but the exact proportion is uncertain. Berries affected by
viscid rot are easily spotted in the bags, and whole bags with one or more rotten berries will be
removed. The removal rate is highly uncertain but will likely not exceed 10%.
Percentage of infected fruit being culled at the retail
A.1.2.3.9. Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail in the EU
e8 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail.
Justiﬁcation: At room temperature symptoms of viscid rot would develop over time and bags with
symptomatic berries would be removed regularly. The percentages of removal are considered to be
higher than those of blueberries. Changes in regulations will not affect the removal rates.
Uncertainty: The storage procedure may vary among stores. Cranberries are often displayed at
open shelves without refrigeration, and the turnover time is uncertain thus the proportion of
cranberries developing viscid rot is uncertain.
A.1.2.3.10. Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers in the EU
e9 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers (waste).
Justiﬁcation: In the refrigerator, symptoms of viscid rot would develop very slowly. The
percentages of removal are considered to be very low. Changes in regulations will not affect the
removal rates.
Uncertainty: Cranberries are stored in the refrigerator or cooked immediately. Very little viscid rot
will develop at the consumer level. The uncertainty about the removal rate is considered to be low.
Table A.39: Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers (waste) under A0, A1
and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0.0001 0.0007 0.001 0.005 0.01
A1 – deregulation 0.0001 0.0007 0.001 0.005 0.01
A2 – stricter measures 0.0001 0.0007 0.001 0.005 0.01
Table A.37: Percentage of infected fruit being culled at packing house under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1
A1 – deregulation 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1
A2 – stricter measures 0 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.1
Table A.38: Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail under A0, A1 and A2
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 – current situation 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.25
A1 – deregulation 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.25
A2 – stricter measures 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.25
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A.1.3. Assessment of entry through plants for planting for the different
scenarios
A.1.3.1. Introduction
The EPPO Global database indicates that countries ofﬁcially affected are the USA, Canada, Chile
and Latvia. Molecular identiﬁcation data is available from the USA, Canada, Chile, China, and Latvia.
However, the EU countries rarely import plants from Chile (ISEFOR records show only one import of a
consignment of 10 plants) or China (ISEFOR database contains one imported consignment of
Vaccinium from China in 2002). Most imported plants from affected countries are from the USA.
Belarus and Russia are also reported to be affected but no conﬁrmation by molecular identiﬁcation has
been made (Dokukina, 2001; Galynskaya et al., 2011; Galynskaya and Liaguskiy, 2012). Export of
Vaccinium P4P from Belarus and Russia is unknown, although information on general P4P exports to
the EU is reported in the EUROSTAT data base. In some territories exporting P4P to the EU (e.g.
Morocco, Mexico, Argentina, Peru and California), D. vaccinii is not reported to be present. Therefore,
trade from these territories is not considered in the calculation of risk, although the pathogen may be
detected in the future.
Different categories of risk were assigned to territories in the tables below (Tables A.39 and A.40)
according to the prevalence and severity of the disease. Cat 3 countries have zero risk and data from
these territories are not included in the tables for the risk calculations.
The genus Vaccinium is listed in EU decision 2015/789 as a plant known to be susceptible to the
European and non-European isolates of Xylella fastidiosa. Import of Vaccinium plants originating from
areas where X. fastidiosa is known to be present is restricted to ofﬁcially recognised pest-free areas or
pest-free production places. X. fastidiosa is present in the US and the USDA recognises ofﬁcial pest-
free areas for X. fastidiosa in the states Oregon and Washington and ofﬁcial pest-free production
places in Massachusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin. In Table 39, an overview is given of the possibility
for trade in Vaccinium plants from US states where D. vaccinii is present.
The PRA considers uncertainty about the total trade volume, including differences in estimates
depending on the source of information, trends and future projections, and also uncertainty on the
identity of the pathogen.
Table A.40: Possibility to trade Vaccinium plants in relation to Xylella fastidiosa restrictions. The risk
of D. vaccinii infection for each US state is also reported
EPPO Global database –
presence D. vaccinii
Possibility for trade in Vaccinium plants
D. vaccinii risk
category
Arkansas No trade
Illinois No trade
Indiana No trade
Georgia* No trade
Maine No trade
Maryland No trade
Massachusetts Only trade from recognised pest-free production places
(less strict requirements for tissue culture only)
1
Michigan Only trade from recognised pest-free production places
(less strict requirements for tissue culture only)
1
New Jersey No trade
North Carolina No trade
Oregon Inside recognised pest-free area (PFA) all trade allowed;
No trade outside PFA
2
Washington Inside recognised pest-free area (PFA) all trade allowed;
No trade outside PFA
2
Wisconsin Only trade from recognised production places (less strict
requirements for tissue culture only)
1
*: Georgia is not mentioned in EPPO Global database as a state where D. vaccinii is present.
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The PRA distinguishes the following scenarios: A0 = current; A1 = deregulation (removal of speciﬁc
quarantine regulations, while certiﬁcation and inspection remain in place); A2 = additional RROs
described in Section 2.3.1 (in summary, ﬁeld-derived unrooted cuttings prohibited from D. vaccinii-
affected countries. P4P supplied either as small plugs originally from tissue culture, or larger potted
plants from pest-free areas).
A.1.3.2. Blueberries plants for planting
Evidence:
Sources of information on blueberry plants:
1) Need for blueberry plants in the EU:
The need for blueberry plants was calculated based on the planting area, number of plants used
per Ha, turnover (amount of replanting annually for the given production area), and projections for
new areas in the future (projected area for blueberries in 2017: 11,000 ha in EU; Brazelton, 2016).
The average planting density is 3,000 plants/ha (Phil Harmon, hearing expert). Plants are replaced
every 15–20 years (Gianluca Savini, hearing expert). The calculation of how many cuttings would be
needed to ﬁll the demand from replacement of old production sites and new planting provides a
means to estimate the yearly demand for P4P in the ﬁeld. P4P grown from plugs require 2 years of
growth before being transplanted to the production ﬁeld. Thus, projections of the need for plugs are
those projected for the area two years later. This calculation results in about 5.4 million P4P needed in
the EU for 2016 (Table C.16 – Appendix C). Extra plants may be produced or imported to guarantee
that sufﬁcient plants would be available for planting in the ﬁeld one or two years later. Additional
plants imported or produced in the EU are exported to countries surrounding the EU, like Morocco
where blueberry production is increasing rapidly. Large nurseries in the EU can produce their own
plugs from tissue culture. One source of information representing EU nurseries suggests that 90% of
planting material is produced in the EU and the rest from outside sources, and that plug plants
produced from tissue culture are only imported if EU nurseries are short of their own material
(Gianluca Savini, hearing expert). However, the number of plants exported from the USA (about
Table A.42: Risk Summary for Cranberries
Material Risk level
Plugs from cuttings Moderate
Potted plants from cuttings and ornamentals Moderate to high (depends on location)
Bales of stem clippings or unrooted cuttings(a) High
Location Incidence category
C&E USA, Can 1) High
W USA, Chile, China, Belarus(b), Russia(b) 2) Low-moderate or uncertain
Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Morocco, S. Africa, NZ, Australia 3) Zero
(a): Most propagation is from cuttings clipped from production ﬁelds or mother plants.
(b): No formal molecular-based identiﬁcation has been made in these locations.
Table A.41: Risk Summary for Blueberries
Material Risk level
Tissue culture Zero
Plugs from tissue culture Very low
Small potted plants, cuttings and ornamentals Low to high (depends on location)
Location Incidence category
C&E USA 1) High
Can, W USA, Chile, China, Belarus(a), Russia(a) 2) Low-moderate or unknown
Peru, Arg, Mexico, Morocco, S. Africa, NZ, Australia, 3) Zero
(a): No formal molecular-based identiﬁcation has been made in these locations but literature suggests presence of the pathogen
(Dokukina, 2001; Galynskaya et al., 2011; Galynskaya and Liaguskiy, 2012) and high suitability of climate in these locations
(Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017).
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6 million blueberry plants per year according to USA State Certiﬁcation Agencies and the largest
blueberry nursery in the USA) is almost as large as the estimated number of plants needed annually in
the EU (7.7 million). Potential explanations are that (a) nurseries order more plants than needed,
foreseeing potential losses before the plants are ready to be planted in production ﬁelds, (b) the sale
of imported plants to other countries than the importing EU countries and (c) underestimation of the
expansion of blueberry production in the EU used to calculate the needs for plants (Brazelton, 2016).
Because large nurseries intend to move their plug plant production to subsidiaries in the EU (Brazelton,
personal communication), the median number of P4P imported from third countries is taken as 5.5
million in 2017, slightly below the number exported to the EU by the USA in 2016.
2) Import data:
a) The ISEFOR database of 12 importing EU countries provides no information on the type of
Vaccinium plant material. Detailed information on species and type of planting material is
available for the Netherlands (see b, below). Other countries report only ‘Vaccinium plants’
(units: number of plants) and give only the number of consignments and total volume
(weight).
b) The Netherlands import data for 2015 from the Dutch NPPO: all the data on import of
Vaccinium P4P into the Netherlands is recorded under a customs code, summarising the
number of consignments, number of plants and the type of plant material. From this data,
the weight per plant for the different plant types could be estimated. In addition, the total
weight of blueberry plants imported into Spain was provided by the Spanish NPPO; these
data were converted to numbers using the Dutch estimated weight data.
c) The EUROSTAT provides the value (in Euros) of all plants (according to custom codes)
imported from different countries worldwide. The proportions of Vaccinium plants imported
into the EU were estimated based on several conversion factors. Five code categories were
selected of P4P that were closest to the codes for the Vaccinium imports in the Netherlands
(mentioned under b). Next, all countries were selected that provide blueberry plants to the
EU (according to Dutch import data). These countries were grouped into three categories
according to the prevalence of D. vaccinii (absent, low and high). The values in the different
categories were converted to numbers of plants based on estimates of the price per plant for
the different plant categories. The EUROSTAT and FAOSTAT data on acreages of berries were
used to calculate the proportion blueberry area compared to all berry areas. The proportion
of blueberry plants varied according to the type of planting materials (a high proportion for
plugs, and lower proportions for potted plants and unrooted cuttings compared to other P4P
like ornamentals). Finally, the numbers of P4P in the different categories were multiplied by
the estimated proportions of blueberry plants. This resulted in estimates of 2.6 million P4P
from the whole USA and Canada, and 276,000 P4P from countries with low prevalence of D.
vaccinii (Belarus, Chile, China and Russia) in 2015.
3) Export data:
Export data from State Certiﬁcation Agencies and from the largest Vaccinium nursery in the USA
indicate that about 6 million blueberries P4P were exported to the EU from the USA in 2016, and that
most of these exports were small plants (plugs) in trays derived from tissue cultures. Tissue culture
material (aseptic) and larger potted plants were exported less frequently. Altogether, export data
indicate that calculations of P4P based on projected needs and estimated imports underestimate the
number of P4P imported into the EU. However, large nurseries project that the number of P4P (except
for tissue culture) exported to the EU will drop in the near future because subsidiaries of USA
companies have been established recently in the EU and surrounding countries like Morocco, where
P4P are produced. However, import of P4P from Morocco is totally unknown.
A.1.3.2.1. Total trade ﬂow of blueberries from countries with D. vaccinii
PE0 – Trade volumes of plants for planting.
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Justiﬁcation
Calculations from EUROSTAT import data indicate that in 2015, approximately 2.6 million blueberry
P4P were imported from the whole of the USA (EUROSTAT does not distinguish between western and
eastern USA) and Canada, while 300,000 were imported from Belarus, Chile, China and Russia.
However, export data from individual states in the USA (USDA-APHIS, 2017) indicate that much larger
numbers of plants were sent to the EU in 2016 (at least 6 million P4P in total). Thus, the median
values are based on a combination of information from exporters and the need for blueberry plants in
the EU (considering that plugs would be imported 2 years in advance of ﬁeld planting, and that more
plugs are ordered than needed in the EU; see Table C.16).
For this PRA, the USA is split into two incidence categories (cat 1 and cat 2) according to the
central and eastern USA (cat 1 with high prevalence of D. vaccinii) and the western USA (cat 2 with
low prevalence of D. vaccinii). The median estimated number of plugs from cat 1 territories is 200,000,
while that from cat 2 territories is 5,000,000 under the current scenario (slightly less than the number
imported from the Western USA in 2016). Under scenario A1 (deregulation), the number of plugs
imported from third countries would expected to remain the same, if the price does not change
relative to that of locally produced plants. Under scenario A2 (stricter regulation), we predict a slight
decrease in the number of imported plugs from third countries, in favour of a shift of purchasing plugs
from EU nurseries.
Uncertainty
Estimates of uncertainties for the A0 scenario are based on variability in trade volumes over the
past several years as well as variation dependent on the source of information used. A recent increase
in blueberry production in the EU with associated demand for new plants may not be sustained.
Additionally, a greater proportion of P4P may be produced within the EU.
Possible changes in the type of plants imported may occur. Under the A1 scenario, it is possible
that sales of certiﬁed plugs will increase slightly compared to the A0 scenario if growers favour
importing cheaper plug plants. Under the A2 scenario, it is likely that sales of imported plugs will
decrease in favour of EU produced plants. It is not clear how much of a shift in sourcing of plants will
occur as there are no data for scenarios A1 or A2.
A.1.3.2.2. Trade volumes of P4P potted plants including ornamentals (blueberries)
PE0 – Trade volumes of plants for planting.
Table A.43: Trade volumes of P4P plugs (blueberries) predicted for 2017 according to country
incidence category exporting to the EU (based on data reported from 2013–2016) for
the A0, A1 and A2 scenarios, respectively
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA) 50,000 150,000 200,000 300,000 500,000
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 1,000,000 3,500,000 5,000,000 5,500,000 7,000,000
A1
1 (C&E USA) 100,000 300,000 500,000 700,000 1,000,000
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 1,000,000 3,500,000 5,000,000 5,500,000 7,000,000
A2
1 (C&E USA) 50,000 150,000 350,000 500,000 700,000
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 800,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 5,000,000 6,000,000
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Justiﬁcation
Again, the USA is split into two prevalence categories according to the central and eastern USA (high
prevalence) and the western USA (low prevalence). The ratios of potted plants to plug plants were
calculated from export data provided by a large blueberry nursery in the USA (1:20 or 0.05 in 2016).
Under the A1 scenario (deregulation), the number of potted plants from central and eastern USA will
likely increase because this area of the USA is closer to the EU, but the uncertainty range will also
increase. The number of potted plants from the western USA and Canada may decrease accordingly, but
the numbers of potted plants may increase from low cost areas in cat 2 such as China and Belarus (which
exports P4P to the EU according to EUROSTAT data). Thus, the number of plants imported from cat 2
locations is expected to remain the same. Under the A2 scenario, it is likely that sales of potted plants will
reduce due to additional costs associated with restrictions or additional regulations imposed on their
production. The proportional reductions (compared to A0) in the high-risk regions are likely to be greater
than those from the low-risk regions, where pest-free areas can still be found.
Uncertainty
Estimates of uncertainty for the A0 scenario are based on variability in trade volumes over the past
several years. A recent increase in blueberry production in the EU with associated demand for
imported plants may not be sustained. Instead, potted plants may be produced more within the EU or
neighbouring third countries. Moreover, the ratio of potted plants to plug plants may not be 1 in 20
(0.05) but larger (1 in just over 4 (0.24) according to the estimated imports from EUROSTAT data).
Possible changes to the type of plants imported (plugs or more expensive larger potted plants) may
occur. Under the A1 scenario, it is possible that sales of plugs will increase slightly compared to the A0
scenario if growers favour importing new varieties from the USA. Thus, there is a lot of uncertainty
about the calculations and shifts in production and plant imports.
A.1.3.2.3. Proportion of blueberry plants having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin at
the place of production
!1 – Proportion of blueberry plants having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin at the place of
production.
Evidence:
In berry production ﬁelds, the incidence of disease caused by D. vaccinii in cat 1 areas can be quite
high (90–100% of the ﬁelds infected, and 9–40% in-ﬁeld incidence), and the pathogen can be isolated
from a large proportion of symptomless stem sections (Weingartner and Klos, 1975; Parker and Ramsdell,
1977). Even in the best fungicide-treated plots, the percentage of blighted twigs can be as high as 20%
(Cline, 2000, 2007). Unlike the high prevalence and incidence in cat 1 areas, the incidence and severity are
clearly less in cat 2 areas. For example, Oregon has a prevalence of 5–10% (A. Schilder, hearing expert).
While plug plants produced from tissue culture are grown in protected greenhouses and are hardly
exposed to D. vaccinii, large potted plants are grown outdoors at the production site, even when they
Table A.44: Trade volumes of P4P potted plants including ornamentals (blueberries) predicted for
2017 according to country incidence category exporting to the EU (based on data
reported from 2013–2016) for the A0, A1 and A2 scenarios, respectively
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA) 5,000 7,000 10,000 15,000 25,000
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 50,000 175,000 250,000 275,000 350,000
A1
1 (C&E USA) 5,000 30,000 50,000 65,000 100,000
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 50,000 175,000 250,000 275,000 350,000
A2
1 (C&E USA) 1,000 3,500 5,000 6,500 10,000
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 200 20,000 50,000 100,000 200,000
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originate from tissue culture and may therefore be exposed to natural inoculum (A. Schilder and
P. Harmon, hearing experts). Larger potted plants are sometimes imported by EU growers from third
countries and may be infected, e.g. a US consignment of 2-year-old potted blueberry plants to Spain
in 2016 was held up, because they had symptoms similar to twig blight but these were caused by a
related species, D. eres (A. Schilder, hearing expert). There is also trade in various Vaccinium plants
for the ornamental market, including bonsai plants. The quality of potted plants for household use can
be lower than that of plants used for professional berry production (A. Schilder and P. Harmon, hearing
experts).
A.1.3.2.4. Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii on P4P plugs (blueberries)
Justiﬁcation
Infection rates were estimated from expert testimony and the literature on past outbreaks in the
EU (9 outbreaks that were mostly eradicated plus one interception in 20 years). Due to nursery
workers eliminating affected plants, we estimated 2 times more infections are likely to occur than the
nine reported outbreaks (established infections) in the past 20 years in the EU, which means one
infection per year or one in 6 million imported P4P may be infected, which supports evidence provided
by hearing experts. Plugs from tissue culture, produced in glasshouses are now the main source of
new plants and are considered to have the same low risk regardless of location (cat 1 or cat 2). China
is considered a cat 2 country because D. vaccinii was isolated in China (Li et al., 2015; Su et al., 2012
(in GenBank); QingHua et al., 2015; Yue and Liang, 2013 (in GenBank); Zhang et al., 2014 (in
GenBank)), although it does not occur in the EPPO database. Under the A0 scenario, plant producers
keep plants protected and frequently treated with fungicides. Compared to the current A0 scenario, it
is estimated that deregulation (A1) will cause infection rates in traded plug plants to increase slightly
(by a factor of two at these low rates) based on an increased likelihood that some plugs may be left
outdoors for hardening-off and the absence of rejection if D. vaccinii is found during inspections. The
A2 scenario assumed no change in infection rates for plug plants as the infection rate is already low.
Uncertainty
The main uncertainty is due to the absence of information combined with a variation in production
practices and exposure of plugs to inoculum at the controlled production sites. Additional uncertainties
may be due to misidentiﬁcation of infection, and inadvertent control of infection by producers to
control other pathogens or to tidy up plants. It is unclear how scenarios A1 and A2 will impact on the
proportion of plants affected. We have assumed no change other than a small increase under A1 in
high-risk (cat 1) locations.
Table A.45: Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii on P4P plugs (blueberries) predicted for
2017 according to country incidence category exporting to the EU for the A0, A1 and
A2 scenarios
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.0000001 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.000001
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.0000001 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.000001
A1
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.0000008 0.000002
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.0000001 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.000001
A2
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.0000001 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.000001
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.0000001 0.0000002 0.0000004 0.000001
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A.1.3.2.5. Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii on P4P potted plants (blueberries)
e1 – Proportion of blueberry plants having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin at the place of
production.
Justiﬁcation
Large potted plants typically spend 1–3 years outdoors on plastic sheets; they are treated with
fungicides but still may become exposed to some natural inoculum. Smaller potted plants are typically
kept under protection and so are exposed to natural inoculum to a limited extent. Infection rates on
potted plants were estimated from expert testimony. Rates of infection for potted plants are highest
for cat 1 regions and are estimated to be ten times lower for cat 2 regions based on expert testimony.
Infection rates in commercial P4P production facilities are considered to be much lower than those of
berry producers in production ﬁelds. A. Schilder (hearing expert) reported 2–3% infection on potted
P4P grown outside, which is much lower than infection rates reported in commercial production ﬁelds
in Michigan (90% of ﬁelds affected and up to 100% incidence of infection within ﬁelds).
Compared to the current A0 scenario, it is estimated that speciﬁc deregulation (A1) will cause
infection rates in potted plants to increase. This is estimated not to be linear but to vary according to
the inoculum pressure of the region (cat 1 or cat 2 locations). The proportional increase in infection
rates under A1 are estimated as x30 for cat 1 regions and x2 for cat 2 regions, because shipments will
not be rejected when D. vaccinii is present, and the incidence in cat 1 regions may be 15 times as high
as that in cat 2 regions. This is still much less than the proportion of plants affected currently in
production ﬁelds because plant traders will still have commercial pressure to supply healthy plants. The
A2 scenario assumed a reduction by a factor of 100 in infection rates due to the absence of import of
potted plants from D. vaccinii infested areas and more careful inspection during production.
Uncertainty
There are no changes in factors causing uncertainty between scenarios but uncertainty over natural
exposure to inoculum, which varies from location to location, even within the current incidence
categories, is much greater for potted plants than for plugs. Additional uncertainties may be due to
limited data, underreporting or misidentiﬁcation of infection, and inadvertent control of infection by
operations to control other pathogens or to tidy up plants. Plant production and disease control
methods vary from one producer to another, which contributes to uncertainty.
A.1.3.3. Cranberry plants for planting
A.1.3.3.1. Trade volumes of cranberry P4P plugs
PE0 – Trade volumes of plants for planting.
Evidence:
Cranberries are primarily multiplied from local materials in the EU (survey results). Very little
information is available about the importation of cranberry P4P, but the area planted with cranberry in
Table A.46: Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii on P4P potted plants (blueberries)
predicted for 2017 according to country incidence category exporting to the EU for the
A0, A1 and A2 scenarios
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.0001 0.001 0.002 0.003
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
A1
1 (C&E USA) 0.01 0.003 0.030 0.06 0.090
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.00002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006
A2
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.000001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00003
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.0000001 0.000001 0.000002 0.000003
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the EU is much smaller than that with blueberry (FAOSTAT, online), resulting in much lower trade ﬂows
than those of blueberry plants. The numbers of cranberry P4P were derived from:
1) The need for cranberry plants:
The need for cranberry P4P is calculated based on planting area, number of plants per Ha,
and turnover. The yearly demand for P4P is calculated from the number of cuttings needed
to ﬁll the demand from replacement of old production sites and new planting. There are
100,000 upright stems plants per Ha, typically, originating from approx. 40,000 cuttings per
Ha (Patty McManus, personal communication). The turn-over time for cranberry is relatively
long at 25–50 years (time from planting to re-establishing a production ﬁeld). An average
turnover time of 30 years was assumed. Assuming that European nurseries provide 90% of
cranberry P4P (nursery survey results), the demand for imported cranberry P4P is calculated
to be 53,333 per year. All traded plants are V. macrocarpon, i.e. the USA-native species. The
production area for cranberries in the EU is 400 ha (FAOSTAT, 2013a,b). This does not
include a large area of Latvia that produces a different species of cranberry, V. oxycoccus.
2) Export data:
Export data is limited. Information was obtained from the State certiﬁcation agency of
Wisconsin (USDA-APHIS, 2017). A bale of cranberry cuttings was exported to Poland in
2015 and another bale was expected to be exported in 2017.
While some plant producers in the EU use tissue culture for cranberries (G. Savini, hearing expert;
results from questionnaires), cranberry P4P are not routinely produced from tissue culture in the USA.
The vast majority of imported P4P are from cuttings, even in the case of plug plants (Patty McManus,
personal communication). Thus, import of cranberry plug plants is very limited compared to that of
blueberry plants. The demand for cranberry plants is also much less than that for blueberry in the EU
and so trade ﬂows in P4P are also much less.
A.1.3.3.2. Trade volumes of P4P cranberry bales, unrooted cuttings and potted plants
Justiﬁcation
The import of cranberry plants (V. macrocarpon, the USA-native species) was estimated from the
need for plants based on planting area, number of plants per Ha, and turnover (see Table C.16).
Expansion of the cranberry area in the EU is assumed to be very limited. European nurseries are
assumed to provide 90% of cranberry P4P (nursery survey results), leading to an estimation for the
demand for imported cranberry P4P to be about 53,000 per year, but due to uncertainties, the PRA
assumes a median trade ﬂow of 50,000 plugs per year under A0.
The estimated trade ﬂow of tissue culture derived plugs under A1 is based on one-third of A0 in high-
prevalence regions assuming that cheaper cuttings would be used instead of plug plants. We expect no
change in the import of plug plants from the low-prevalence regions under A1. However, under the A2
scenario, no unrooted cuttings or large potted plants would be allowed from severely affected cat 1
Table A.47: Trade volumes of P4P plugs (cranberries) predicted for 2017 according to country
incidence category exporting to the EU
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 5,000 15,000 20,000 30,000 50,000
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 60,000
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 1,000 3,000 8,000 10,000 15,000
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 60,000
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 5,000 15,000 15,000 25,000 40,000
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 10,000 20,000 35,000 45,000 70,000
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regions and this change could lead to a slight increase in plug plants from less-affected regions like the W
USA, accompanied by a similar decrease in plug plants from the high-prevalence areas.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is mainly due to a lack of data on imported cranberry plants. Cranberry plants are often
multiplied locally from the mowings of existing cranberry production ﬁelds, but import of high-yielding
USA cultivars is possible. Trade ﬂows in imported cranberry plants were estimated at approximately
one-tenth that of blueberry plants but vary tremendously due to changes in demand. Uncertainty
about import of P4P from low-prevalence areas is even greater, but cranberry production is increasing
in Chile and China, which may lead to increased numbers of P4P exported to the EU. However, the
uncertainty about this is large.
Justiﬁcation
Although there is little information about the import of potted plants into the EU, information
supplied by the State Authorities in Wisconsin (emails on February 3 and 6, 2017) indicated that one
bale of cranberry mowings (about 25 kg) from a production ﬁeld was exported to Poland in 2015. The
material was accompanied by a certiﬁcate because the ﬁeld had been inspected and found free from
visible symptoms. It was estimated that one bale of 25 kg could supply 3,000 unrooted cranberry
cuttings. In addition, 500 potted plants were estimated in the trade ﬂow from cat 1 areas. Only 1,000
potted plants were estimated to be exported from cat 2 areas, which are located at a greater distance
from the EU compared to cat 1 areas.
The estimated trade ﬂow of unrooted cuttings and potted plants under A1 is estimated at double
that from under A0, because unrooted cuttings are a cheaper source of plants and the risk of
rejections due to D. vaccinii would be reduced, even though import and export inspections would
remain in place. However, under the A2 scenario, no unrooted cuttings or large potted plants would be
allowed from severely affected cat 1 regions, leading to a slight increase from less-affected regions.
Uncertainty
Trade ﬂows in cranberry plants and cuttings are highly uncertain due to the absence of ﬁrm trade
data. The main variation is due to variations in demand and price, including transportation costs.
There may also be unregulated movement of P4P for example from non-EU Eastern European
countries into the EU (personal communication Tomasz Kałuski, Instytut Ochrony Roslin, Poland).
A.1.3.3.3. Proportion of cranberry P4P infected with D. vaccinii predicted
e1 – Proportion of cranberry plants having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin at the place of
production.
Evidence:
There is little quantitative information in the literature on the incidence or severity of D. vaccinii-
induced dieback on cranberry plants. A. Schilder (hearing expert) and P. McManus (consulted expert)
Table A.48: Trade volumes of P4P bales, unrooted cuttings and potted plants (cranberries)
predicted for 2017 according to country incidence category exporting to the EU
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 1,500 3,500 4,500 10,000
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 500 1,000 2,500 5,000
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 3,000 7,000 9,000 20,000
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 500 1,000 2,500 5,000
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0 0 0 0
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 1500 3,000 4,500 8,000
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reported the percentage of cranberry plants infected with D. vaccinii as 1–20% and the prevalence (%
ﬁelds affected) as 80% in C&E USA (cat 1). Individual twigs were reported to become infected and die
in a matter of weeks but the whole plant does not die, which is partially the reason why the disease
can persist. P. McManus reports higher disease pressure in New Jersey, which is an important
production area for new varieties that are traded overseas.
Incidence of infection is thought to be higher for cranberry than for blueberry as production ﬁelds
are used for propagation. Nevertheless, no interceptions of cranberry P4P have occurred in the EU to
date, possibly due to the relatively low numbers of imported cranberry plants. However, recent
outbreaks in Poland were on cranberries (Michalecka et al., 2017).
As bales of cranberry cuttings were not imported into the EU until recently and the risk of introduction
of D. vaccinii with cranberry fruit is likely minimal, the PRA used the number of D. vaccinii outbreaks on
cranberries in the EU during the past ten years to estimate the percentages of infected cranberry plants
introduced into the EU. The difference between plugs and potted plants is minimal in this respect,
because both are produced from cuttings exposed to D. vaccinii in areas where D. vaccinii occurs. The
ﬁrst report of D. vaccinii on cranberry in the EU was in Lithuania in 2004 (EPPO data). A second outbreak
on V. macrocarpon occurred in 2013 in Poland (Michalecka et al., 2017). The number of imported
infected plants is estimated to be two times more than the number of outbreaks due to nursery workers
eliminating affected plants by routine rogueing without formally identifying the pathogen.
Justiﬁcation
Plugs of cranberry plants are generally not produced from tissue culture, although they are grown
under controlled conditions. Assuming that 20,000 plug plants (plus 500 potted plants) were imported
every year from high-risk countries, and 200,000 in 10 years, two outbreaks but four imports would
result from a 0.00002 proportion of plants infected. Thus, in cat 1 areas, plug plants can have a
signiﬁcant infection risk, but the estimate is between that of blueberry plugs (from tissue culture) and
blueberry potted plants. Infection rates in cat 2 areas are considered 100-fold lower than those in cat
1 areas based on expert opinion.
Under the A1 scenario, infection rates for plug plants are estimated to be twofold higher than those
under the A0 scenario in both the high-prevalence and low-prevalence regions, because no rejections
due to the D. vaccinii presence would be expected, although export inspection and certiﬁcation and
import inspection would remain in place. Under A2, no changes in infection rates are expected for plug
plants from cat 2 areas as infection risk is low. However, under A2, the infection rates are thought to
be 10-fold reduced by the extra regulations in cat 1 areas, because stricter regulations will be in place
for greenhouse production. No change is predicted for cat 2 regions.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty in the proportion of plants affected is due to natural variability in exposure of plants to
the pathogen, when plants are not produced from tissue culture. Moreover, the proportion of plants
affected may increase in cat 2 regions or countries currently without the pathogen present (cat 3) that
may change to cat 2.
Table A.49: Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii on P4P plugs (cranberries) predicted for
2017 according to country incidence category exporting to the EU
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.000002 0.00002 0.00005 0.0001
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00000002 0.0000002 0.0000005 0.000001
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.000004 0.00004 0.0001 0.0002
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00000004 0.0000004 0.000001 0.000002
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.0000002 0.000002 0.000005 0.00001
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00000002 0.0000002 0.0000005 0.000001
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A.1.3.3.4. Proportion of cranberry P4P bales, unrooted cuttings and potted plants
predicted to be infected with D. vaccinii
e1 – Proportion of cranberry plants having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin at the place of
production.
The infection rates on potted plants and bales are considered to be higher than that on plugs, even
though all categories are originating from stem cuttings. Bales are imported straight from an inspected
production ﬁeld, but it is difﬁcult to inspect all plants in a ﬁeld. Infection rates for potted plants and
bales are highest for cat 1 regions and estimated to be 100-fold higher than plugs. Bales are not
imported from cat 2 locations, and the infection rates are considered the same as those of plugs.
Under the A1 scenario, infection rates for potted plants and bales of plants (unrooted cuttings) are
estimated to be twofold higher than those under the A0 scenario in both the cat 1 and cat 2 regions,
because no rejections due to the D. vaccinii presence would be expected, although export inspection
and certiﬁcation and import inspection would remain in place. Under A2, no cranberry cuttings or
potted plants will be allowed from cat 1 regions (disease risk 0), while no change in infection rate is
predicted for cat 2 regions, as rejection of loads with D. vaccinii symptoms will remain in place.
Uncertainty
Variation in the proportion of plants affected is included in the range presented in the table and is
due to natural variability in exposure of plants to the pathogen, particularly for unrooted cuttings
(bales) and large potted plants which have been outdoors.
Additional uncertainty remains due to the proportion of plants affected potentially increasing in cat 2
regions or countries currently without the pathogen present. There is also large uncertainty about potential
imports from Belarus; free movement of people from this country into Poland (100 km from the border) is
allowed (Tomasz Kałuski, Instytut Ochrony Roslin, Poland, personal communication). The disease has been
reported as being widespread, but the pathogen has not been identiﬁed with molecular tools in Belarus.
A.1.3.3.5. Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed before being further
shipped for export. There are no packing houses. The material leaving the
nursery goes straight to the port for export. (both blueberry and cranberry)
e2 – This parameter was set to zero.
A.1.3.3.6. Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at export inspection
at the EU point of entry (both blueberry and cranberry)
e3 – Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at export inspection at the EU
point of entry (both blueberry and cranberry).
A phytosanitary certiﬁcate is added to each shipment of plants. This is issued by the State plant
pest regulatory agency, who visit the production site and check before export, whether the
Table A.50: Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii on P4P bales, unrooted cuttings and
potted plants (cranberries) predicted for 2017 according to country incidence category
exporting to the EU
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.0002 0.002 0.005 0.01
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00000002 0.0000002 0.0000005 0.000001
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.0004 0.004 0.01 0.02
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00000004 0.0000004 0.000001 0.000002
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0 0 0 0
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00000002 0.0000002 0.0000005 0.000001
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consignment is compliant with the requirements. Therefore, there is currently no additional inspection
at the exporting country border and this process.
In all cases, 100% of the symptomatic plants are assumed to be removed before shipment.
Weingartner and Klos (1975) isolated D. vaccinii from 38% of 242 symptomless stem sections, and
25% of 38 symptomatic stem sections in Michigan and Indiana. For this PRA, it is assumed that about
half of the infections are asymptomatic at the plant production stage. Therefore, only half of the
infected plants are assumed to be removed before they are shipped.
A.1.3.3.7. Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at import inspection
at the EU point of entry
Evidence:
Currently only < 1% of plugs in trays are inspected at the EU border (although it is assumed that
the exporting company removed any symptomatic plants before shipment and the recipient company
will also make an inspection). For larger potted plants, a more detailed inspection at the EU border is
thought to occur. No increase in abundance is likely during transport of plants carrying symptomless
infections. However, the appearance of symptoms from existing infections can occur, which may affect
subsequent detection if plants are inspected. No change in the appearance of infection is likely with air
freighted plants due to travel time being very short but appearance of new symptoms on latently
infected plants could occur with surface shipped plants (in particular potted plants), allowing the
possibility of border inspection noticing some infections.
The incubation period (time from infection to symptom development) on blueberry ranges from
3 weeks to 3 months (A. Schilder, hearing expert). There was only one notiﬁcation in EUROPHYT in
the last 30 years, which was in 1996, when Milano airport identiﬁed D. vaccinii on Vaccinium P4P from
the USA. No increase in abundance is likely during transport of plants with symptomless infections.
However, the appearance of existing infections that were incubating can occur, which may affect
subsequent detection if plants are inspected.
Justiﬁcation
The table above shows proportions of infected plants that could be detected and removed, not a
proportion of all plants. The numbers in the tables are used to calculate the number of infected plants
removed from the entry pathway at the border inspection. Proportions are very low for plugs because the
plants are young and so there are usually no developed symptoms. Any visual symptoms will be small and
easily missed; the main symptom being wilted shoots. Our estimate of likely detection is based on expert
opinion with a median at one detection per thousand infected plants and an upper (99%) range a factor
of ten less than that and a lower (1%) range at zero (i.e. unable to detect any infected plants because
they are all latent infections). In addition, currently only < 1% of plugs in trays are inspected at the EU
border. We assume that > 99% of infected P4P are symptomless infections when packed for export
because those with symptoms will be discarded by the producer before export. Hence, the table above
shows only the proportion of infected plants that might be detected and removed. No changes to these
values are expected under scenarios A1 nor A2 and there is no difference in the chance of an infected
Table A.51: Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and
removed (blueberry plugs)
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
A1
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
A2
1 (C&E USA) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
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plant being noticed between those originating from cat 1 and cat 2 locations. Differences in the
proportion of infected plants between locations are already considered in the previous steps.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that > 99% of infected P4P are symptomless when packed
for export. If the ﬁgure is actually less than this, we should expect more infected plants to be noticed
and removed at the original exporting company, which will lower the proportion of infected plants
being shipped but will not signiﬁcantly alter the chances of symptomless infected plants being noticed
at inspection. If the ﬁgure is actually more than this, then we will have very slightly underestimated
the number of infected plants passing unnoticed. The ﬁgures also assume that less than 1% of plants
are actually inspected, which may change according to the policy of a member state border force.
A.1.3.3.8. Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually
and removed (blueberry potted plants)
e4 – Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and removed.
NB Where the pathway is not applicable due to restrictions in trading, a score of 1 has been
entered, which means that all plants will be removed (since this type of material is not allowed) and so
the number of plants imported under this category will be zero.
Justiﬁcation
For larger potted plants, a more detailed inspection is thought to occur than for plug tray plants but
still only a few per cent of plants are inspected. Again, it is assumed that > 99% of infected P4P are
symptomless when packed for export because those with symptoms will be discarded by the producer.
Hence, the table above shows only the proportion of infected plants that might be detected and
removed. Based on expert opinion and a greater severity of symptoms appearing on larger potted
plants than plug-tray plants, our estimated median proportion of infected plants detected and removed
at the EU border is 0.25 and an upper (99%) range is 0.5 (i.e. 50% of affected plants will be noticed
and removed), while the lower (1%) range is 0.05 (i.e. 5% of affected plants will be noticed. No
changes to these values are expected under scenarios A1 nor A2 for cat 2 locations but the trade will
be restricted under scenario A2 for cat 1 locations so a value of 1 is used in the table above, indicating
that all plants will be removed.
Uncertainty
The appearance of symptoms from existing infections depends on the transport period and
conditions during transport. These are variable and may affect subsequent detection if plants are
inspected. As for plugs, uncertainty is based on the assumption that >99% of infected P4P are
symptomless when packed for export. Variation in this percentage can give a slight under- or
overestimate as described for plugs.
Table A.52: Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and
removed (blueberry potted plants)
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A1
1 (C&E USA) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A2
1 (C&E USA) 1 1 1 1 1
2 (Can, W USA, China, Chile) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
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A.1.3.3.9. Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually
and removed (cranberry plug plants)
e4 – Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and removed.
Justiﬁcation
The incubation period for cranberry is similar to that on blueberry, viz. up to 3 months (P McManus,
consulted expert). Thus, the appearance of existing infections that were incubating can occur, which
may affect subsequent detection if plants are inspected. Currently, only < 1% of plugs in trays are
inspected. We assume that > 99% of infected plug P4P symptomless, for the same reason as given for
blueberries. There have been no interceptions at the EU border on cranberry P4P. Based on expert
opinion, our estimated median proportion of infected plug-tray plants detected and removed at the EU
border is one per thousand infected plants and an upper (99%) range is one in 100, while the lower
(1%) range is 0 (i.e. there is a 1% chance that no infected plants will be noticed due to all infections
being latent). No changes to these values are expected under scenarios A1 nor A2 and there are no
differences due to the origin of the plants (cat 1 or cat 2 locations, as differences in the proportion of
plants affected is already considered in a previous step).
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that > 99% of infected P4P are symptomless when packed
for export, and that no changes in infection occur during transportation. As explained above, the
transport duration and conditions may be variable, resulting in variable symptom development.
Variations in the percentage symptomless infections can lead to slight under- or overestimations, as
described above.
A.1.3.3.10. Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually
and removed (cranberry unrooted cuttings and potted plants)
e4 – Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and removed.
Table A.53: Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and
removed (cranberry plug plants)
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0 0.00001 0.0001 0.0003 0.001
Table A.54: Proportion of infected plants at the EU border that could be detected visually and
removed (cranberry unrooted cuttings and potted plants)
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.035 0.05
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.035 0.05
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.035 0.05
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.035 0.05
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NB Where the pathway is not applicable due to restrictions in trading, a score of 1 has been
entered, which means that all plants will be removed (since this type of material is not allowed) and so
the number of plants imported under this category will be zero.
Justiﬁcation
For larger potted plants, a more detailed inspection is thought to occur than for plug tray plants but
still only a few per cent of plants are inspected. In contrast, it is impossible to check most unrooted
cuttings that are transported as a bale because they will be within the bale. No change in the
appearance of infection is likely with air freighted plants due to travel time being very short but
appearance of new symptoms on latently infected plants could occur with surface shipped plants,
allowing the possibility of border inspection noticing some infections. However, symptoms may appear
on previously asymptomatic but infected plants, which may affect subsequent detection if plants are
inspected. We assume that > 99% of infected P4P are symptomless incubating infections when packed
for export because those with symptoms will be discarded by the producer.
There have been no interceptions at the EU border on cranberry P4P. However, the recent practice
of importing bales of cut stems directly taken from the production ﬁeld as material for P4P is
considered to be a high-risk activity and it is not possible for inspectors to see any of the internal plant
material.
Based on expert opinion and a greater severity of symptoms appearing on larger potted plants than
plug-tray plants, but a reduced ability to inspect baled cuttings, our estimated median proportion of
infected plants detected and removed at the EU border is 0.025 (i.e. 2.5% of infections will be
noticed) and an upper (99%) range is 0.05 (i.e. 5% of affected plants will be noticed and removed),
while the lower (1%) range is 0.005 (i.e. 0.5% of affected plants will be noticed). No changes to these
values are expected by location or under scenarios A1 nor A2 apart from that trade in this material
from cat 1 locations will be prohibited in scenario A2. Inspectors should concentrate on potted plants
rather than plugs because larger potted plants are more likely to have visible symptoms.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that > 99% of infected P4P are symptomless when packed
for export, and that no changes in infection occur during transportation. However, the transport
duration and conditions may be variable, resulting in variable symptom development and variable
percentages of symptomless infected plants, leading to slight under- or overestimation of the numbers
of plants removed at the border.
A.1.3.3.11. Proportion (or multiplier) accounting for a change in the number of infected
plants for planting during intra-EU transport, e.g. due to cross-infection or
cross-contamination between individual plants (cranberry unrooted cuttings
and potted plants)
e5 – This parameter was set to one (1): no effect.
A.1.3.3.12. Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at the recipient
nursery site in the EU (both blueberry and cranberry)
e6 – Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at the recipient nursery site in the
EU.
Evidence:
Figures in the tables below are based on the proportion of infected potted blueberry plants
estimated (by expert opinion in the absence of data) to be detected at the EU border inspection
(previous section), adjusted for a 6-month period at the recipient plant nursery, where further
development of latent infections will cause symptoms to appear on some affected plants. Estimates
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 1 1 1 1 1
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.035 0.05
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are based on potted plants because it is expected that plants imported as plug plants will be potted up
and will be spaced out slightly to allow for growth. There may be some pruning to encourage side
shoots to develop. The incubation period is up to 3 months (A. Schilder, hearing expert), so most
incubating infections should appear. It is possible that sporulation of the asexual stage could cross
infect neighbouring plants if they are exposed to rain or overhead irrigation and if the plants are
ﬂowering or have pruning wounds. Hence, although most original infections on imported plants would
become symptomatic and could be noticed and removed (if good practice is followed), some new
infections, constituting establishment of an infection focus and described more fully in the next section
(Spread) would mean that some symptomless infections remain, hence the pathogen becomes
established at a new site.
Justiﬁcation
The table above reﬂects a change in the proportion of infected plants caused predominantly by
removal of symptomatic infections contrasted with a small potential component of cross-infection to
new hosts. The estimated median proportion of infected plants detected and removed at the recipient
nursery is 0.25 (i.e. 25% of infected plants will be removed, which is most visibly affected plants but
no new latent infections) and an upper (99%) range is 0.5 (i.e. 50% of affected plants will be noticed
and removed), while the lower (1%) range is 0.05 (i.e. 5% of affected plants will be noticed. No
changes to these values are expected under scenarios A1 nor A2, or for plants originating from
different countries.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that most infected P4P will develop symptoms within 2
months and be removed. Some nurseries may not follow good practice and may not eliminate the
infections in a timely way, which could make our estimate of removed plant proportions too high.
Similarly, the estimated component of cross-infection to new hosts may be greater than predicted,
which will also increase the abundance of the pathogen. In contrast, good practice and lack of
conditions conducive for cross infection (no watering from above or plants reared indoors) could mean
that no cross-infection occurs in the initial 6-month period deemed to constitute the establishment
period.
A.1.3.3.13. Proportion of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected
visually and removed within 2 months of entry (blueberry potted plants)
e6 – Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at the recipient nursery site in the
EU.
Table A.55: Proportions of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected visually and
removed within 2 months of entry (blueberry plug plants)
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
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NB Where the pathway is not applicable due to restrictions in trading, a score of 1 has been
entered, which means that all plants will be removed (since this type of material is not allowed) and so
the number of plants imported under this category will be zero.
Justiﬁcation
The table above reﬂects a change in the proportion of infected plants caused predominantly by
removal of symptomatic infections contrasted with a small potential component of cross-infection to
new hosts. The estimated proportions of infected plants detected and removed at the recipient nursery
are the same as for plug plants (that were transplanted into pots upon arrival). No changes to these
values are expected under scenarios A1 nor A2 for plants originating from cat 2 locations but no
material of this type will be permitted from cat 1 locations under scenario A2, so a coefﬁcient of 1, is
used here to show that this pathway reduces to zero risk.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that most infected P4P will develop symptoms within 2
months and be removed. Like the estimated proportions, the uncertainties are the same for potted
plants and plug plants, and are strongly affected by agricultural practices of the receiving nurseries.
Limited spread of the pathogen is possible during the ﬁrst 2 months, depending on the climate and
irrigation system used.
A.1.3.3.14. Proportion of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected
visually and removed within 2 months of entry (cranberry plug plants)
e6 – Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at the recipient nursery site in the
EU.
Table A.56: Proportion of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected visually and
removed within 2 months of entry (blueberry potted plants)
Location incidence category
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A1
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A2
1 (C&E USA, Can) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
2 (W USA, China, Chile, Belarus, Russia) 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Table A.57: Proportion of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected visually and
removed within 2 months of entry (cranberry plug plants)
Proportion of plants with infection visible
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
Cat 1 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Cat 2 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A1
Cat 1 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Cat 2 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A2
Cat 1 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Cat 2 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
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Justiﬁcation
The table above reﬂects a change in the proportion of infected plants caused predominantly by
removal of symptomatic infections contrasted with a small potential component of cross-infection to
new hosts. The estimated proportions are the same as those estimated for blueberries, because
symptoms are equally obvious for both Vaccinium species. No changes to these values are expected
under scenarios A1 nor A2, or for plants originating from different countries.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that most infected P4P will develop symptoms within 2
months and be removed. Like the estimated proportions, the uncertainties are the same for potted
plants and plug plants, and are strongly affected by agricultural practices of the receiving nurseries.
A.1.3.3.15. Proportion of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected
visually and removed within 2 months of entry (cranberry unrooted cuttings
and potted plants)
e6 – Proportion of infected plants for planting that are removed at the recipient nursery site in the
EU.
NB Where the pathway is not applicable due to restrictions in trading, a score of 1 has been
entered, which means that all plants will be removed (since this type of material is not allowed) and so
the number of plants imported under this category will be zero.
Justiﬁcation
The table above reﬂects a change in the proportion of infected plants caused predominantly by
removal of symptomatic infections contrasted with a small potential component of cross-infection to
new hosts. The estimated proportions of infected potted cranberry plants detected and removed at the
recipient nursery are the same as those of infected potted blueberry plants. No changes to these
values are expected under scenarios A1 nor A2 for plants originating from cat 2 locations. Similarly as
for blueberries, no material of this type will be permitted from cat 1 locations under scenario A2, so a
coefﬁcient of 1, is used here to show that this pathway reduces to zero risk.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is based on the assumption that most infected P4P will develop symptoms within 2
months and be removed. Like the estimated proportions, the uncertainties are the same for potted
plants and plug plants, and are strongly affected by agricultural practices of the receiving nurseries.
Limited spread of the pathogen is possible during the ﬁrst 2 months, depending on the climate and
irrigation system used.
Table A.58: Proportion of infected plants at the recipient site that could be detected visually and
removed within 2 months of entry (cranberry unrooted cuttings and potted plants)
Proportion of plants with infection visible
Percentiles
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0
Cat 1 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Cat 2 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A1
Cat 1 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Cat 2 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A2
Cat 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cat 2 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
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A.2. Establishment
A.2.1. Formal model for Establishment
As mentioned under conceptual model for establishment, we divide assessment of establishment into
two steps: (a) distribution of imports of infected berries and P4P in individual EU countries, and (b) the
probability of establishment of D. vaccinii in those countries. The distribution and establishment is
described ﬁrst for blueberry and cranberry fruit, then for distribution and establishment of plug plants in
nurseries and for distribution and establishment of potted plants and cuttings in production ﬁelds.
A.2.1.1. Distribution of imported infected blueberry and cranberry fruits
Infected blueberries and cranberries are allocated to four regions in the EU according to ﬁxed
proportions as described below.
Importation of Vaccinium berries is available by country (FAOSTAT). Thus, knowledge about the
distribution of imported blueberries and cranberries over the EU countries is fairly ﬁrm (Table A.59).
We assume that the distribution of infected blueberries and cranberries over the EU countries is similar
to that of total blueberries and cranberries. The EU MS were grouped into four large regions (NW, NE,
SW and SE) with similar levels of import of blueberries or cranberries and climate suitability for
D. vaccinii. Because it is too complex to estimate the risk of import and establishment for each
individual country and the numbers of infected berries would be too low for individual countries, the
estimated allocations of imported blueberries or cranberries per country were added for each of the
four regions, which occupy similar total areas (Table A.59). Thus, the largest import of infected
blueberries (parameter b1) is in the NW (52%), followed by the NE (26%) and SW (22%). Similarly,
the largest import of infected cranberries is in the NW (93%), and hardly any import in the NE (4%)
and SW (3%). There is no import of blueberries or cranberries in the SE (0%). These are considered
ﬁxed proportions that cannot be varied independently, because they need to add up to 100%.
Table A.59: Allocation (proportion) of imported infected blueberry and cranberry P4P based on
estimated imports and presence of D. vaccinii in neighbouring countries, and allocation
of imported infected blueberry and cranberry fruits (parameter b1)
Import of P4P in 2016
D. vaccinii
present
Allocation
of
Allocation
of
Allocation
of
Allocation
of
Region
in EU
Country Blueberry(a) Cranberry(b)
or
nearby(c)
Imported
blueberry
P4P(d)
Imported
cranberry
P4P(d)
Imported
blueberry
fruit(e)
Imported
cranberry
fruit(e)
NW Belgium None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.02 0.07
NW Denmark None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.02 0.00
NW Germany Low None No 0.05 0.0001 0.23 0.08
NW Ireland None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.01
NW Luxemburg None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
NW Netherlands Low None No 0.05 0.0001 0.08 0.28
NW Sweden None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.02 0.01
NW United
Kingdom
Medium None No 0.1 0.0001 0.15 0.48
NW EU 0.2005 0.0008 0.52 0.93
NE Austria None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.12 0.00
NE Czech
republic
None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.01 0.00
NE Estonia None Low Yes 0.01 0.1 0.00 0.00
NE Finland None None Yes 0.01 0.0001 0.03 0.01
NE Hungary None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
NE Latvia None Low Yes 0.05 0.1 0.01 0.00
NE Lithuania None Low Yes 0.01 0.1 0.04 0.02
NE Poland Low Medium Yes 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.01
NE Slovakia None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
NE Slovenia None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
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A.2.2. Formal model for establishment of D. vaccinii from imported
infected fruits
A.2.2.1. State variables and parameters for establishment from fruits
Import of P4P in 2016
D. vaccinii
present
Allocation
of
Allocation
of
Allocation
of
Allocation
of
Region
in EU
Country Blueberry(a) Cranberry(b)
or
nearby(c)
Imported
blueberry
P4P(d)
Imported
cranberry
P4P(d)
Imported
blueberry
fruit(e)
Imported
cranberry
fruit(e)
NE EU 0.2303 0.5004 0.26 0.04
SW France Very low None No 0.01 0.0001 0.08 0.01
SW Italy Low None No 0.05 0.0001 0.06 0.01
SW Portugal None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SW Spain Very high Medium No 0.5 0.5 0.08 0.01
SW EU 0.5601 0.5003 0.22 0.03
SE Bulgaria None None no 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SE Croatia None None no 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SE Cyprus None None no 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SE Greece None None no 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SE Malta None None no 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SE Romania None None No 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
SE EU 0.0006 0.0006 0.00 0.00
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
(a): Based on information from Fall Creek nursery for 2015–2017.
(b): Based on increase in production of cranberries in recent years (EUROSTAT data combined with information at http://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-top-countries-in-cranberry-production.html and export information from the USA
(USDA-APHIS, 2017)).
(c): Based on the presence of D. vaccinii in Latvia and its presumable presence in Belarus and Russia.
(d): Relative estimates from qualitative information in the columns to the left (expert information).
(e): FAOSTAT data.
Table A.60: State variables of the establishment model for blueberry and cranberry fruit waste
from packing houses or consumers (waste from retail is incinerated or put into landﬁlls
and plays no role in D. vaccinii transmission). All variables are expressed in numbers of
individual berries and plants, considering the whole yearly ﬂow of blueberry and
cranberry fruit from countries with ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii into the EU
Symbol Meaning
Nb0 Total number of berries infected by D. vaccinii ending up as waste in the EU per year
Nb1a Total number of berries infected by D. vaccinii ending up as waste in the NW region of the EU per
year
Nb1b Total number of berries infected by D. vaccinii ending up as waste in the NE region of the EU per
year
Nb1c Total number of berries infected by D. vaccinii ending up as waste in the SW region of the EU per
year
Nb1d Total number of berries infected by D. vaccinii ending up as waste in the SE region of the EU per
year
Nb2a Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii from infected berry waste in the NW region of the EU
per year
Nb2b Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii from infected berry waste in the NE region of the EU
per year
Nb2c Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii from infected berry waste in the SW region of the EU
per year
Nb2d Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii from infected berry waste in the SE region of the EU
per year
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A.2.2.2. Model equations for establishment from fruits
The Panel calculated the number of founder populations of D. vaccinii resulting from transfers from
berry fruit using the following formula:
Nb1 ¼ b1 # ðNE9 þ NE11Þ
Nb2 ¼ b2 # Nb1
Variable NB1 is the number of blueberry and cranberry fruits that go to waste in packing houses
and consumer yards and is distributed over four regions in the EU according to ﬁxed proportions (b1),
with different values for each of the four regions (Table A.59). Variables NE9 and 'NE11 denote the
number of infected berries per year ending up as waste at packing houses and consumer homes per
year (from the Entry model).
Variable NB2 is the estimated number of established founder plants resulting from berry waste ﬂows
across the EU each year. Parameter b2 indicates the probability of transfer of inoculum and
establishment of D. vaccinii on a host plant per berry when fruit is discarded (commonly composted)
outside packinghouses or in a home garden. The calculation is made separately for blueberry waste
and cranberry waste, as well as for each of the four regions in the EU. The resulting numbers of
infected plants are summed to obtain the total number of established founder plants resulting from
blueberry and cranberry fruit waste in each of the four regions:
Ntotalb ¼ N
blueberry pathway
b
þ Ncranberry pathway
b
A.2.2.3. Parameter estimation for establishment of D. vaccinii from blueberry
and cranberry fruit waste
The establishment of infection foci is calculated in terms of numbers of infected plants from the
waste of individual berries occurring per year.
The probability of establishment of D. vaccinii from berry waste in a production ﬁeld or natural
areas is affected by the suitability of the local climate for disease development as well as the density of
Vaccinium plants in the particular country of importation. The climate suitability was calculated from
the percentage of each country located in low and high suitability conditions (Figure 5 in
Section 2.3.2.1). The weighted average was calculated by adding the percentage under low suitability
multiplied by 0.1 and the percentage under high suitability multiplied by 0.9. Vaccinium densities were
estimated from Figure 6, websites (http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-top-countries-in-cranberry-
production.html), and Figure 8 (Section 2.3.2.1). Establishment risk in production areas was estimated
from climate suitability (assuming unlimited plant densities), and that in natural areas from climate
suitability and plant densities. The EU countries were grouped into four regions (NW, NE, SW and SE),
Table A.61: Parameters of the establishment model for blueberry and cranberry fruit waste from
packing houses or consumers. All parameters are multiplication numbers (mostly
proportions, i.e. < 1)
Symbol Meaning
b1a Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the NW region of the EU per year
b1b Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the NE region of the EU per year
b1c Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the SW region of the EU per year
b1d Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the SE region of the EU per year
b2a Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii resulting in plant infection and establishment in the NW
region in the EU per year
b2b Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii resulting in plant infection and establishment in the NE
region in the EU per year
b2c Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii resulting in plant infection and establishment in the SW
region in the EU per year
b2d Proportion of fruits infected with D. vaccinii resulting in plant infection and establishment in the SE
region in the EU per year
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occupying similar total areas (Figure 4, Section 2.3.2.1). The average risks of establishment were
calculated for each region (Table A.62), and these risks were considered the median values for
modelling purposes.
Table A.62: Estimation of the risk of establishment of D. vaccinii from blueberry and cranberry
waste. For production ﬁelds, climate suitability determines the risk of establishment.
For natural areas the risk of establishment is dependent on climate suitability and
Vaccinium plant densities
Climate suitability Vaccinium density
Relative
establishment
risk in
natural areasSector
in EU
Country
Low
(1)
High
(2)
Average
Weighted
average(a)
Wild berry
relative
area
Weighted
average(a)
Climate 3
density(b)
NW Belgium 90.4 0.0 0.09 0.21
NW Denmark 100.0 0.0 0.10 0.10
NW Germany 97.1 0.8 0.10 0.28
NW Ireland 1.6 0.0 0.00 0.26
NW Luxemburg 66.7 0.0 0.07 0.35
NW Netherlands 100.0 0.0 0.10 0.07
NW Sweden 63.6 1.8 0.08 0.80
NW United
Kingdom
45.8 0.0 0.05 0.29
NW
average
0.0773 0.46 0.04
NE Austria 56.4 26.8 0.30 0.61
NE Czech
republic
98.0 1.7 0.11 0.33
NE Estonia 79.4 20.6 0.26 0.58
NE Finland 56.5 0.8 0.06 0.79
NE Hungary 76.2 23.8 0.29 0.00
NE Latvia 27.5 72.5 0.68 0.53
NE Lithuania 50.9 49.1 0.49 0.33
NE Poland 81.2 18.8 0.25 0.31
NE
average
0.2299 0.48 0.11
SW France 93.6 2.0 0.11 0.15
SW Italy 76.0 4.6 0.12 0.22
SW Portugal 44.3 9.9 0.13 0.00
SW Spain 73.7 3.4 0.10 0.12
SW
average
0.1116 0.14 0.02
SE Bulgaria 75.9 24.1 0.29 0.20
SE Croatia 30.6 59.0 0.56 0.11
SE Cyprus 56.0 0.0 0.06 0.00
SE Greece 57.3 22.1 0.26 0.00
SE Malta 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00
SE Romania 78.0 18.9 0.25 0.20
SE Slovakia 62.8 34.9 0.38 0.22
SE Slovenia 35.2 55.7 0.54 0.43
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The probability of establishment of D. vaccinii from the waste of blueberry and cranberry fruit is
expected to be very small. Two factors contribute to the low likelihood of establishment from infected
berries as compared to infected plants for planting: (1) a berry is an uncertain and comparatively small
source of inoculum; the fungus will need to sporulate on the berry, and other pathogens or
saprophytic fungi in a berry may interfere with such sporulation, especially if berries are deposited as
waste (plants with stem lesions are more reliable and larger sources of spores); (2) berry waste on
compost heaps will not often be deposited in close proximity to berry plants, while plants for planting
will always be planted near other berry plants. A conceptual model for the risk of transfer and
establishment of D. vaccinii from berry waste to a Vaccinium plant is given below (Figure A.1).
The parameter b1 is composed of two components: for the median, the probability is 1/100 that
D. vaccinii in an infected berry will survive and 1/100 that it will sporulate at the time when Vaccinium
plants are susceptible in close proximity are susceptible. This results in a probability of 1/10,000 that
viable inoculum is produced at the right time. The uncertainty is quite large with a lower limit of
1/100,000 and an upper limit of 1/100 (Table A.63). Parameters b2 and b3 are reduction factors for
density of Vaccinium plants in the immediate surroundings of sporulating berry waste and climate
suitability, calculated as ‘relative risk of establishment’ by multiplying b2 and b3 (Table A.63). The
resulting probability distributions for establishment of D. vaccinii from fruit waste are presented in
Table A.63 for the four geographic regions in the EU.
Climate suitability Vaccinium density
Relative
establishment
risk in
natural areasSector
in EU
Country
Low
(1)
High
(2)
Average
Weighted
average(a)
Wild berry
relative
area
Weighted
average(a)
Climate 3
density(b)
SE
average
0.3032 0.16 0.05
(a): Regional averages were weighted according to the areas (km2) of the countries in each region.
(b): Relative risks in natural areas were calculated by multiplying the regional weighted averages of climate suitability and
Vaccinium plant density.
β1: Propor4on of infected berries in waste poten4ally 
transferring inoculum to Vaccinium plants
Infected berries in waste
Infected berries in waste with sporula4ng D. vaccinii
Number of Vaccinium plants receiving D. vaccinii spores
Number of Vaccinium plants infected by D. vaccinii
β2: Infec4on reduc4on factor due to limited plant density
β3: Establishment reduc4on factor due to climate suitability
Figure A.1: Conceptual model of the transfer of D. vaccinii from infected berries in waste to
Vaccinium plants becoming infected. Three rates are distinguished: b1 for infected berries
becoming sporulating berries, b2 for spores from sporulating infected berries to reach
Vaccinium plants and b3 for Vaccinium plants with D. vaccinii spores becoming infected.
These rates are not used individually in the model, but are combined into one probability
of establishment factor (Table A.63)
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In the above, no account was taken of clustering of berries during the transfer and establishment
process, i.e. the pathway unit equals the transfer unit, or each infected berry can result in an infected
Vaccinium plant and initiate an established focus of infection. The rationale for this assumption is that
the number of infected berries entering Europe is quite large, but the probability of any one berry
causing a successful transfer and infection is very small with a median value of 1/10,000 in the NE and
2/100,000 in the SW region of the EU. As a result, ‘successful’ berries are likely to be ‘alone’.
The probability of establishment from fruit waste is not dependent on the regulation scenario.
A.2.3. Distribution of imported infected blueberry and cranberry P4P
The numbers of infected plants as estimated in the Entry steps of the models are allocated to
countries according to ﬁxed proportions (Table A.59) based on total (healthy) plant imports from the
largest blueberry nursery in the USA (Fall Creek Nursery in Oregon), and from estimated expansion of
cranberry production in the various EU countries (EUROSTAT data combined with information at http://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-top-countries-in-cranberry-production.html and export information
from the USA (USDA-APHIS, 2017)). As no quantitative information is available about the import of
P4P and berries from neighbouring Belarus and Russia, some extra weight is given for the risk of
importing infected materials from those countries, by multiplying the calculated risk by 2.
Thus, the distribution of imported blueberry and cranberry P4P were estimated for individual
countries based on blueberry and cranberry production areas (Figure 8 in the conceptual model
Section 2.3.2.1), combined with knowledge of the countries that received P4P from the largest
blueberry nursery in the USA and information from US State plant certiﬁcation agencies (USDA APHIS,
2017). The potential presence of D. vaccinii in neighbouring countries was taken into account as
described above for Belarus and Russia (Table A.59). The same grouping was used of EU MS in four
large regions (NW, NE, SW and SE) with similar levels of import of P4P and climate suitability for
D. vaccinii. And again, the estimated allocations (parameter B1) of imported P4P per country were
added for each of the four regions. The distribution of the import of infected plants is considered the
same as that of the total number of P4P. Also, the distribution of plug plants and potted plants over
the EU countries is considered the same. Thus, imported infected blueberry P4P arrive mostly in the
SW (56%), followed by the NE (23.1%) and the NW (20%), while import is minimal in the SE (< 1%).
The imported infected cranberry P4P is primarily in the SW and NE (50% each), while the proportions
are less than 1% in the NW and SE. We consider these ﬁxed proportions, because they cannot be
varied independently, but need to add up to 100%.
Table A.63: Distribution of probabilities of establishment of D. vaccinii from blueberry and
cranberry fruit waste (parameter b2) in four geographic regions in the EU based on
climate suitability and Vaccinium density in individual EU countries
Percentiles (b1 is in bold)
Risk of
establishment
from
Region
in EU
Relative risk
(b2 3 b3)
1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
0.00001 0.00004 0.0001 0.001 0.01
Blueberry
waste
NW 0.04 0.0000004 0.0000016 0.000004 0.00004 0.0004
NE 0.11 0.0000011 0.0000044 0.000011 0.00011 0.0011
SW 0.02 0.0000002 0.0000008 0.000002 0.00002 0.0002
SE 0.05 0.0000005 0.000002 0.000005 0.00005 0.0005
0.00001 0.00004 0.0001 0.001 0.01
Cranberry
waste
NW 0.04 0.0000004 0.0000016 0.000004 0.00004 0.0004
NE 0.11 0.0000011 0.0000044 0.000011 0.00011 0.0011
SW 0.02 0.0000002 0.0000008 0.000002 0.00002 0.0002
SE 0.05 0.0000005 0.000002 0.000005 0.00005 0.0005
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A.2.4. Formal model for establishment of D. vaccinii from imported
infected plants for planting
A.2.4.1. State variables and parameters for establishment from plants in
nurseries
A.2.4.2. Model equations for establishment from plants in nurseries
The number of founder populations that become established in nurseries is determined only by the
removal rate of symptomatic plants that develop during the ﬁrst 2 months (incubation period) after
arrival. The local climate does not affect establishment, because the infections are systemic and the
controlled environment with overhead irrigation provides a conducive climate at any location in the EU.
The Panel calculated the number of founder populations of D. vaccinii resulting from imported infected
blueberry and cranberry plants for planting (plug plants) that passed inspection unnoticed and ended
up in receiving nurseries using the following formula:
NB1 ¼ B1 # ðNE5Þ
NB2 ¼ B2 # NB1
Variable NB1 is the number of blueberry or cranberry plug plants that are distributed over four
regions in the EU according to ﬁxed import proportions (B1), with different values for each of the four
regions (Table A.59). Variable NE5 denotes the number of infected plants per year that passed import
inspection in the EU (from the Entry model).
Table A.64: State variables of the establishment model for blueberry and cranberry plugs and small
potted plants in receiving nurseries. All variables are expressed in numbers of
individual plants, considering the whole yearly ﬂow of plug plants from countries with
ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii into the EU
Symbol Meaning
NB0 Total number of plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the EU per year
NB1a Total number of plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the NW region of the EU per year
NB1b Total number of plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the NE region of the EU per year
NB1c Total number of plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the SW region of the EU per year
NB1d Total number of plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the SE region of the EU per year
NB2a Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling and result in establishment in the
NW region of the EU per year
NB2b Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling and result in establishment in the NE
region of the EU per year
NB2c Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling and result in establishment in the
SW region of the EU per year
NB2d Total number of plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling and result in establishment in the SE
region of the EU per year
Table A.65: Parameters of the establishment model for blueberry and cranberry plugs and potted
plants in nurseries. All parameters are multiplication numbers (mostly proportions, i.e. < 1)
Symbol Meaning
B1a Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the NW region of the EU
B1b Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the NE region of the EU
B1c Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the SW region of the EU
B1d Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the SE region of the EU
B2abcd Proportion of plants infected with D. vaccinii that is removed by culling of symptomatic plants; the
remaining proportion gets established in the four geographic regions in the EU (same parameter
value for all regions)
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Variable NB2 is the estimated number of established founder plants resulting from imported infected
plug plants across the EU each year. Parameter B2 indicates the probability of establishment of
D. vaccinii on host plants in the receiving nursery. The calculation is made separately for blueberry and
cranberry plants, as well as for each of the four regions in the EU. The resulting numbers of infected
plants are summed to obtain the total number of established founder plants resulting from imported
infected plug plants in each of the four regions:
NtotalB ¼ N
blueberry pathway
B þ N
cranberry pathway
B
A.2.4.3. Parameter estimation for establishment from plants in nurseries
As mentioned under the conceptual model Section 2.3.2.1, the probability of establishment of
D. vaccinii from plug plants and small potted plants in receiving nurseries is considered to be
dependent on removal of symptomatic plants only, not on climate suitability. We assume that the
median effectiveness of plant removal is 0.5. The removal rates are considered the same for all three
scenarios.
A.2.4.4. State variables and parameters for establishment from plants in
production ﬁelds
Table A.66: Proportions of infected blueberry and cranberry plug plants at the recipient nursery
that could be detected visually and removed within 2 months of entry
Percentile 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 incidence 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8
A1 incidence 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8
A2 incidence 0.05 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8
Table A.67: State variables of the establishment model for blueberry and cranberry potted plants
and cuttings planted in production ﬁelds. All variables are expressed in numbers of
individual plants, considering the whole yearly ﬂow of potted plants and ﬁeld cuttings
from countries with ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii into the EU
Symbol Meaning
NBB0 Total number of potted plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the EU per year
NBB1a Total number of potted plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the NW region of the EU per
year
NBB1b Total number of potted plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the NE region of the EU per
year
NBB1c Total number of potted plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the SW region of the EU per
year
NBB1d Total number of potted plants infected by D. vaccinii that passed into the SE region of the EU per
year
NBB2a Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling in the NW region of the EU
per year
NBB2b Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling in the NE region of the EU per
year
NBB2c Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling in the SW region of the EU
per year
NBB2d Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that pass culling in the SE region of the EU per
year
NBB3a Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that passed culling and resulted in
establishment in the NW region of the EU per year
NBB3b Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that passed culling and resulted in
establishment in the NE region of the EU per year
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A.2.4.5. Model equations for establishment from plants in production ﬁelds
The number of founder populations that become established in open ﬁelds is determined by the
removal rate of symptomatic plants that develop during the ﬁrst two month (incubation period) after
arrival, and by the local climate. Plant densities surrounding infected imported plants are always high
in production ﬁelds. The Panel calculated the number of founder populations of D. vaccinii resulting
from imported infected blueberry and cranberry plants for planting (potted plants or cuttings) that
passed inspection unnoticed and ended up in receiving production ﬁelds using the following formula:
NBB1 ¼ BB1 # ðNE5Þ
NBB2 ¼ ð1! BB2Þ # BB3# NBB1
Variable NBB1 is the number of blueberry or cranberry potted plants or cuttings that are distributed
over four regions in the EU according to ﬁxed import proportions (BB1), with different values for each
of the four regions (Table A.59). Variable NE5 denotes the number of infected plants per year that
passed import inspection in the EU (from the Entry model).
Variable NBB2 is the estimated number of established founder plants resulting from imported
infected potted plants or cuttings across the EU each year. Parameter BB2 indicates the probability of
establishment of D. vaccinii on host plants in the receiving nursery. The calculation is made separately
for blueberry and cranberry plants, as well as for each of the four regions in the EU. The resulting
numbers of infected plants are summed to obtain the total number of established founder plants
resulting from imported infected potted plants (or cuttings) in each of the four regions:
NtotalBB ¼ N
blueberry pathway
BB þ N
cranberry pathway
BB
Symbol Meaning
NBB3c Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that passed culling and resulted in
establishment in the SW region of the EU per year
NBB3d Total number of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii that passed culling and resulted in
establishment in the SE region of the EU per year
Table A.68: Parameters of the establishment model for blueberry and cranberry potted plants or
cuttings planted in the ﬁeld. All parameters are multiplication numbers (mostly
proportions, i.e. < 1)
Symbol Meaning
BB1a Proportion of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the NW region of the EU
per year
BB1b Proportion of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the NE region of the EU
per year
BB1c Proportion of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the SW region of the EU
per year
BB1d Proportion of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii allocated to countries in the SE region of the EU
per year
BB2abcd Proportion of potted plants infected with D. vaccinii remaining after culling of symptomatic plants in
the four geographic regions in the EU per year (same parameter value for all regions)
BB3a Proportion of remaining potted plants infected with D. vaccinii resulting in establishment in the NW
region in the EU per year
BB3b Proportion of remaining potted plants infected with D. vaccinii resulting in establishment in the NE
region in the EU per year
BB3c Proportion of remaining potted plants infected with D. vaccinii resulting in establishment in the SW
region in the EU per year
BB3d Proportion of remaining potted plants infected with D. vaccinii resulting in establishment in the SE
region in the EU per year
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A.2.4.6. Parameter estimation for establishment of D. vaccinii from P4P in
production ﬁelds
Plants in production ﬁelds that develop symptoms of D. vaccinii are removed at a lower rate,
because inspection by nursery and production workers will be less intensive under A0 than for plugs
that are under intensive scrutiny in the receiving nursery. Under A1, post-entry quarantine will not be
in place, and plant removal is likely reduced, while the situation under A2 is likely the same as under
A0 (except that potted plants or ﬁeld-grown cuttings would not be imported anymore). Removal rates
are not dependent on country of entry of the imported plants.
The residual infected plants (that were not detected and removed) are multiplied by the
probabilities of establishment in order to arrive at realistic establishment estimates. Effects of climate
are not dependent on regulation scenario.
The probability of establishment of D. vaccinii from potted P4P and from cuttings in a production
ﬁeld is affected by the suitability of the local climate for the disease (Figure 5 in Section 2.3.2.1) but
not on the density of Vaccinium plants (which are assumed not to be limiting). Establishment risk was
estimated from climate suitability in individual countries (Table A.62). Again, the EU countries were
grouped into four regions (NW, NE, SW and SE), occupying similar total areas. The average risks of
establishment were calculated for each region, and these risks were considered the median values for
modelling purposes.
Similar to the D. vaccinii establishment from berry waste, no account was taken of clustering of P4P
during the transfer and establishment process, i.e. the pathway unit equals the transfer unit, or each
infected plant for planting can by itself initiate an established focus of infection. The rationale for this
assumption is that the state of being infected is a rare event that is not likely to occur in clusters, due
to the high phytosanitary standards in the trade (but with the exception of the rare trade in
ﬁeld-grown cranberry cuttings).
Table A.69: Proportions of infected blueberry and cranberry potted plants or cuttings in production
ﬁelds that could be detected visually and removed within 2 months of entry
Percentile 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
A0 incidence 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
A1 incidence 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.25
A2 incidence 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.5
Table A.70: Distribution of probabilities of establishment of D. vaccinii from blueberry and
cranberry P4P in production ﬁelds (parameter BB3) in four geographic regions in the
EU, based on climate suitability in EU Regions
Percentiles
Risk of establishment
from
Region
in EU
Climate
suitability (b3)
(a) 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Blueberry P4P NW 0.0773 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.1
NE 0.2299 0.06 0.15 0.023 0.40 0.68
SW 0.1116 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
SE 0.3032 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.56
Cranberry P4P NW 0.0773 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.1
NE 0.2299 0.06 0.15 0.023 0.40 0.68
SW 0.1116 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
SE 0.3032 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.56
(a): The climate suitability of Table A.62.
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A.3. Spread
A.3.1. Formal model for Spread
For each of four geographic regions in Europe (Figure 4), a spread model is run to estimate the
consequences in terms of spread of entry and establishment over a time frame of 5 years. The entry
and establishment ﬂows (F1–F6) are elaborated in Sections A.3.1 (entry) and A.3.2 (establishment).
Here, the further spread of infection in the European territory is estimated. Both human-assisted
spread (with plants for planting) and natural spread (with spores: conidia and ascospores) are
accounted for. The model calculates the spread within each of four geographic regions, but does not
calculate the spread between these four geographic regions.
The spread model is identical for the four regions, but climate is considered in the calculation of
spread within production ﬁelds and natural Vaccinium stands, and between production ﬁelds and
natural Vaccinium stands. Hence, the rate of spread differs between the four regions.
A ﬂow diagram of the spread model is given in Figure A.2.
The model calculates the number infected plants in each of ﬁve compartments: nurseries nurseries,
production ﬁelds, natural Vaccinium stands, garden centres and home gardens (Figure A.2). Within
Figure A.2: Flow chart representing the conceptual model for spread. The model comprises ﬁve
ecological compartments, for each of four geographic regions in the EU: NW, NE, SW and
SE. Within each region, the model comprises six ﬂows of entry and establishment
(F1!F6) and 11 ﬂows of infection between compartments. Parameterisation of the ﬂows
is identical for the four regions, except for ﬂows that involve dispersal of spores followed
by infection. The parameterisation of these ﬂows takes into account the prevalence of
berries in each region, and the average suitability of the climate for D. vaccinii
Diaporthe vaccinii pest risk assessment
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 110 EFSA Journal 2017;15(9):4924
each compartment, the model calculates the number of infected Vaccinium plants. No distinction is
made between species of Vaccinium. As a consequence, entry and establishment ﬂows via blueberry
and cranberry are summed.
The number of infected plants in the ﬁve compartments are represented by the state variables
N1 – N5. Values of the state variable at time t + 1 (next year) are calculated on the basis of ﬂows
which are based on the values of the state variable at time t (current year). The initial condition for
the model is a disease free situation with zero infected plants in all compartments. Hence, the model
outcomes represent the number of infected plants in each of the four regions after ﬁve years of entry,
establishment and spread under each of three scenarios.
Infected plants in nurseries:
N1 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ F1 þ F2 þ F9
Infected plants in production ﬁelds:
N2 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ F3 þ F4 þ F7 þ F11 þ F15
Infected plants in natural Vaccinium stands:
N3 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ F5 þ F10 þ F12 þ F16
Infected plants in garden centres:
N4 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ F8 þ F14
Infected plants in home gardens:
N5 t þ 1ð Þ ¼ F6 þ F13 þ F17
Flows that are shown in red font are ﬂows of entry and establishment (‘primary infections’,
originating from outside the European territory). Flows that are shown in black are spread ﬂows
(secondary infections and survival of infected plants from 1 year to the next).
Survival is explicitly accounted for in the ﬂows; therefore, the state variable does not appear in the
right-hand side of the equations.
The 17 ﬂows in the spread model are described in Table A.71.
Table A.71: Flows in the spread model
Symbol Meaning
F1 Entry and establishment into nurseries with plants for planting in plug trays (NB2 from the
establishment model)
F2 Entry and establishment into nurseries with potted plants for planting and with ﬁeld-derived cuttings
(part of NBB2 from the establishment model)
F3 Entry and establishment into production ﬁelds with potted plants for planting and with ﬁeld-derived
cuttings (part of NBB2 from the establishment model)
F4 Entry and establishment in production ﬁelds from founder plants infected from berry waste composting
at nearby packing houses (part of Nb2)
F5 Entry and establishment in natural Vaccinium stands from founder plants infected from berry waste
composting at packing houses and municipalities by air-borne inoculum (Nb2)
F6 Entry and establishment in home gardens from founder plants infected from berry waste composting
and air-borne spread in home gardens (part of Nb2)
F7 Flow of infected plants from nurseries to production ﬁelds
F8 Flow of infected plants from nurseries to garden centres
F9 Dynamics of infected plants within nurseries
F10 Flow of infection from production ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium stands
F11 Dynamics of infection within production ﬁelds
F12 Dynamics of infection in natural Vaccinium stands
F13 Flow of infected plants from garden centres to home gardens
F14 Dynamics of infection in garden centres
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Six of the ﬂows (F1–F6) represent entry and establishment from outside the EU and were quantiﬁed
in Section A.1 (Entry) and A.2 (Establishment). The ﬂows F7–F17 represent spread. They were
formulated as follows:
Spread from nurseries to production ﬁelds (F7)
F7 ¼ s1 # ð1! s2Þ # N1
s1 is the spread factor from infected plants in nurseries to infected plants in production ﬁelds.
s2 is the proportion of (infected) plants going to garden centres.
Spread from nurseries to garden centres (F8)
F8 ¼ s3 # s2 # N1
s3 is the spread factor from nurseries to garden centres.
Spread and survival of D. vaccinii in nurseries (F9)
F9 ¼ s1 # N1 þ s4 # N1
s1 represents spread of infection in a nursery (here considered equal in size to the infection ﬂow to
production ﬁelds), while s4 represents survival of an infected plant within a nursery from 1 year to the
next.
Spread from production ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium (F10)
F10 ¼ s5 climateð Þ # N2
where the spread factor s5 depends on climate suitability for D. vaccinii.
Survival and spread of D. vaccinii in production ﬁelds (F11)
F11 ¼ 1# N2 þ s7 climateð Þ # N2
Year to year survival of infected plants in production ﬁelds is set to 1; hence, the ﬁrst term at the
right-hand side.
s7 is the spread of D. vaccinii to neighbours within production ﬁelds. It depends on climate suitability
for D. vaccinii.
Survival and spread of D. vaccinii in natural Vaccinium stands (F12)
F12 ¼ s8 climateð Þ # N3
Spread from garden centres to home gardens (F13)
F13 ¼ s9 # N4
Survival and spread of D. vaccinii in garden centres (F14)
F14 ¼ 1! s9ð Þ # N4 þ s7 # N4
The ﬁrst term is the proportion of plants that is not sold. The second term is spread within
nurseries. The same spread factor is used as for production ﬁelds.
Spread from home gardens to production ﬁelds (F15)
F15 ¼ 0
This ﬂow is considered to be negligible and set to zero.
Symbol Meaning
F15 Flow of infection from home gardens to production ﬁelds
F16 Flow of infection from home gardens to natural Vaccinium stands
F17 Dynamics of infection in home gardens
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Spread from home gardens to natural Vaccinium stands (F16)
F16 ¼ 0
This ﬂow is considered to be negligible and set to zero.
Survival and spread of D. vaccinii in home gardens (F17)
F17 ¼ N5
Survival is near one, but spread is negligible because populations of Vaccinium plants in home
gardens are too small to allow relevant spread.
A.3.2. Parameter estimation and elicitation for the spread model
1. Entry and establishment into nurseries with plants for planting in plug trays (F1)
This ﬂow is calculated in the entry section. It includes establishment, which is not determined by
environmental factors in this case, but only by the chance of an infected plant being rogued before it
is removed. If a plant is not removed, the disease is established by deﬁnition. A single infected plant
thus acts as a founder population.
2. Entry and establishment into nurseries with potted plants for planting and with
ﬁeld-derived cuttings (F2)
These ﬂows are calculated in the entry section.
3. Entry and establishment into production ﬁelds with potted plants for planting and with
ﬁeld-derived cuttings (F3)
These ﬂows are calculated in the entry section.
4. Entry and establishment in production ﬁelds due to berry waste composting at nearby
packing houses (F4)
These ﬂows are calculated in the entry section.
5. Entry and establishment in natural Vaccinium stands due to berry waste composting at
packing houses and municipalities by air-borne inoculum (F5)
These ﬂows are calculated in the entry section.
6. Entry and establishment in home gardens due to berry waste composting and air-borne
spread in home gardens (F6)
These ﬂows are calculated in the entry section.
7. Flow of infection from nurseries to production ﬁelds (F7)
F7 ¼ s1 # ð1! s2Þ # N1
s1 is the spread factor from infected plants in nurseries to infected plants in production ﬁelds.
s2 is the proportion of (infected) plants going to garden centres.
To elicit a value for s1, the spread factor from nurseries to production ﬁelds, the experts asked the
question: Assume one infected plant in a nursery; how many offspring infected plants will there be
next year in production ﬁelds from this one infected plant in the nursery:
i) Because the infection has spread from ﬁeld to ﬁeld by natural means (spores or vectors).
ii) Because infection can spread from plant to plant in the nursery and the grown-up plants are
later transplanted in a production ﬁeld.
iii) Because the infected plants are used as propagating material (as a mother plant) and their
offspring is planted in a production ﬁeld?
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Spread by conidia from nursery ﬁelds to production ﬁelds is very unlikely because conidia are splash
dispersed. Therefore, this spread was set to zero. This pathway was not further considered and was
set to 0.
The second mechanism was considered plausible. The experts considered a two-year growing up
period. The infected plant may be removed before infection is spread to neighbours through conidia.
But, an infected plant can also produce spores and infect neighbours. The elicited distribution is:
Spread from mother plants depends on the probability that an infected plant is used as a mother
plant and the number of offspring that is made of that plant. Multiplication factor is in the order of 30.
From a bigger and older mother plant (medium-sized bush), as many as 100–200 cutting can be
obtained (Annemiek Schilder), but fewer from younger plants. However, as mother plants are very
clean, spread of infection from mother plants was not considered plausible. This pathway was not
further considered.
Further evidence considered
When plants come in plug trays, they are grown up in the nursery but not multiplied. It is one in,
one out.
With conidia forming fungi, if only one seed is infected, a whole nursery may become infected.
D. vaccinii does not easily make pycnidia on young plants because pycnidia production requires
stem cankers.
Infection is promoted by sprinklers. Nurseries have sprinklers.
50% chance an infected plant is rogued before it is sold and moved to a production ﬁeld. 50%
chance it spread inoculums to some nearest neighbours.
Infection is not easy. Only when plants are ﬂowering or when the plants are damaged.
Uncertainties
There is no pertinent evidence. These numbers are based on expert reasoning.
Experts also estimated the proportion of the infected plants going to garden centres.
Evidence: none.
Uncertainty: High, but the sensitivity is expected to be low because of the smallness of the
infection ﬂow into nurseries. As a result, virtually all infected import material will go directly to
production ﬁelds, and not enter into nurseries and from there into garden centres.
8. Flow of infection from nurseries to garden centres (F8)
F8 ¼ s3 # s2 # N1
s3 is the spread factor from nurseries to garden centres.
Here, the experts asked the question: how many offspring infected plants will there be next year in
garden centres because infected plants have been produced in the nursery from infected material and
transported to a garden centre (propagation).
i) Because the infection has spread from a nursery ﬁeld to a production ﬁeld by natural.
ii) Because infection can spread from plant to plant in the nursery and the grown-up plants.
iii) Because the infected plants are used as propagating material (as a mother plant) which is
planted in a production ﬁeld.
Table A.72: Distribution of parameter s1 (spread factor from nurseries to production ﬁelds)
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 0.1 0.75 1 1.5 3
Table A.73: Proportion going to garden centres (s2)
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 0.05 0.08 0.1 0.13 0.2
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Mechanisms 1 and 3 were not considered plausible, following reasoning state when estimating s1.
The second mechanism (spread within the nursery and movement of infected plant material from a
nursery to a garden centre) was considered possible. Quality of planting material going to garden
centres is generally lower than that of plant material going to production ﬁelds. To reﬂect the lower
quality, the 1 percentile was increased compared to the distribution elicited for s1. No further
modiﬁcation was made to the estimates made for s1. Hence, the distribution of s3 is:
9. Dynamics of infected plants within nurseries (F9)
F9 ¼ s1 # N1 þ s4 # N1
s1 represents spread of infection in a nursery (here considered equal in size to the infection ﬂow to
production ﬁelds), while s4 represents survival of an infected plant within a nursery from one year to
the next.
s1 was already estimated above (see Section on F7).
For the survival of infected plants from 1 year to the next in a nursery (s4), the following
distribution was elicited.
Justiﬁcation: There is inspection. Half of infected plants show symptoms and get removed.
Uncertainties: No evidence, expert judgement.
10. Flow of infection from production ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium stands (F10)
F10 ¼ s5 climateð Þ # N2
where the spread factor s5 depends on climate suitability for D. vaccinii.
To estimate the spread from production ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium stands, the experts considered
the probability of transfer of spores from production ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium stands, and the
suitability of the climate for causing infection and persistence of the pathogen. For the latter, the
experts used the climate suitability factor calculated by averaging MMF and MaxEnt (Narouei-Khandan
et al., 2017). The latter factor was ﬁrst rescaled to have an average value of one over the four climatic
regions. In the estimation of transfer, the experts did consider ‘average’ infection conditions. Thus,
they estimated the number of infected plants in natural Vaccinium stands from one infected plant in a
production ﬁeld under average climatic conditions.
To elicit a coefﬁcient for transfer, the experts imagined one infected plant in a production ﬁeld and
asked the question: how many offspring infected plants will there be next year in nature from this one
infected plant in a production ﬁeld because the infection has spread from ﬁeld to ﬁeld by natural
means (spores or vectors). The resulting coefﬁcient was:
Table A.75: Distribution of survival of infected plants from one year to the next in a nursery (s4)
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Table A.74: Distribution of parameter s3: spread factor from nurseries to garden centres
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 3
Table A.76: Coefﬁcient for effective spread of infection through transfer of spores from production
ﬁelds to natural Vaccinium stands (s5; for ‘average’ climate)
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 1/100,000 1/20,000 1/10,000 1/5,000 1/1,000
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This factor was then multiplied with scaled climate suitability factors for the four geographic
regions.
Evidence
There is no evidence for substantial spread from production ﬁelds to natural areas (e.g. from Latvia
or Belarus.
Around the blueberry production ﬁelds in Horst (Netherlands) highbush blueberry is becoming a
pest (a weed) providing evidence that birds are spreading it?
Twenty outbreaks have been reported in the last 30 years, and 1 interception. Only 1 outbreak
(in Latvia) has resulted in spread in a natural area.
Uncertainties
The role of berry eating birds is not known. But spread with birds is a common pathway of spread
for fungi, although no information is available for Phomopsis species.
11. Dynamics of infection within production ﬁelds (F11)
F11 ¼ 1# N2 þ s7 climateð Þ # N2
Year to year survival of infected plants in production ﬁelds is set to 1; hence the ﬁrst term at the
right-hand side.
s7 is the spread of D. vaccinii to neighbours within production ﬁelds. It depends on climate
suitability for D. vaccinii.
To elicit a value for s7, experts considered one infected plant in a production ﬁeld and asked the
question how many offspring infected plants there will be next year from this one infected plant
because the infection has spread to neighbours (short distance dispersal), assuming ‘average’ climatic
conditions across the EU.
As a basis, the same distribution was used as for s1 (spread in nurseries).
Climate was then taken into account by multiplying the estimated coefﬁcients with a climate
suitability factor speciﬁc for the geographic region.
Table A.77: Distribution of s5
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Overall average multiplier (not
speciﬁc for zones)
1/100,000 1/20,000 1/10,000 1/5,000 1/1,000
Region Climate suitability(a)
Value NW 0.43 4.3E-06 2.15E-05 0.000043 0.000086 0.00043
Value NE 1.27 1.27E-05 6.35E-05 0.000127 0.000254 0.00127
Value SW 0.62 6.2E-06 0.000031 0.000062 0.000124 0.00062
Value SE 1.68 1.68E-05 0.000084 0.000168 0.000336 0.00168
(a): The scaled climate suitability was derived from the climate suitability in Table A.60 so that the average value for the four
regions is 1.0.
Table A.78: Distribution of s7 spread factor of D. vaccinii in production ﬁelds for average climate
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 0.1 0.75 1 1.5 3
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12. Dynamics of infection in natural Vaccinium stands (F12)
F12 ¼ s8 # N3
where s8 is a spread factor.
To elicit the value of s8, the experts considered one infected plant in a natural Vaccinium stand and
asked the question: how many offspring infected plants will there be next year from this one infected plant:
i) Because the plant has not been removed (survival).
ii) Because the infection has spread to neighbours or afar (short + long distance dispersal).
Literature was used to support estimation of the spread factor. Damicone et al. (1990) estimated
the relative rate of disease increase of Diaporthe phaseolorum in soybean to range between 0.02 and
0.12 per week in the growing season. For the same pathogen, Subbarao et al. (1992) estimated rates
varying from 0.06 to 0.21 per day (Subbarao et al., 1992). The high rate reported by Subbarao was
under irrigation, the low rate without irrigation. The low rates of Damicone were under ambient
conditions for cultivars differing in resistance. Exponential rates of increase cannot be maintained for
long times. Assuming time periods of exponential growth of 30, 40, 50 and 60 days, and taking a
mid-point estimate (0.1 d-1) from the data of Subbarao, we obtain spread factors ranging from 20 to
400 (i.e. from exp(30 9 0.1) to exp(60 9 0.1)). No winter mortality is accounted for in these
calculations. To represent uncertainty, percentile values from 1 to 100 were used. These are multiplied
with the climate suitability coefﬁcients to obtain the quantiles for s8 in each geographic region.
13. Flow of infection from garden centres to home gardens (F13)
F13 ¼ s9 # N4
s9 is the proportion of (infected) plants that is sold to consumers and planted in home gardens.
This proportion should be close to one, but less than one because not all plants in a garden centre
may eventually be sold. Plants in poor health may be marked down and sold as well. The following
distribution was assumed.
Table A.79: Distribution of s7
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Overall average multiplier
(not speciﬁc for zones)
0.3 0.75 1 1.5 3
Region Climate suitability
factor(a)
Value NW 0.43 0.129 0.3225 0.43 0.645 1.29
Value NE 1.27 0.381 0.9525 1.27 1.905 3.81
Value SW 0.62 0.186 0.465 0.62 0.93 1.86
Value SE 1.68 0.504 1.26 1.68 2.52 5.04
(a): The scaled climate suitability was derived from the climate suitability in Table A.60 so that the average value for the four
regions is 1.0.
Table A.80: Distribution of s8
Climate
suitability
(a)
Percentile
Region
1 25 50 75 99
Overall average multiplier
(not speciﬁc for zones)
1 3 10 30 100
Value NW 0.43 0.43 1.29 4.3 12.9 43
Value NE 1.27 1.27 3.81 12.7 38.1 127
Value SW 0.62 0.62 1.86 6.2 18.6 62
Value SE 1.68 1.68 5.04 16.8 50.4 168
(a): The scaled climate suitability was derived from the climate suitability in Table A.60 so that the average value for the four
regions is 1.0.
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14. Dynamics of infection in garden centres (F14)
F14 ¼ 1! s9ð Þ # N4 þ s1 # N4
The ﬁrst term is the proportion of plants that is not sold. The second term is spread within
nurseries.
Here, the experts considered one infected plant in a garden centre and asked the question: how
many offspring infected plants will there be next year in garden centres from this one infected plant:
i) Because the plant has not been removed (survival).
ii) Because the infection has spread to neighbours (dispersal).
(Spread to other gardens centres is not considered.)
The same spread factor was used as in nurseries, i.e. s1, considering that similar conditions of
irrigation and surveillance apply.
15. Flow of infection from home gardens to production ﬁelds (F15)
F15 ¼ 0
To assess this ﬂow, experts considered one infected plant in a home garden, asking the question:
how many offspring infected plants will there be next year in production ﬁelds from this one infected
plant due to natural means (spore dispersal or vectors).
This ﬂow was considered to be negligible and was set to zero.
16. Flow of infection from home gardens to natural Vaccinium stands (F16)
F16 ¼ 0
To assess this ﬂow, experts considered one infected plant in a home garden, and asked the
question: how many offspring infected plants will there be next year in natural Vaccinium stands from
this one infected plant due to spread by natural means (spore dispersal or vectors).
Evidence
No ascospores are produced on blueberries. Spread is only by conidiospores. These are unlikely to
reach nature areas from home gardens.
This ﬂow was thus considered to be negligible and was set to zero.
17. Dynamics of infection in home gardens (F17)
To assess this ﬂow, experts considered one infected plant in a home garden, and asked the
question: how many offspring infected plants will there be next year in home gardens from this one
infected plant due to spread by natural means (spore dispersal or vectors).
Survival of infected was estimated to be near 1.
Spread was not considered to be important because local populations in home gardens are too
small to allow relevant spread. Therefore, the ﬂow was estimated as:
F17 ¼ N5
Table A.81: Distribution of s9, proportion of plants in garden centres sold to consumers and
planted in home gardens
Percentile
1 25 50 75 99
Value 0.5 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.95
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Appendix B – Description and analysis of the relevant risk reducing options
(RRO) for D. vaccinii
The Panel reviewed in Section A of this Appendix the list of potential RROs and, based on expert
judgement, determined those that could be applied as phytosanitary measure to D. vaccinii in the
three assessed scenarios (Section B). In Section C, an overview is given of the requirements to
guarantee pest freedom of areas, places and consignments, and in Section D, an overview is given of
the feasibility of eradication of D. vaccinii for three different situations.
B.1. Review of risk reducing options
1.01 Growing plants in isolation
The objective of this RRO is to implement exclusion conditions to isolate the crop from pests (e.g. a
dedicated structure such a greenhouse). According to EU Directive 2014-98 (Provisions for the
certiﬁcation and marketing of pre-basic, basic and certiﬁed fruit plant propagating material and fruit
plants intended for fruit production), pre-basic material of Vaccinium has to be produced in insect-proof
facilities above ground and as potted plants. Thus, this RRO is part of RRO 2.06 (Certiﬁcation of
reproductive material, see below). [Note: other categories of propagated material can be produced in
open ﬁelds]
1.03 Chemical treatments on crops including reproductive material
A wide array of different fungicides is used on cranberries and blueberries in Canada and the USA.
Besides the classical fungicides (copper or sulfur compounds, carbamates, phthalamides and nitrile),
newer classes of fungicides are used such as strobilurins, pyrimidines, aniline pyrimidine, diarylamine and
triazoles, depending on their registration in a particular production area (Caruso and Ramsdell, 1995;
Cline et al., 2000, 2007; Williamson et al., 2013). Cranberry viscid rot and upright dieback can be
controlled effectively by regular fungicide applications during bloom and early berry development
(Sabaratnam et al., 2014). In areas highly conducive to P. vaccinii infection, all cranberry ﬁelds are
sprayed with fungicides (3–5 sprays per year), while in less conducive areas about half of the ﬁelds may
be sprayed (1–3 times per year) (P. MacManus, questionnaire on 13/1/2017). Most cranberry ﬁelds
receive 5–6 sprays per year (A. Schilder, questionnaire 24/11/2016). Highbush blueberries in highly
conducive areas receive 7–11 fungicide sprays per year, while lowbush blueberries are sprayed 5–7 times
per year (A. Schilder, questionnaire 24/11/2016). In less conducive areas, highbush blueberries receive
2–3 fungicide applications per year (Williamson et al., 2013).
1.05 Cleaning and disinfection of facilities, tools and machinery
Pruning tools (pruning scissors, saws and mechanical pruning machines) provide wounds and may
be a pathway of transmission of D. vaccinii within a farm. The pathogen can be transmitted on such
tools in the form of spores.
Pruning tools and machinery should be cleaned before being moved to a next farm.
Cleaning tools and machinery is regarded as Good Agricultural Practice and is not considered as a
RRO in this assessment.
1.07 Use of non-contaminated water
Irrigation is common practice in blueberry and cranberry nurseries and berry production sites.
Overhead irrigation may create an ideal environment for spread and survival of D. vaccinii in ﬁelds
where the pest is present. A risk reducing option could be the prohibition for overhead irrigation for
nurseries in areas where D. vaccinii is present.
1.08 Physical treatments on consignments or during processing
There is no data available on an effective heat treatment for D. vaccinii in Vaccinium. This RRO is
not considered as an RRO in scenarios.
1.10 Waste management
After pruning, the brush debris and cut branches should be removed and shredded or burned if
required to prevent pathogen spread (Davies and Crocker, 1994; Caruso and Ramsdell, 1995). Waste
management is regarded as Good Agricultural Practice and is not considered as a RRO in this
assessment.
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1.12 Roguing and pruning
Blueberry bushes are pruned annually, usually in the dormant season. At that time, bushes are
thinned out to remove dead and diseased branches (among others infected by D. vaccinii), and
improve light penetration and ﬂower bud formation in the interior of the plant. Brush pruning
(heading-back) can be done mechanically to balance shoot and root size, control plant size, and
balance the crop load. It is also used to shape the bush for mechanical harvesting. Brush pruning can
be done in the summer. Cranberry plants are also pruned, but primarily to remove infected upright
branches (Pesticide Risk Reduction Program, 2007).
Although pruning diseased plant parts may reduce the impact of D. vaccinii at harvest, pruning is
not considered as an effective risk reducing option to guarantee pest freedom. Asymptomatic plant
parts may not be pruned, thus pruning can only delay the onset of plant death.
In the infested nurseries, the most important sanitation measure is the immediate removal and
destruction of host plants infected by D. vaccinii and the neighbouring plants in the immediate vicinity
of the infected plants (e.g. within a radius of 3 m), because the pathogen can be present without
showing symptoms. Therefore, the complete removal and destruction of infected bushes is the most
appropriate course of action. The cut branches and all the debris should be destroyed by ﬁre or
properly buried in sanitary landﬁlls.
1.17 Post-entry quarantine and other restrictions of movement
Plants for planting of Vaccinium is listed as a host in the EU emergency measures for
Xylella fastidiosa (EU/2015/789). As a consequence, there is a prohibition for the import of Vaccinium
plants from countries where X. fastidiosa is present, unless the plant material originates from an
ofﬁcially declared pest-free production place and only consists of in vitro plant material. This RRO
could be used to exclude certain riskful plant categories from trade such as ﬁeld grown potted plants
or cuttings from production places. [add text explaining why these are riskful]
2.01 Inspection and trapping
Plants intended for planting of Vaccinium and fruits of Vaccinium are listed in annex V-B of EC/2000/29,
therefore, an export inspection, export certiﬁcate and import inspection is required. Regular inspection of
bushes is needed to detect twig blight, canker and upright dieback in areas where the pathogen is
present.
The majority of infected plants and fruits that show disease symptoms are unlikely to escape visual
inspection. However, the asymptomatic presence of D. vaccinii may occur since the incubation period
can be 2–8 weeks. For blueberry plants, it was demonstrated that 5% of healthy looking plants
became symptomatic (Milholland, 1982). For cranberry, D. vaccinii could be isolated from 90% of
apparently healthy vines (Friend and Boone, 1968).
2.02 Laboratory testing
To distinguish D. vaccinii from other fungi with similar symptoms laboratory testing with an
approved diagnostic protocol may be necessary. Laboratory testing may also be necessary to
investigate the asymptomatic presence of D. vaccinii in nurseries situated in areas where D. vaccinii is
present. The Panel has no information if testing for the asymptomatic presence of D. vaccinii in
nurseries is currently applied. Is testing consignments at import to detect the asymptomatic presence
a feasible option?
2.04 Phytosanitary certiﬁcates and plant passport
RRO effect covered by inspection 2.01.
2.06 Certiﬁcation of reproductive material (voluntary/ofﬁcial)
Vaccinium is included in EU Directive 2014-98 (Provisions for the certiﬁcation and marketing of pre-
basic, basic and certiﬁed fruit plant propagating material and fruit plants intended for fruit production).
B.2. Summary of relevant RRO’s for the pathway plants for planting
(P4P) for each scenario
Note: because the risk assessment revealed that fruit is an insigniﬁcant pathway for D. vaccinii,
only the RROs for the pathway P4P were assessed.
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A0 – Current measures for P4P
The relevant RRO’s currently applied (scenario A0) are:
1) Certiﬁcation of reproductive material
2) Fungicide treatments of production ﬁelds
3) Inspection of nurseries
4) Roguing in case of a ﬁnding of D. vaccinii
5) Laboratory testing to verify presence of D. vaccinii
6) Restriction to in vitro plant material from pest-free areas for Xylella
7) Export inspection
8) Import inspection.
A1 – Deregulation of D. vaccinii – Measures for P4P
In scenario A1, D. vaccinii has no quarantine status. This would imply that inspection for D. vaccinii
is not obligatory anymore as well as laboratory testing. The certiﬁcation system for Vaccinium would
remain in place, as well as fungicidal control of fungi present in nurseries. Pruning and roguing of dead
and diseased plants may continue despite the deregulation of D. vaccinii.
The relevant RRO’s in scenario A1 are:
1) Certiﬁcation of reproductive material
2) Fungicide treatments of production ﬁelds
3) Roguing in case of a ﬁnding of D. vaccinii
4) Restriction to in vitro plant material from pest-free areas for Xylella.
A2 – More stringent measures for P4P
Improved guarantees for pest freedom of nurseries in areas where D. vaccinii is present can be
achieved by restricting the trade to plug plants derived from tissue culture and grown in D. vaccinii-
free enclosed structures (i.e. this excludes potted plants and cuttings from ﬁeld grown plants).
The relevant RRO’s in scenario A2 are:
1) Certiﬁcation of reproductive material
2) Fungicide treatments of production ﬁelds
3) Inspection of nurseries
4) Roguing in case of a ﬁnding of D. vaccinii
5) Laboratory testing to verify presence of D. vaccinii
6) Restriction to in vitro plant material from pest-free areas for Xylella
7) Export inspection
8) Import inspection
9) Restriction to trade in plants for planting from pest-free areas or in areas where D. vaccinii is
present a restriction to trade in plug plants derived from tissue culture and grown in D. vaccinii-
free enclosed structures. (i.e. this excludes potted plants and cuttings from ﬁeld grown plants).
B.3. Analysis of possibilities to guarantee Pest Freedom
Pest-free area
Nurseries situated in an ofﬁcially approved pest-free area (e.g. country, region) can guarantee
pest-free propagation material, assuming that a reliable surveillance system is in place to guarantee
pest freedom of the area.
Pest-free production place
In areas where D. vaccinii is present, for a Pest-Free Production Place (PFPP) the following ofﬁcial
measures have to be in place to guarantee pest freedom of the nursery:
• Production under protected cultivation (e.g. greenhouses).
• The nursery is situated in an area that guarantees the absence or low D. vaccinii prevalence.
• Regular (i.e. calendar) fungicide treatments of the nursery.
• Inspection for D. vaccinii symptoms and testing if necessary.
• In case of a ﬁnding D. vaccinii, roguing of all plants in the infected production unit and prohibition of
movement of all plants in the nursery until no disease symptoms have been detected for one year.
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Pest-free consignments
For nurseries where the presence of D. vaccinii cannot be fully excluded, pest-free propagative
material can be produced with the following possible measures:
• As far as the Panel is aware, there are no physical or chemical treatments available to
guarantee pest freedom of Vaccinium.
• Therefore, the only reliable measure is the restriction for trade to plants derived from
micropropagated plant material (plantlets from tissue culture) and plants from pest-free areas.
B.4. Assessment of feasibility of eradication of an outbreak of
D. vaccinii
In Table B.1, an overview is given of the RROs that can be applied in eradication of an outbreak of
D. vaccinii and the constraints that may apply for the speciﬁc RRO. In Table 2, an overview is given for
the comparison of eradication success for three different outbreak situations.
Table B.1: Overview of the RROs that can be applied in eradication of an outbreak of D. vaccinii
Possible RROs Effect/target Constraints on effectiveness
Inspection Detection of symptomatic plants in nursery No, symptoms are clear
Sampling and testing Identiﬁcation of D. vaccinii and detection of
asymptomatic plants in nursery
A high intensity sampling and testing
scheme may be required to verify the
absence of asymptomatic plants (i.e. to
identify with 99% reliability a level of
presence of infected plants of 1% or above
and targeted especially at plants displaying
suspect symptoms)
Fungicide treatment Population control Restricted period of effectiveness: mainly
effective in blooming period
Roguing of infected
plants and
neighbouring plants
(e.g. in a zone of
10 m around infected
plants?)
Removal of infected plants in production
place
No
Restriction of
movement of plant
material for 1 year
(or 2 years?)
If asymptomatic presence of the pathogen
is difﬁcult to detect with sampling and
testing a restriction of movement of the
plants in the affected nursery is necessary
to prevent spread of the pest
Guarantee of pest freedom of plant lots
where infected plants were removed
(i.e. no development of symptoms
1–2 years after detection in nursery)
Field grown plants can only be traded after
it is veriﬁed that nursery is declared pest
free (i.e. eradication was successful).
Exemption for plug plants derived from
tissue culture and grown in D. vaccinii free
enclosed structures
Symptom development of all asymptomatic
plants present may take 1 (or 2?) growing
season
Surveillance in Buffer
zone
Detection of other possible outbreaks in the
surrounding area of the production place
If new outbreaks are detected the affected
production place is not in a pest-free area,
until pathogen is eradicated from the area
The appropriate size of the buffer zone.
Density and spatial distribution of suitable
host plants in environment
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Nursery
The probability of successful eradication of an outbreak in a nursery is assessed as high. In general,
nurseries have a good intrinsic quality system for the detection and removal of diseased plants. One of
the constraints for successful eradication is the detection of asymptomatic plants by sampling and
testing. The difﬁculty in the detection of asymptomatic plants can be circumvented by the removal of
all plants surrounding asymptomatic plants and/or a prohibition for movement of plants to allow
symptom development of asymptomatic plants. To guarantee pest freedom of the area surrounding
the affected nursery, surveillance is necessary for the presence of the pathogen in wild vegetation in a
speciﬁed buffer zone.
Availability of data: D. vaccinii was successfully eradicated from a nursery in Poland (based on survey
results in 2016).
Berry production place
In principle, the same eradication measures can be applied in berry production places in
comparison to nurseries, including the restriction of movement of berries from the production place
until the production place is declared pest free. Therefore, the probability of successful eradication of
an outbreak in a berry production place is assessed as high.
Availability of data: D. vaccinii was successfully eradicated from a berry production place in The
Netherlands in 201 (NPPO 2015).
Natural environment, including home gardens
The probability of successful eradication of an outbreak in the natural environment is assessed as
low. The main constraints for eradication of D. vaccinii in the natural environment are the density and
distribution of suitable wild and ornamental host plants in the environment. This may hamper the
detection of all possible host plants and the feasibility to apply the selected RRO measures in the
natural environment and home gardens.
Availability of data: After the conﬁrmation of the presence of D. vaccinii on wild Vaccinium, no attempt
was made to eradicate D. vaccinii in the natural environment in Latvia (survey results in 2016).
Time steps relevant for control measures for FRUITS pathway
Note: Trade volumes are assumed to remain unchanged. The effect of the control measures is
analysed for the four relevant time steps in the entry process.
A0 Current situation
Vaccinium fruit needs an export certiﬁcate, however, there are no speciﬁc requirements for D.
vaccinii on fruits, (i.e. there is a general inspection requirement for Vaccinium fruit); thus, there is a
limited legal basis for rejection of consignments of Vaccinium fruit on the basis of the D. vaccinii
presence (which is listed as IIAI for Vaccinium Plants for planting but not for fruits).
Table B.2: Comparison of eradication success for different outbreak situations
Possible RROs Nursery Berry production Natural environment
Inspection *
Sampling and testing * * ***
Fungicide treatment *
Roguing of infected plants *
Restriction of movement *
Surveillance in Buffer zone * * **
Possibility for Eradication success High High Low
Level of constraints on RRO: empty cell: no constrains, *: low, **: medium, ***: high.
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1. Export Production Place (step e3) Pest control measures & sorting (the presence of D. vaccinii affects
the quality of the fruit, and such berries may be sorted out at export)
2. Export inspection (step e3b) No rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
3. Import inspection (step e5) No rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
4. EU Packing & Retail Place (step e7 & e8) Handling of incoming consignment
A1 No quarantine status
No Change compared to A0: Vaccinium fruit needs export certiﬁcate, no speciﬁc requirements for D.
vaccinii.
No species speciﬁc visual symptoms of D. vaccinii in production places (testing is needed to verify
the presence of D. vaccinii)
1. Export Production Place (step e3) Pest control measures & sorting
2. Export inspection (step e3b) No rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
3. Import inspection (step e5) No rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
4. EU Packing & Retail Place (step e7 & e8) Handling of incoming consignment
A2 Speciﬁc import requirements for fruit related to D. vaccinii
(a) Only fruit produced in pest-free areas or
For export countries/areas where D. vaccinii occurs pest-free production places in the open ﬁeld
may be difﬁcult to achieve, even with fungicidal treatments a guarantee of pest freedom (absence
of spores/conidia on fruit) may be difﬁcult. Production under protected cultivation conditions is
theoretically possible (i.e. no ﬁeld exposure) but considered not to be feasible.
An effective treatment of berry consignments is not available.
Only option for areas where D. vaccinii is present:
(b) Fruit for (re)packaging or processing only in EU registered facilities with appropriate hygiene
measures.
Conclusion: Option for exporting countries (a) or (b). This should be checked by exporting NPPO
and importing NPPO (certiﬁcate check for veriﬁcation of (a) or (b) at import).
Current situation in Belarus, RF and China (D. vaccinii presumed to be present) show that
guarantee of pest freedom may not always be reliable.
Steps in risk assessment for entry model with FRUIT pathway
Note: ‘No Effect’ indicates no difference with A0: copy A0 quantile table for A1 and A2 in this step.
AO
Effect of A1
compared to A0
Effect of A2
compared to A0
NE0 – Estimated total number of blueberries (in millions) imported
from countries with ofﬁcial presence of D. vaccinii into the EU per year
No effect No effect
e1 – Prevalence level; Proportion of blueberry production ﬁelds
infected with D. vaccinii in countries where D. vaccinii is present or
presumed to be present
No effect No effect
e2 – Incidence level; Proportion of blueberry fruit harvested in ﬁelds
with presence of D. vaccinii that are infected with the fungus. This
includes latent infections
No effect No effect
e3 – Proportion of infected berries that are remaining at packing
houses before being further shipped for export
No effect No effect
e3b – Proportion of infected berries removed after export inspection No effect No effect
e4 – Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected
berries during transport from Third countries to the EU, e.g. due to
cross-infection or cross-contamination between berries
No effect No effect
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AO
Effect of A1
compared to A0
Effect of A2
compared to A0
e5 – Proportion of infected berries that is intercepted at import
inspection
No effect Import restriction:
only fruits from
pest-free areas
or only fruit for
processing
e6 –Multiplier accounting for a change in the number of infected
berries during intra-EU transport, e.g. due to cross-infection or cross-
contamination between berries
No effect No effect
e7 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed at packing
houses in the EU
No effect Enhanced removal
in registered
facilities?
e8 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed at retail in the EU No effect No effect
e9 – Proportion of infected berries that is removed by consumers
(waste)
No effect No effect
Time steps relevant for control measures for P4P pathway
Note: Trade volumes are assumed to remain unchanged. The effect of the control measures is
analysed for the four relevant time steps in the entry process.
A0 Current situation
D. vaccinii should be absent on Vaccinium P4P consignments. For areas where Xylella fastidiosa is
present, restriction to in-vitro Vaccinium only.
Export nursery Pest control measures & sorting
Export inspection Rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
Import inspection Rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
EU Nursery handling of incoming consignment
A1 No quarantine status
Export certiﬁcate and inspection of Vaccinium remains, but no consignment rejections because of
D. vaccinii presence.
Export nursery Fungicidal control for fruit rot pathogens (incl. D. vaccinii) remains. Areas where D. vaccinii is
present do not risk export rejection; increase in D. vaccinii presence in export consignments
Export inspection Export inspection remains, but no rejections on basis of D. vaccinii presence
Import
inspection
Import inspection remains, but no rejections on basis of D. vaccinii presence
EU nursery No Change
A2 Speciﬁc import requirements related to D. vaccinii
For export countries/areas where D. vaccinii occurs:
– import restriction to P4P derived from meristem culture and produced in protected cultivation
conditions (i.e. no ﬁeld exposure).
Export nursery Fungicidal control for fruit rot pathogens (incl. D. vaccinii) remains. Absence of
D. vaccinii presence in export consignments
Export inspection Rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
Import inspection Rejection of consignments with D. vaccinii symptoms
EU nursery No change
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Appendix C – Tables of data for the opinion
Table C.1: Trade of Vaccinium plants for planting (pieces) into the EU
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Country of origin
Argentina 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Chile 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Zealand 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 0 0 0 600 0 0 0 0 0 15
United States of America 95,895 98,712 69,208 35 1,598 771 27,921 1 7,000 2,200
Total 95,895 99,822 69,212 635 1,598 771 27,921 1 7,000 2,217
Source: ISEFOR database.
Diaporthe vaccinii pest risk assessment
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 126 EFSA Journal 2017;15(9):4924
Table C.2: Import of Vaccinium berries into the EU-28 in tonnes
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
Argentina 481.4 776.6 1,623.9 2,176.9 2,821.1 3,194.1 3,995.9 4,850.5 4,476.2 3,937.7
Australia 80.6 96.2 51.5 72.3 54.9 89.1 58.4 107.1 0.0 2.4
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belarus 1,259.6 1,354.4 2,187.1 2,513.6 323.7 617.9 257.8 1,101.7 242.5 204.0
Bosnia Herzegovina 21.9 51.4 46.5 92.8 42.1 31.1 63.9 79.7 39.5 88.4
Brazil 13.6 18.5 8.5 10.9 8.8 7.9 6.1 5.2 0.9 1.8
Cameroon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
Canada 42.5 36.0 240.0 321.6 916.6 553.5 209.2 629.8 358.8 633.4
Chile 918.7 1,620.5 2,844.5 3,823.5 5,414.5 5,364.3 7,253.9 8,898.1 11,894.1 13,577.6
China 0.2 29.0 5.3 6.4 49.3 106.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 12.6
Colombia 1.2 1.8 9.8 16.9 35.2 58.8 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.0 15.5
Ghana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greenland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guatemala 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.8
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Iran 0.2 0.0 0.2 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Israel 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lebanon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madagascar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 1.7 2.0 12.2 16.8 1.0 3.3 11.8 4.3 75.2 63.4
Montenegro 0.0 0.0 166.0 187.6 68.7 192.2 367.0 234.6 150.2 171.8
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 214.9 625.7 1,264.8 1,866.9 2,928.0 3,416.1
New Zealand 38.1 130.2 125.2 111.5 96.2 62.6 8.4 9.9 3.7 0.0
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Norway 28.1 11.6 26.5 6.3 1.7 20.7 8.0 11.5 58.3 33.3
Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.1 4.1 40.5 516.7
Russian Federation 4,118.6 3,139.5 2,514.9 473.4 0.0 14.6 10.0 1.5 427.4 516.7
Serbia 148.4 0.0 44.7 0.0 287.1 176.2 313.9 255.1 288.3 426.7
South Africa 125.2 136.8 135.6 147.1 181.4 559.9 740.2 983.4 1,180.1 1,376.6
Switzerland 13.1 1.8 2.7 25.3 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.6
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TFYR of Macedonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.7 205.7 93.6 48.1 210.1
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
Turkey 9.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uganda 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.3 1.8 0.3 9.3 0.2 3.5
Ukraine 2,794.7 1,960.9 1,219.5 513.6 521.6 514.3 722.6 614.9 793.3 407.9
United Rep. of Tanzania 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2
Uruguay 3.8 16.0 80.7 332.8 578.0 642.3 1,214.2 1,432.4 1,265.2 1,024.5
USA 974.5 1,522.9 1,911.1 1,725.9 1,258.8 1,255.3 1,297.1 1,290.7 1,247.5 1,368.2
Zimbabwe 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5
Total 11,075.7 10,906.8 13,264.9 12,583.5 12,882.5 14,143.3 18,014.8 22,485.3 25,530.0 28,023.4
Source: UN Comtrade database.
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Table C.3: Import of blueberries per EU member state in tonnes
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country
Austria 1,825 2,114 1,649 1,286 2,124 2,581 2,265 2,591 1,208 3,815
Belgium 24 28 39 130 367 185 448 307 145 584
Bulgaria NA NA 0 0 0 0 15 63 15 80
Croatia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Cyprus NA NA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Czech Republic 195 139 151 97 200 133 156 169 217 179
Denmark 198 120 247 255 182 615 790 686 785 636
Estonia 744 1,126 1,312 1,732 1,128 3,248 1,158 1,501 65 23
Finland 506 1,415 356 967 980 1,200 518 113 552 1,049
France 180 263 290 331 1,098 1,519 1,484 2,598 3,400 2,665
Germany 1,514 1,434 1,210 1,773 2,372 3,872 4,815 4,673 6,621 7,121
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Ireland 10 20 9 48 3 0 35 3 1 2
Italy 414 347 396 579 907 835 1,300 1,436 1,812 2,117
Latvia 20 21 44 39 50 387 535 60 64 406
Lithuania 1,671 1,669 2,360 2,758 342 1,133 424 1,070 1,102 1,264
Luxembourg 7 7 9 10 11 12 29 39 48 58
Malta 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 201 1,074 660 318 772 676 2,059 3,305 2,499 2,586
Poland 1,551 2,204 1,915 2,278 741 1,108 1,138 1,692 1,342 1,770
Portugal 1 0 1 4 5 3 2 54 96 156
Romania 0 2 1 19 7 3 3 8 13 24
Slovakia 0 2 4 3 5 18 25 40 45 39
Slovenia 149 29 34 23 57 149 100 82 65 94
Spain 112 49 29 63 76 130 438 452 1,089 2,646
Sweden 869 579 1,067 693 119 130 213 319 674 587
United Kingdom 451 1,039 789 2,587 1,158 901 2,007 1,832 3,873 4,793
Total 10,642 13,681 12,573 15,993 12,705 18,838 19,957 23,093 25,732 32,694
NA: Not available.
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.4: Import of cranberries per EU member state in tonnes
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country
Austria 93 72 78 15 40 42 27 18 73 88
Belgium 547 551 645 593 703 748 902 1,418 1,948 2,095
Bulgaria NA NA 0 0 0 9 9 8 0 0
Croatia 2 4 4 7 5 4 6 20 35 23
Cyprus NA NA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 193 13 27 28 102 154 66 79 70 83
Estonia 1 0 2 3 8 1 4 47 1 1
Finland 8 3 14 17 56 61 82 141 149 231
France 51 71 84 42 41 101 55 128 204 209
Germany 223 110 80 181 139 275 539 1,239 1,734 2,340
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Hungary NA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 11 10 15 21 52 22 74 258 146 173
Italy 63 88 112 75 73 204 174 206 149 150
Latvia 94 86 215 227 157 47 250 85 4 2
Lithuania 25 25 40 57 7 13 13 13 82 471
Luxembourg NA NA NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1
Netherlands 755 1,061 2,310 2,507 3,346 3,463 4,172 6,185 7,397 8,050
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal NA NA NA NA 23 10 135 129 57 2
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0
Slovakia NA NA NA NA 1 5 7 7 7 3
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Spain 10 24 12 34 15 301 411 628 321 212
Sweden 60 30 18 12 39 78 94 232 182 267
United Kingdom 2,239 3,454 5,487 6,726 9,586 9,456 10,296 12,665 13,941 14,254
Total 4,390 5,602 9,145 10,545 14,393 14,995 17,316 23,508 26,503 28,655
NA: Not available.
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.5: Import of cranberries into the EU in tonnes (main producers)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country of origin
Belarus 248.3 254.3 665.0 683.8 123.4 188.7 78.5 388.9 77.6 62.3
Canada 8.4 6.8 73.0 87.5 349.4 169.1 63.7 222.3 114.8 193.5
Chile 181.1 304.3 864.8 1,040.2 2,064.0 1,638.6 2,209.3 3,141.4 3,805.7 4,148.3
TFYR of Macedonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 62.6 33.0 15.4 64.2
USA 192.1 285.9 581.1 469.6 479.8 383.4 395.1 455.7 399.2 418.0
Output of calculations based on Comtrade and FAOSTAT trade data.
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Table C.6: Import of blueberries into the EU in tonnes
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country of origin
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Argentina 386.5 630.8 1,130.2 1,584.7 1,745.7 2,218.4 2,778.9 3,138.1 3,044.0 2,734.6
Australia 64.7 78.1 35.8 52.6 34.0 61.9 40.6 69.3 0.0 1.7
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belarus 1,011.3 1,100.1 1,522.1 1,829.8 200.3 429.2 179.3 712.8 164.9 141.7
Bosnia Herzegovina 17.6 41.7 32.4 67.6 26.1 21.6 44.4 51.6 26.9 61.4
Brazil 10.9 15.0 5.9 7.9 5.4 5.5 4.2 3.4 0.6 1.3
Cameroon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Canada 34.1 29.2 167.0 234.1 567.2 384.4 145.5 407.4 244.0 439.9
Chile 737.6 1,316.2 1,979.6 2,783.3 3,350.6 3,725.7 5,044.6 5,756.7 8,088.4 9,429.3
China 0.2 23.6 3.7 4.7 30.5 74.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.8
Colombia 1.0 1.5 6.8 12.3 21.8 40.8 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.0
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 10.8
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guatemala 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.6
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Iran 0.2 0.0 0.1 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Israel 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lebanon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madagascar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 1.4 1.6 8.5 12.2 0.6 2.3 8.2 2.8 51.2 44.1
Montenegro 0.0 0.0 115.5 136.6 42.5 133.5 255.2 151.8 102.1 119.3
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 133.0 434.6 879.6 1,207.8 1,991.1 2,372.4
New Zealand 30.6 105.8 87.1 81.2 59.5 43.5 5.8 6.4 2.5 0.0
Norway 22.5 9.4 18.5 4.6 1.1 14.4 5.6 7.4 39.6 23.1
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Peru 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 2.7 27.5 358.8
Russian Federation 3,306.7 2,550.0 1,750.3 344.6 0.0 10.1 7.0 1.0 290.7 358.8
Serbia 119.1 0.0 31.1 0.0 177.7 122.4 218.3 165.0 196.0 296.3
South Africa 100.5 111.1 94.4 107.1 112.3 388.9 514.8 636.2 802.5 956.0
Switzerland 10.5 1.5 1.9 18.4 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.4
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TFYR of Macedonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.7 143.1 60.6 32.7 145.9
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
Turkey 7.2 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uganda 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.2 6.0 0.1 2.4
Ukraine 2,243.8 1,592.7 848.7 373.9 322.8 357.2 502.5 397.8 539.5 283.3
United Rep. of Tanzania 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1
Uruguay 3.1 13.0 56.2 242.3 357.7 446.1 844.4 926.7 860.4 711.5
USA 782.4 1,237.0 1,330.1 1,256.4 779.0 871.9 902.1 835.0 848.4 950.2
Zimbabwe 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3
Output of calculations based on Comtrade and FAOSTAT trade data.
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Table C.7: Export of cranberries per year for the non-EU countries in tonnes
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country of origin
Albania 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 9 0 0
Belarus 1,329 1,438 2,478 3,105 690 2,497 1,208 1,526 594 666
Canada 44,972 40,828 47,202 45,316 40,402 41,485 34,493 35,737 58,764 60,107
Chile 10,104 11,938 15,433 20,872 34,707 38,508 55,099 73,760 69,134 81,656
China 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China, Taiwan Province of 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Egypt 13 177 98 0 0 1 0 13 18 16
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
India 9 49 0 49 6 1 0 2 2 1
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 30 30 30 30 0
Netherlands 60 151 521 894 799 346 410 1,890 3,994 3,479
Norway 0 0 0 0 8 3 2 8 50 32
Qatar 10 32 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 48 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Russian Federation 0 0 25 0 25 10 0 0 0 0
Saudi Arabia 74 36 30 82 0 0 0 0 0 0
Serbia and Montenegro 148 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 0 0 21 0 5 0 4 2 22 4
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 20 0 213 213 6 20 283 0 48 314
Tunisia 0 0 2 0 0 0 196 117 0 4
Turkey 0 0 8 0 4 0 1 0 12 8
United Arab Emirates 6 54 277 320 0 0 16 16 16
United Kingdom 0 35 70 119 98 124 147 237 128 134
United States of America 9,121 13,609 12,627 16,128 19,709 14,825 12,603 10,631 9,113 11,115
Total 65,860 68,335 78,853 87,062 96,781 97,853 104,482 123,978 141,925 157,553
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.8: Export of blueberries per year for the non-EU countries in tonnes
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country of origin
Albania NA NA NA NA 0 0 3 0 0 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 19,776 15,171 15,959 12,780 17,051 19,249 20,564 20,090 29,713 30,215
China 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1
China, Macao SAR NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA
China, Taiwan Province of 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1
Honduras 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
Jamaica NA NA NA NA NA 3 0 11 0 0
Montenegro NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Morocco 0 0 0 0 137 636 1,761 1,501 2,711 4,790
New Zealand 380 561 778 793 587 697 1,190 667 936 1,115
Peru NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1,499
Romania 273 529 335 234 339 46 340 378 609 514
Russian Federation 1,692 1,282 2,116 116 0 0 0 0 160 15
Serbia NA NA 25 17 215 179 0 0 0 0
Thailand NA NA NA 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 2,384 2,170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 1 4 13 21 41 31 64 41 56 407
United States of America 16,825 24,342 22,952 29,033 35,773 35,704 40,425 49,036 45,182 48,862
Uruguay NA NA NA 488 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 65,860 68,335 78,853 87,062 96,781 97,853 104,482 123,978 141,925 157,553
NA: Not available.
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.9: Import of ‘Other live plants (including their roots), cuttings and slips; mushroom Spawn (CN-code: 0602)’ from non-EU countries. Quantity
values are illustrated in 100 kg
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Reporter country
Austria 3,154 3,102 3,204 1,394 1,201 1,234
Belgium (and LUXBG -> 1998) 21,395 21,670 28,244 28,440 32,197 32,502
Bulgaria 3,963 14,862 26,658 17,540 23,947 29,508
Croatia 4,711 4,672 9,081 7,225 3,400 3,246
Cyprus 20,696 18,589 10,222 6,586 6,970 2,436
Czech Republic (CS-> 1992) 1,017 570 440 816 1,053 815
Denmark 8,621 7,697 8,826 6,090 5,535 6,978
Estonia 0 0 6 1 2 3
Finland 50 63 94 32 38 67
France 18,110 16,419 14,607 10,107 9,791 7,576
Germany (incl. DD from 1991) 45,822 39,700 44,258 38,394 38,322 41,389
Greece 2,822 845 769 1,875 478 888
Hungary 7,861 8,408 5,776 6,979 1,479 2,643
Ireland 1,868 1,228 404 198 58 424
Italy 60,153 60,480 43,061 43,527 35,651 30,681
Latvia 230 414 26 849 266 198
Lithuania 321 735 1,179 399 232 433
Luxembourg 0 582 35 0 0 0
Malta 1 7 0 3 17 2
Netherlands 708,055 673,760 634,206 584,625 570,078 524,464
Poland 1,803 1,297 2,282 5,266 14,772 55,504
Portugal 3,372 1,863 2,977 2,374 1,525 734
Romania 4,922 6,204 13,138 64,267 30,101 11,780
Slovakia 2 45 3 7 85 5
Slovenia 3,175 5,761 5,479 3,406 3,486 4,716
Spain 58,294 49,070 41,949 47,072 52,700 50,422
Sweden 1,462 1,631 2,503 1,220 432 505
United Kingdom 13,776 11,197 9,246 6,239 5,076 4,645
EU28 995,656 950,871 908,673 884,931 838,892 813,798
Source: EUROSTAT.
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Table C.10: Proportion of import of ‘other live plants’ per country
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Reporter country
Austria 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Belgium (and LUXBG -> 1998) 2.1% 2.3% 3.1% 3.2% 3.8% 4.0%
Bulgaria 0.4% 1.6% 2.9% 2.0% 2.9% 3.6%
Croatia 0.5% 0.5% 1.0% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4%
Cyprus 2.1% 2.0% 1.1% 0.7% 0.8% 0.3%
Czech Republic (CS->1992) 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Denmark 0.9% 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9%
Estonia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Finland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
France 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.1% 1.2% 0.9%
Germany (incl. DD from 1991) 4.6% 4.2% 4.9% 4.3% 4.6% 5.1%
Greece 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Hungary 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.8% 0.2% 0.3%
Ireland 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Italy 6.0% 6.4% 4.7% 4.9% 4.2% 3.8%
Latvia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Lithuania 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Luxembourg 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Malta 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Netherlands 71.1% 70.9% 69.8% 66.1% 68.0% 64.4%
Poland 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 1.8% 6.8%
Portugal 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1%
Romania 0.5% 0.7% 1.4% 7.3% 3.6% 1.4%
Slovakia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Slovenia 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6%
Spain 5.9% 5.2% 4.6% 5.3% 6.3% 6.2%
Sweden 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
United Kingdom 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Source: EUROSTAT.
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Table C.11: Area of production of blueberries in the EU in hectares
Area of production (ha) of blueberries in the EU
2007 2008 2010 2014
Country
Austria NA NA NA 86
Belgium NA NA NA NA
Bulgaria NA NA NA NA
Croatia NA NA NA NA
Cyprus NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic NA NA NA NA
Denmark 20 20 24 30
Estonia NA NA NA 60
Finland NA NA NA NA
France 328 340 360 416
Germany 1,781 2,050 2,146 2,316
Greece NA NA NA NA
Ireland NA NA NA 22
Italy 219 243 275 472
Latvia NA NA NA 70
Lithuania NA NA NA 70
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA
Hungary NA NA NA NA
Malta NA NA NA NA
Netherlands 235 243 259 700
Poland 2,713 2,794 3,158 3,740
Portugal 130 134 194 470
Romania NA NA NA 140
Slovenia NA NA NA NA
Slovakia NA NA NA NA
Spain 757 850 1,053 1,824
Sweden 32 32 36 44
United Kingdom NA NA NA 380
NA: Not available.
Source: USHBC Report 2014.
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Table C.12: Area of production of blueberries in the Europe in hectares
Area of production (ha) of blueberries in the EU
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Country
Bulgaria 17 16 15 15 14
Denmark 38 44 46 53 55
France 2,640 2,455 2,458 2,402 2,490
Germany 1,429 1,434 1,835 2,031 2,083
Italy 174 174 175 176 176
Latvia 600 1,000 1,000 1,440 1,400
Lithuania 3,000 2,700 2,600 2,600 2,200
Netherlands 535 584 586 574 639
Norway 23 25 23 25 22
Poland 2,167 2,404 3,126 3,223 3,470
Romania 372 361 280 334 310
Russian Federation 500 500 500 500 500
Sweden 4,470 4,700 5,000 4,675 4,655
Switzerland 46 55 66 73 73
Ukraine 200 200 150 150 150
Source: FAOSTAT, 14 February 2017.
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Table C.13: Area of production of cranberries in the EU in hectares
Area of production (ha) of cranberries in the EU
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Country
Austria NA NA NA NA NA
Belgium NA NA NA NA NA
Bulgaria 76 72 72 80 75
Croatia NA NA NA NA NA
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic NA NA NA NA NA
Denmark NA NA NA NA NA
Estonia NA NA NA NA NA
Finland NA NA NA NA NA
France NA NA NA NA NA
Germany NA NA NA NA NA
Greece NA NA NA NA NA
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA
Italy NA NA NA NA NA
Latvia 400 400 400 400 267
Lithuania NA NA NA NA NA
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA
Malta NA NA NA NA NA
Netherlands NA NA NA NA NA
Poland NA NA NA NA NA
Portugal NA NA NA NA NA
Romania 81 80 80 80 80
Slovenia NA NA NA NA NA
Slovakia NA NA NA NA NA
Spain NA NA NA NA 30
Sweden NA NA NA NA NA
United Kingdom NA NA NA NA NA
NA: Not available.
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.14: Projections of growth of EU blueberry production based on Brazelton Report 2014
Projections of growth of EU blueberry production
Millions of pounds tonnes
Year
2014 150 67,500
2015 180 81,000
2016 200 90,000
2017 220 99,000
2018 240 108,000
2019 280 126,000
Source: Brazelton Report 2014.
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Table C.15: Area of production of blueberries in the EU in hectares (historical and projection data)
2007 2008 2010 2014 2016(a) 2018(a) 2020(a)
Country
Austria NA NA NA 86 94 101 109
Belgium NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Bulgaria NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Croatia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Denmark 20 20 24 30 33 36 38
Estonia NA NA NA 60 65 71 76
Finland NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
France 328 340 360 416 441 466 491
Germany 1,781 2,050 2,146 2,316 2,469 2,621 2,774
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Ireland NA NA NA 22 24 26 28
Italy 219 243 275 472 544 617 689
Latvia NA NA NA 70 76 83 89
Lithuania NA NA NA 70 76 83 89
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Malta NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Netherlands 235 243 259 700 893 1,230 1,695
Poland 2,713 2,794 3,158 3,740 4,034 4,327 4,621
Portugal 130 134 194 470 621 911 1,338
Romania NA NA NA 140 153 165 178
Slovakia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Slovenia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Spain 757 850 1,053 1,824 2,778 3,572 4,594
Sweden 32 32 36 44 NA NA NA
United Kingdom NA NA NA 380 414 448 483
NA: Not available.
(a): Projection.
Source: USHBC Report 2014.
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Table C.16: Estimate of blueberry plant needs for Europe per year
2014(a) 2016(b) 2018(b) 2020(b)
Blueberry area 10,840 12,714 14,758 17,293
N. plants/ha 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Renewal of existing berry orchards (ha) – total/15 723 848 984 1,153
New berry orchards (ha) 800 937 1,022 1,268
Total new plantations (ha) 1,523 1785 2,006 2,420
Plants needed/year 4,568,000 5,354,156 6,017,573 7,261,156
(a): Base year.
(b): Projection.
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Table C.17: Production of blueberries in tonnes
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Country
Austria NA NA NA NA NA
Belgium 100 100 100 100 98
Bulgaria 90 96 NA NA NA
Croatia NA NA NA NA NA
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic NA NA NA NA NA
Denmark 47 54 57 34 35
Estonia NA NA NA NA NA
Finland NA NA NA NA NA
France 11,001 9,379 8,161 9,011 9,200
Germany 8,305 6,608 8,843 10,277 12,077
Greece NA NA NA NA NA
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA
Italy 1,620 1,632 1,643 1,655 1,667
Latvia 600 1,000 1,000 1,110 1,000
Lithuania 600 1,000 1,000 1,110 1,000
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA
Malta NA NA NA NA NA
Netherlands 600 1,000 1,000 1,110 1,000
Poland 9,195 8,595 11,251 12,731 12,469
Portugal 247 251 255 254 267
Romania 2,277 2,229 1,746 2,103 1,968
Slovakia NA NA NA NA NA
Slovenia NA NA NA NA NA
Spain 1,700 5,000 5,500 5,500 5,000
Sweden 2,550 2,600 3,000 2,733 2,675
United Kingdom NA NA NA NA NA
NA: Not available.
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.18: Production of cranberries in tonnes
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Country
Austria NA NA NA NA NA
Belgium 95 93 90 90 90
Bulgaria 90 96 NA NA NA
Croatia NA NA NA NA NA
Cyprus NA NA NA NA NA
Czech Republic NA NA NA NA NA
Denmark NA NA NA NA NA
Estonia NA NA NA NA NA
Finland NA NA NA NA NA
France 46 48 49 51 53
Germany NA NA NA NA NA
Greece NA NA NA NA NA
Hungary NA NA NA NA NA
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA
Italy NA NA NA NA NA
Latvia 976 791 676 618 617
Lithuania NA NA NA NA NA
Luxembourg NA NA NA NA NA
Malta NA NA NA NA NA
Netherlands NA NA NA NA NA
Poland NA NA NA NA NA
Portugal NA NA NA NA NA
Romania 642 639 549 621 563
Slovakia NA NA NA NA NA
Slovenia NA NA NA NA NA
Spain 100 100 100 100 100
Sweden NA NA NA NA NA
United Kingdom NA NA NA NA NA
NA: Not available.
Source: FAOSTAT.
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Table C.19: Surveillance results of Diaporthe vaccinii from EU member states
Country Crop Location
No. of inspected
companies/sites
No. of visual
inspections
No. of
samples
Positive
samples
Belgium Vaccinium corymbosum 23 (out of 31) companies with blue berry
fruit production (Vaccinium corymbosum)
23 14(a) 0
Netherlands Vaccinium Nursery 9 1 0
Vaccinium corymbosum Open ﬁeld 35 6 0
Vaccinium myrtillus Forest 72 20 0
Latvia Vaccinium plants (cranberries,
blueberries)
Vaccinium plants (cranberries, blueberries)
in nurseries, productions sites and marshes
60 53 3(b)
Czech
Republic
Vaccinium (European and
American cultivars)
Plants for planting of Vaccinium (European
and American cultivars) and in natural
vegetation of the entire territory of CZ.
Fruits on the market were also included in
the survey
76 22 0
Germany Vaccinium 21 fruit production of blueberries, twelve
private gardens, 19 nurseries and 26
garden centres
66 88 45 0
Poland Vaccinium myrtillus,
Vaccinium vitis-idaea,
Vaccinium corymbosum,
Vaccinum corymbosum,
Vaccinium ovatum,
Vaccinium angustifolium,
Vaccinium macrocarpon,
Vaccinum oxycoccos
455 4(c) 0
Sweden Vaccinum spp. Nurseries 90 6 0
Vaccinum spp. Garden Centres 100 11 0
Vaccinum spp. Other sites, berry producer – 2 0
Lithuania 53 24 0
(a):14 samples were collected from 12 companies.
(b): Two positive samples were found in cranberry production sites and one positive sample was found in blueberry production site.
(c): Samples were taken only from Vaccinium corymbosum.
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Table C.20: Areas with natural Vaccinium plants (in km2) in the EU Member States (based on the presence of V. myrtillus and V. vitis-idea)
Areas with natural Vaccinium plants
Country
AT Austria 51,453
BE Belgium 6,409
BG Bulgaria 22,612
CZ Czech Republic 26,291
DE Germany 98,566
DK Denmark 4,481
EE Estonia 26,418
ES Spain 60,147
FI Finland 267,272
FR France 96,657
GR Greece 1
HR Croatia 6,437
HU Hungary 431
IE Ireland 18,356
IT Italy 64,918
LT Lithuania 21,458
LU Luxembourg 916
LV Latvia 34,018
NL Netherlands 3,024
PL Poland 95,908
PT Portugal 170
RO Romania 47,005
SE Sweden 36,1784
SI Slovenia 8,708
SK Slovakia 11,022
UK United Kingdom 71,247
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Table C.21: Diaporthe vaccinii interceptions on consignments from third countries reported in EUROPHYT (data extracted from EUROPHYT, June 2014,
for 2016 data checked till (including) the week 39
Year Country Origin Intercepted commodity
Number of
interceptions
Volume of the
consignments (11)
pieces
Volume of the
intercepted part (12)
pieces
Volume of
contaminated part (13)
pieces
1996 Italy United States
of America
Vaccinium sp. (INTENDED
FOR PLANTING: NOT YET
PLANTED)
Table C.22: Current distribution of Diaporthe vaccinii n the risk assessment area, based on EPPO Global Database
Current situation Member state State
Absent, no pest record Austria
Absent, no pest record Belgium
Absent, pest eradicated Germany
Present, restricted distribution Latvia
Absent, pest eradicated Lithuania
Absent, pest eradicated Netherlands
Absent, pest eradicated Poland
Absent, pest no longer present Romania
Absent, pest no longer present United Kingdom
Absent, pest no longer present United Kingdom England
Absent, pest no longer present United Kingdom Scotland
Table C.23: Effectiveness of import inspections for scenarios A0 and A1
Effectiveness of phytosanitary measures or certiﬁcation schemes on pest abundance at import(a)
Quantile (percentile)
Reduction factor
Quantile (percentile)
Multiplier
A0-PW1 A1-PW1 A0-PW1 A1-PW1
Lower (1%) 0.4 0.4 Upper (99%) 0.6 0.6
Q1 (25%) 0.6 0.6 Q3 (75%) 0.4 0.4
Median (50%) 0.67 0.67 Median (50%) 0.33 0.33
Q3 (75%) 0.75 0.75 Q1 (25%) 0.25 0.25
Upper (99%) 0.9 0.9 Lower (1%) 0.1 0.1
(a): The assessment model uses a multiplier which is calculated as one minus the estimated effectiveness factor. A value for an upper quantile for effectiveness corresponds to a lower quantile for
the multiplier, and vice versa.
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Appendix D – Maps
Figure D.1: Blueberry cultivated areas in EU countries in 2014. Values are in ha. (Data source: US Highbush Blueberry Council report, 2015)
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The dotted area represents the potential occurrence of the two above listed species.
Figure D.2: Distribution of Vaccinium species (based on V. myrtillus and V. vitis-idea maps) in natural and semi-natural vegetation (based on Corine Land
Cover map)
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Figure D.3: Relative cover of Vaccinium species at NUTS 2 level (based on the map reported in Figure 3)
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Figure D.4: Suitability of climatological conditions for the potential establishment of D. vaccinii in Europe based on the MMF model. (Narouei-Khandan
et al., 2017). Lower values indicate lower risk
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Figure D.5: Suitability of climatological conditions for the potential establishment of D. vaccinii in Europe based on the MaxEnt model. (Narouei-Khandan
et al., 2017). Lower values indicate lower risk
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Figure D.6: Suitability of climatological conditions for the potential establishment of D. vaccinii in Europe at NUTS2 level, based on the combined risks
calculated with the correlative models MaxEnt and Multi-model Framework (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017)
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Figure D.7: Suitability of climatological conditions for the potential establishment of D. vaccinii in Europe at NUTS2 level, based on the combined risks
calculated with the correlative models MaxEnt and Multi-model Framework (Narouei-Khandan et al., 2017)
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Figure D.8: Locations where D. vaccinii has been detected in Europe. In blue are the locations where the pest has been eradicated, in red all the other
locations
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Figure D.9: EU regions used for the establishment assessment. The four regions are characterised by different level of climate suitability
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Appendix E – Sensitivity analysis
In the graphs reported in this appendix is shown the decomposition of the uncertainty for various
combinations of pathways and sub-steps. All these combinations refer to the A0 scenario.
As example, from the graph reported below, we can see that for the Entry of D. vaccinii-infected
blueberry plugs, the factor having the largest contribution to the overall uncertainty is
e1_plug_blue_HR that is the proportion of blueberry production ﬁelds infected with D. vaccinii in the
High-Risk countries. The second factor (N0_plug_blue_LR) is the number of plugs imported from the
Low-Risk countries (Figure E.1).
Rules for the interpretation of parameter names:
fruit = berry pathway
plug = plugs pathway
pot = potted plants and cuttings pathways
blue = blueberry
cran = cranberry
HR = High-Risk areas (as deﬁned in the PRA)
LR = Low-Risk areas (as deﬁned in the PRA)
N0, etc. = values (i.e. number of imported blueberry fruits) as deﬁned in the Appendix A
e1, e2, . . .., eX = parameters (i.e. Proportion of ﬁelds having D. vaccinii in the countries of origin
under A0) as deﬁned in the Appendix A.
Figure E.1: Example of sensitivity analysis
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Figure E.2: Sensitivity analysis
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Annex A – Diaporthe vaccinii @Risk ﬁle
Annex A can be found in the online version of this output (‘Supporting information’ section):
https://doi.org/onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4924/abstract
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